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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is an account of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) variations in firm level 
practices between two countries, France and the UK. This comparison is theoretically located 
in the comparative capitalism framework where the sampled countries differ substantially. 
This study confirms the existence of differences in CSR practices between these two 
countries and qualifies the nature and extent of these variations. UK companies appear more 
socially responsible than French companies, but the genuine character of this involvement is 
questioned. Besides, this study demonstrates how these differences are the results of a 
combined (but complex) effect of varieties of capitalism and firm level characteristics.  
 
The study of CSR involvement and antecedents is worth pursuing because the question of 
CSR and the role of companies are still debated. Should companies be only interested in 
maximising their profits for the sake of their shareholders following Friedman’s (1970) 
admonition? Or should they be more involved in the community, taking a greater part in 
solving societal problems? How far should they go in fighting global warming? In practice, 
companies have been held responsible for issues traditionally handled by the state, but not all 
of them engage in CSR (Gjølberg, 2009b; Kinderman, 2009). There is an increasing amount 
of companies engaging in CSR reporting and relying on sustainability jargon: sustainable, 
ethical, ethically sourced, environmentally friendly to name only a few. And yet, the last 
decade, for instance, has witnessed a global financial crisis, repeated business scandals 
(banking, tax, labour conditions, pays), rising inequalities in developed and developing 
countries, and worsened human-made global warming. So how are companies and national 
states behaving?   
 
This study contributes to the existing literature at several levels. It is a unique cross-country 
analysis of CSR antecedents and CSR practices between France and the UK. It is based on a 
quantitative multi-level analysis of its antecedents combining the impact of national 
institutions, companies’ characteristics and HR managers’ perceptions. The comparative CSR 
literature tends to study CSR antecedents one level at a time. This study fills in this gap by 
providing a global picture of CSR antecedents, rooted in two main strands of literature: the 
comparative capitalism literature, and the comparative CSR literature. The study offers 
insights on the separate and combined impact of varieties of capitalism and company 
characteristics on the nature of CSR practices. France and the UK are particularly interesting 
cases for this study since they present significant differences in their type of capitalism. The 
UK is traditionally characterised as a Liberal Market Economy. France provides a comparison 
case as it is a country which is difficult to categorise, and does not easily fall into the 
traditional liberal or coordinated market categories.  
 
Using a self-administered questionnaire, this study collected data from 162 respondents (95 
French and 67 UK). This study shows variations in CSR maturity between France and the 
UK, with UK companies showing a greater involvement in all aspect of CSR. Importantly, 
CSR should not be treated as a homogeneous concept rather it encompasses four components: 
compulsory CSR, customers, suppliers and philanthropy, and the environment. The study 
demonstrates that each component does not have the same antecedents. The variety of 
capitalism plays a role when it comes to the general level of CSR and its compulsory aspect, 
whereas the economic situation of the companies plays a crucial part in the other components. 
This study presents a novel finding regarding HR managers’ perception of CSR outcomes and 
rationale. While demonstrating the positive role of HR managers’ perceptions on CSR 
practices, French and UK managers exhibit a contradictory picture of CSR. The former 
believes in the benefits of CSR in terms of improving the bottom line. UK HR managers are 
not convinced that CSR is beneficial, but more importantly they trust their managers to 
engage in it for ethical reasons. Finally, this study advances theory explaining the differences 
in cross-country managers perceptions of CSR relying on the theory of relative deprivation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This study is an account of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) variations in firm level 
practices between two countries, France and the UK. This comparison is theoretically located 
in the comparative capitalism framework where the sampled countries differ substantially. 
This study confirms the existence of differences in CSR practices between these two 
countries and qualifies the nature and extent of these variations. UK companies appear more 
socially responsible than French companies, but the genuine character of this involvement is 
questioned. This study also demonstrates how these differences are the results of a combined 
and complex effect of varieties of capitalism and firm level characteristics.  
 
The study of CSR involvement and antecedents is worth pursuing because in the current era, 
the question of CSR and the role of companies are still debated. Should companies be only 
interested in maximising their profits for the sake of their shareholders following Friedman’s 
(1970) admonition? Or should they be more involved in the community, taking a greater part 
in solving societal problems? How far should they go in fighting global warming? In practice, 
companies have been held responsible for issues traditionally handled by the state, but not all 
of them engage in CSR (Gjølberg, 2009b; Kinderman, 2009). There is an increasing number 
of companies engaging in CSR reporting and relying on sustainability jargon: sustainable, 
ethical, ethically sourced, environmentally friendly, to name only a few. And yet, the last 
decade, for instance, has witnessed a global financial crisis, repeated business scandals 
(banking, tax, labour conditions, executive pay), rising inequalities in developed and 
developing countries, and worsening human-caused global warming. So how are companies 
and national states behaving?   
 
CSR is not a new concept; it can be dated back to the XIX century, where companies were 
giving money to various causes in the name of philanthropy. CSR should not be looked at for 
itself but rather in connection with the evolution of capitalism itself. The interest in CSR has 
fluctuated over the centuries on a par with the evolution of the economic system. One thing 
remains certain though: the interest in CSR has not died out, quite the opposite. Over the last 
decades, CSR has proved even more topical due to the recent evolutions of capitalism. No 
matter what CSR is called – and it has received many designations over the years – the crucial 
element is that it repeatedly questions the role of business. This question is at the core of 
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capitalism because the answer influences the direction of the economic system and the 
institutions created to support it.    
 
The election of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (UK) (1979) and Ronald Reagan in 
the United States of America (US) (1981), combined with the fall of the USSR and the 
opening of China to a market economy, marked a turning point in the history of capitalism 
with the victory and further expansion of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005). There are two major 
issues connected to that movement. The first one is: have all economies become broadly neo-
liberal? And the second issue relates to the possible association between neoliberalism and a 
larger number of ethical scandals.  
Neoliberalism is an ideology suggesting that ‘human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the 
state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices’ 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 2). In Anglo-Saxon countries, that ideology has led to the rise of neo-liberal 
capitalism where markets dominate every aspect of people’s lives, where the state is 
considered with suspicion and profit-maximisation is the ultimate goal for companies. At the 
root of capitalism, for it to survive, capital accumulation needs to continue (Harvey, 2010). 
This ideology has rapidly spread across the world in parallel to globalisation with the opening 
of countries, free trade agreements, and free flow of goods and people. Despite its unrivalled 
presence, neo-liberal capitalism is contested due to its negative effects and is entitled by some 
as ‘Disaster Capitalism’ (Klein, 2014). In developing countries, for example, multinational 
companies (MNCs) have been accused of human rights violations, child labour and inhumane 
working conditions. In developed countries, inequalities between the 1% and the rest of the 
population have never been so acute (Piketty, 2013). Corporate scandals, elite excesses and 
the US-originated subprime crisis in 2008, leading to a severe economic crisis and austerity 
measures as a result, have resulted in increased anger towards the current economic system. 
The election of Trump in the US, Brexit, and far-right candidate Marine Le Pen accessing the 
second round of the French elections illustrate that anger and disenchantment. As if it was not 
enough, global warming and its consequences on our society and ultimate survival, add an 
extra-layer of distrust towards the efficiency of capitalism.  Klein does not hesitate to speak of 
a war between capitalism and the climate: ‘the battle is already under way, but right now 
capitalism is winning hands down. It wins every time the need for economic growth is used as 
the excuse for putting off climate action yet again, or for breaking emission reduction 
commitments already made’ (Klein, 2014, p. 22). 
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Since this study is situated in the comparative capitalism literature, examining the notion of 
institutions is necessary before presenting the objectives and scope of this study. 
 
 
1.1 The notion of institutions 
 
This thesis is not about institutions per se but relies a lot on the concept. Therefore, an initial 
clarification is necessary in order to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding in particular 
due to the abundant literature in this area.  However, given the wideness of institutional 
theory, the purpose of this discussion is not to be exhaustive but rather to indicate what makes 
an institution in the context of this research. 
 
Institutions and institutional theory is an old object of research (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991) 
and therefore has received numerous definitions depending on scholars’ school of research 
(Scott, 1987; Streeck and Thelen, 2009). Questioning the concept of institutions, its creation, 
development or more generally adopting an institutional perspective has taken place in 
various disciplines such as politics, sociology, economics and business (Morgan and 
Hauptmeier, 2014). Considering the complexity and broadness of the notion, the 
institutionalist field is not a homogeneous one. It is classically admitted that four main strands 
constitute it: rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Morgan and 
Hauptmeier, 2014). Depending on the chosen approach, the definition of institution 
necessarily differs.  It appears relevant for the study to examine the definitions provided as 
well as the approach adopted by each variant of institutionalism.  
 
Rational choice institutionalism originates in a branch of economics where individuals are 
considered as rational beings and their individual preferences are governed by the 
maximisation of their utility (Morgan and Hauptmeier, 2014). The rational choice school 
traditionally conceives institutions in two ways: an exogenous way and an endogenous one 
(Shepsle, 2006). The former can be exemplified by one of its most famous writers, Douglas 
North, who provided the following definition ‘institutions are the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both 
informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and 
formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)’ (North, 1991, p. 97). From this definition, 
it is clear that institutions consist of exogenous constraints on individual and corporate 
behaviours thought of in a game theoretic way (Shepsle, 2006). The other conception sees 
institutions still as rules of the game, but this time they are directly, endogenously, the 
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product of actors creating and implementing these rules themselves (Shepsle, 2006). 
Regardless of the exogenous or endogenous variation, rational choice institutionalism puts 
particular emphasis on private property rights, viewed as a key institution. 
 
Historical institutionalism, also known as ‘old institutionalism’, (as in the variety of 
capitalism approach, which will be presented in Chapter 2) draws to a varying degree on 
rational choice institutionalism notably in terms of path dependency, cost calculations 
(Morgan and Hauptmeier, 2014). Generally speaking, institutions are seen as ‘formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the polity or political economy’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938). However it 
adopts a different approach, less micro (i.e. centred on individual agents) and more macro 
(positioning at the national level) in order to understand the creation, continuation and 
evolution of institutions (Sanders, 2006). Institutions are conceived as the results of specific 
and unusual historical circumstances. ‘This attention to goals, collective action, outcomes, 
and persistence inevitably draws Historical Institutionalism to ideas, and ideas are different 
from the preferences or consciousness of rules which RC is concerned. Ideas are relational, 
and often embody normative a priori’ (Sanders, 2006, p. 42).  
Historical institutionalism despite an approach in direct opposition to rational choice 
institutionalism suffers as well from a lack of homogeneity and deploys its understanding of 
institutions over a wide spectrum. At one end of that spectrum, the variety of capitalism 
approach shares multiple aspects with rational choice institutionalism in its understanding of 
institutions whereas at the other end the path followed by Streeck and Thelen for instance 
offers more room to actors (Morgan and Hauptmeier, 2014). Thelen and Streeck (2009) 
define an institution based on its enforceable power. An institution must be an obligation that 
applies to everyone: ‘the institutions in which we are interested here are formalized rules that 
may be enforced by calling upon a third party. (…) it is the possibility of third-party 
enforcement that indicates whether a rule has legitimacy. As long as the breach of a rule or 
the violation of an expectation, informal or formal, leads to no more than a strategic response 
by the actors directly affected, we are dealing, not with an institution, but with a more or less 
voluntarily agreed social convention. We are dealing with an institution only if and to the 
extent that third parties predictably and reliably come to the support of actors whose 
institutionalized, and therefore legitimate, normative expectations have been disappointed’ 
(Streeck & Thelen 2009, p.106). What contrasts in this particular vision of institutions deals 
with the fact that individual preferences are not entirely pre-defined by institutions as other 
strands of historical institutionalism pretend (Morgan and Hauptmeier, 2014). ‘In other 
words, institutions do not determine preferences: they may shape them in significant ways but 
actors can project a different future, leading them to act in new ways. Actors can also review 
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the past, identify for themselves the origins of institutions in some specific set of conditions, 
and as a result decide, in the present, that these conditions no longer hold. They can therefore 
act, potentially successfully, against the inertial powers of existing institutions, creating new 
patterns of action’ (Morgan and Hauptmeier, 2014, p. 6). In a nutshell, the VoC approach and 
the one formulated by Streeck and Thelen encapsulate two opposite views of institutions: on 
the one hand institutions form individual preferences, on the other they are resources freely 
used by actors (Morgan and Hauptmeier, 2014). According to Morgan and Hauptmeier 
(2014), works such as Amable’s (2003) or Deeg and Jackson’s (2006; 2008) try to build the 
bridge between these two extremes by providing more attention to questions of politics and 
power. As an example, Amable (2003, p. 36) offers a more social and political definition of 
institutions: ‘Institutions will be defined as a set of rules that structure social interactions in 
particular ways. (…) Institutions are rules that provide information about how agents are 
expected to act in certain situations, and can be recognized by those who are members of the 
relevant group as the rules to which others conform in these situations. They structure the 
strategic choices of agents in such a way as to produce equilibrium outcomes’. In his 
definition, Amable (2003) distinguishes formal and informal rules based on their codification 
and the existence of compliance mechanisms. Both formal and informal rules may be 
institutionally embedded.  
 
The final (and relevant to this study) strand of institutional theory and the most recent is 
constructivist institutionalism, as explained by Schmidt (2010). This approach highlights the 
importance of discourses, ideas and their meaning in the understanding of institutional 
changes (Morgan and Hauptmeier, 2014). It relies on both concepts of path dependency and 
ideational dependency. As Hay explains ‘such a formulation implies a dynamic 
understanding of the relationship between institutions on the one hand, and the individuals 
and groups who comprise them (and on whose experience they impinge) on the other. It 
emphasises institutional innovation, dynamism, and transformation, as well as the need for a 
consideration of processes of change over a significant period of time’ (Hay, 2006, p. 65). 
 
As Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 955) conclude in their presentation of the first three 
institutionalism, ‘none of these literatures appears to be wrong-headed or substantially 
untrue. More often, each seems to be providing a partial account of the forces at work in a 
given situation or capturing different dimensions of the human action and institutional impact 
present there’. The same need for discussion between the first three institutionalisms can 
certainly be extended to the last one, namely constructivist institutionalism.  
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Based on this short presentation of the different strands of institutionalism, this research 
follows Amable’s (2003, p. 36) definition where ‘institutions are rules that provide 
information about how agents are expected to act in certain situations, and can be recognized 
by those who are members of the relevant group as the rules to which others conform in these 
situations. They structure the strategic choices of agents in such a way as to produce 
equilibrium outcomes’. The advantage of this definition is that it connects two separate 
visions of institutions: on one hand institutions seen as resources and on the other institutions 
as forming individual preferences. The second advantage of this definition is that it 
acknowledges the role played by politics and power between actors in their relation to 
institutions.  
 
From an empirical perspective, one might ask which institutions such a study should 
concretely examine. The institutions that matter are located at three distinct levels: state level, 
including for instance governments, legal systems, welfare systems, and educational systems; 
market levels, covering firms, networks and associations; and at the social, cultural level, 
encompassing aspects of religion, families and communities. This study will focus on the 
national level institutions, the ones identified in the making of a variety of capitalism by the 
comparative capitalism literature (as defined in Chapter 2). 
 
1.2 Objectives and scope of the study 
 
The degree of involvement of companies in CSR is the topic of this study. More specifically, 
this study is a cross-country analysis of CSR practices between two countries: France and the 
UK.  It aims to contribute to the understanding of CSR practices and differences in CSR 
involvement between these two countries. As will be explained in further detail in Chapter 2, 
the choice of France and the UK is not trifling.  By trying to understand better the variations 
in CSR involvement and practices, two main lines of explanation are examined: the impact of 
national institutions and the impact of companies’ characteristics.  
  
In order to accomplish its goals, the study focuses on the following main research questions:  
• What types of CSR practices do we observe in French and UK companies? Are they 
different or do we observe a homogenisation of CSR practices? 
• What is the impact of key institutional features on CSR practices? Do they differ 
between France and the UK? 
• What is the impact of key companies’ characteristics on CSR practices? Do they 
differ between France and the UK?  
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Figure 1.1 presents the model investigated in this study, namely the combined role played by 
the institutional environment and companies’ characteristics on CSR practices. The following 
chapters focus on particular aspects of this figure.  
It should be noted that national institutions and companies have an effect on each other as 
suggested by the double-headed arrow between them. Even though this study is not primarily 
focused on the connection between them, the link is acknowledged. We also appreciate the 
way in which CSR practices in turn can affect national institutions and companies. However, 
this aspect is far beyond the focus of this project and will not be touched upon. 
 
The model investigated in this study relies on a quantitative analysis combining primary and 
secondary data. Secondary data is necessary to quantify country-level institutions to qualify 
the French and UK varieties of capitalism. Primary data is needed for the investigation of 
CSR practices, their determinants and firm level characteristics. A bespoke survey was 
created for that purpose. 
	  
 
Figure 1.1 Research model  
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This study adds to the existing literature in several ways.   
From a theoretical perspective, this study provides a multi-level approach of CSR antecedents 
analysing the impact of institutional factors combined with companies’ characteristics. It aims 
at gaining a better understanding of CSR antecedents, which have not been studied 
holistically i.e. combining several levels of analysis.   
In the comparative CSR literature, there are many theoretical studies of the potential impact 
of the institutional framework on CSR practices (Jackson, 2005; Matten and Moon, 2008; 
Gjølberg, 2009b; Kinderman, 2009). This literature is essentially theoretical, empirical studies 
(such as this one) that measure the impact of institutional factors on CSR practices are 
missing. Furthermore, this literature is divided between two understandings of the relation 
between CSR and institutions. As Chapter 2 will explain, CSR is either seen as a mirror of the 
national institutions or it is viewed as a complement to them (Jackson, 2005; Matten and 
Moon, 2008; Gjølberg, 2009b; Kinderman, 2009). This study will shed some light on that 
debate, helping clarify the connection of CSR with the institutional framework.  
 
From an empirical perspective, prior studies on CSR practices – in the comparative CSR 
literature and in the country-specific CSR literature – are for the most part US-centred 
(Garriga and Melé, 2004; Berthoin Antal and Sobczak, 2007). This research provides an 
empirical study of France and puts it in perspective with the UK. Many authors, in particular 
the regulationists, have indeed battled to develop a good taxonomy for French capitalism.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis contains a total of seven chapters and is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a 
review of the literature this research engages with, in particular the literature connecting CSR 
and national institutions, and the literature connecting CSR and companies’ characteristics. 
Chapter 3 discusses the method used in this thesis. Because it is a quantitative analysis of 
CSR practices, primary and secondary data are needed to characterise both national 
institutions and company characteristics. This chapter elaborates on the data collection and 
the survey used for this purpose. Chapter 4 provides the first step in the analysis by exploring 
the existence of differences in CSR practices between France and the UK. The following 
chapter (Chapter 5) provides explanations to these differences by assessing the combined 
effect of national institutions and companies’ characteristics. Chapter 6 adds another layer to 
the analysis by investigating the way HR managers - whose actions will have a direct effect 
on a central internal stakeholder, employees - view the role of CSR and its rationale. The 
thesis ends with Chapter 7, which summarises the main findings of the study, its limitations 
	 10	
and suggests avenues for future research. Two appendices contain the questionnaire used to 
collect data, one in English and one in French. A third one contains complementary 
regression tables.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This is a study of comparative CSR from a comparative capitalism perspective. Pinpointing 
and characterising the impact of a type of capitalism and company characteristics on CSR 
practices requires a thorough investigation of two strands of literature: the comparative 
capitalism literature, and the comparative CSR literature. Nevertheless, the goal of this 
literature review cannot be to review both literatures in their entirety, as it would go beyond 
the scope of this study. What is of interest in this undertaking is to grasp how national 
economies in general, and the United-Kingdom and France in particular, are analysed and 
compared in order to evaluate the specificities of the UK and French variety of capitalism and 
its likely impact on CSR practices. The aim is not to produce another analysis of varieties of 
capitalism but to enlighten CSR practices from a comparative capitalism perspective.  
 
The rationale behind this aim is twofold. First of all, France and the UK embody different 
varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Clift, 2004b). Therefore, one 
may consider whether these differences in the type of capitalism have an impact on CSR 
practices. But recognising that France and the UK exhibit different types of capitalism is not 
sufficient in order to better understand CSR practices. We need to unveil the impact of 
national institutional features on CSR practices, or put differently, the connections between 
national institutions and CSR practices.  
Secondly, the UK and France benefit from an uneven research treatment. While the UK is the 
object of numerous studies, French capitalism suffers from a lower level of attention due 
mainly to the changes over the last decades rendering its model more complex to grasp. For 
the studies that actually focus on France, the analysis leads to contradictory conclusions as 
scholars consider France either as a liberal market economy in the making, a more 
coordinated market economy, or a new type of state organised capitalism. Such uncertainty 
does not affect the UK, as scholars indisputably agree that it presents all the characteristics of 
a liberal market economy. From a research perspective, the diversity of analysis cannot be 
satisfactory and demonstrates that the French model is, so far, not well captured by the 
literature. A clearer picture of the French model is missing. Therefore, this study may 
enlighten the classification of the French type of capitalism while looking at it with a CSR 
lens. For that matter, the comparative capitalism paradigm provides a helpful tool for 
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comparing national institutional arrangements, which highlights and emphasises similarities, 
specificities and differences as well as evolutions from one model to another. 
Finally, it may also be argued that national institutions are not the only factors or 
determinants of CSR behaviours (Fransen, 2013). In other words, the impact on CSR 
practices should not only be looked at from an institutional perspective but also take into 
account the firm level perspective with aspects of company size (Brammer and Millington, 
2006), corporate governance (Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013) or industry (Ziegler, Schröder and Rennings, 2007; Block and Wagner, 
2010). Combining this analysis with one at the company level presents the advantage of 
cumulating two levels of analysis: the macro level (state level) and the micro level (company 
level). Companies, influenced by national institutions, keep some margin of action or at least 
interpretation when it comes to behaviours in general, and CSR in particular. The cumulative 
relations between institutions and companies’ actions or agency should not be ignored for that 
reason. Consequently, considering the antecedents of CSR measures at the firm level plays a 
significant role in this study. What favours or hinders the adoption of CSR measures at the 
firm level may also have an impact on CSR practices.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the main strands of the 
comparative capitalism literature, presented with a particular emphasis on how this literature 
analyses the cases of France and the UK. In the second section, the focus is on the 
comparative CSR literature, including a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. The last 
section is dedicated to the study of CSR antecedents at the firm level.  
 
 
2.2 The comparative capitalism literature 
 
The study of national economic systems is not a novel academic research pathway. Research 
in this domain has been going on for the last forty years at least, with scholars embracing 
various types of approaches from economics (Porta, Lopez-de-silanes and Shleifer, 2008), to 
political science (Hall, 1986; Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001). In this 
study, we are interested in characterising the French and the UK national economies resting 
on the comparative capitalism framework as a preliminary approach in order to reach a better 
understanding of its impact on CSR practices in a second step. There has been no unique 
answer to that query, insofar as the French case appears more difficult to grasp than the UK 
one. As noted the diversity of approaches leads to contrasting analysis of France, considered 
either as a liberal market economy in the making or a more coordinated market economy 
(Hancké, 2001; Amable, 2003; Goyer and Jung, 2011). The UK, on the other hand, presents a 
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rather straightforward case for it unequivocally fits the liberal market economy category (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003). The difficulty comes therefore from the French case and 
its patchy consideration, which calls for a more in-depth investigation.  
 
Before examining in detail how France and the UK are depicted and analysed, it is necessary 
to start with a general review of the comparative capitalism framework and the terms of the 
debate. The manner in which France and the UK are examined is directly dependent on the 
strengths, weaknesses and limitations of the comparative capitalism literature. In light of this 
literature, the cases of France and the UK are then developed.  
 
2.2.1 The terms of the debate: the comparative capitalism framework 
 
For more than a decade, the comparative political economy literature, as well as the 
comparative economics literature, have strived to explain the differences in national systems 
and its impact on countries’ economic performance (Jackson and Deeg, 2006). Numerous 
theories have arisen yielding various narratives to explain the observed differences and 
similarities between political economies. The comparative political economy literature as well 
as the comparative economics literature have acknowledged the impact and role of 
institutions on economic performance while adopting opposite perspectives (Djankov et al., 
2003; Deeg and Jackson, 2006). The comparative economics focus is ‘on how institutions 
help secure property rights’ (Jackson and Deeg, 2006, p. 6) together with issues of handling 
disorder, dictatorship and institutional efficiency, while the comparative capitalism literature 
investigates the link between institutions and individual or corporate behaviours (Djankov et 
al., 2003; Jackson and Deeg, 2006). Consequently, the comparative capitalism literature 
appears to be more relevant and insightful to qualify and to measure the links between 
national institutional frameworks and corporate behaviours regarding a particular corporate 
phenomenon, such as CSR, than the comparative economics literature. In other words, the 
question is not about the general features of each national system but deals with the direct and 
indirect link between the French and British national settings and local implementations of 
CSR activities and outcomes.  Indeed, the comparative capitalism framework facilitates 
connecting these two levels of analysis: the macro level where institutions operate and the 
micro level where firms are engaged in economic activities.  
 
After the fall of both the Berlin wall in 1989 and the socialist model embodied by the USSR, 
some scholars believed for a moment that history would come to an end and that we would 
witness the hegemony of the American model of capitalism (Fukuyama, 1992). However, this 
depiction of the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century is far from the truth. It 
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cannot be ignored that globalisation and the creation of regional organisations such as the 
European Union may have a significant and long-lasting impact in terms of homogenising 
countries, their institutions, economic practices and potentially culture. Despite these 
powerful forces, the issue of how many varieties of capitalism exist is still a central one that 
occupies many economic, political and academic debates. Put differently, it boils down to the 
following query: are we facing a homogenisation of political economies towards a single 
model or are we observing the conservation of national specificities? Behind that question lies 
a heated debate on economic performance and growth sustainability. In other words, as long 
as we observe differences among national economic performances with countries performing 
much better than their neighbours, is this (relative) success rooted in specific national 
institutional arrangements? Moreover, can the success of one model be copied and 
implemented by other countries? This debate about homogenisation is paramount for our 
topic in the sense that the impact on CSR practices should be different dependent on whether 
France and the UK display a similar or dissimilar model of capitalism. However before even 
considering the impact on CSR, it is necessary to first consider whether France and the UK 
present a similar or dissimilar model of capitalism. 
From a general perspective, this query is relatively easily answered in the current literature. 
The existence of multiple political economies is widely accepted by scholars even though 
some authors still claim the supremacy of one model over the others, namely the supremacy 
of the American liberal model (Panitch and Gindin, 2005). In this perspective, globalisation 
has been blamed for establishing and reinforcing the domination of the American model of 
capitalism, which is a model of liberal market economy, over all the others (Deeg and 
Jackson, 2006). Does that mean that studying varieties of capitalism is pointless? It is not. 
The study of the variety of capitalism is still relevant today as convergence towards this 
unique capitalist model seems unlikely: diversity among countries remains and is likely to 
grow even stronger based on specific institutional arrangements and national comparative 
advantages (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Boyer, 2002b, 2005b). Furthermore, much of the 
comparative capitalism literature is very focused on coordinated markets. This means that 
problems with liberal markets are often neglected. Given the ongoing nature of systemic 
change - and entropy- we therefore still need to demonstrate where France and the UK are 
presently located in the varieties of capitalism framework , between the LME, CME, 
(possibly deregulating) étatisme and compensating state categories (Hancké, Rhodes and 
Thatcher, 2007). 
In order to classify countries based on their model of capitalism, the comparative capitalism 
scholarship has looked at and compared national economies in different ways following 
contrasting methodological approaches. Most of the theories explore varieties of capitalism in 
terms of ideal types to contrast with real cases that are then ordered among these ideal types. 
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Others observe empirical cases to deduce ideal categories (Amable, 2003; Crouch, 2009; 
Streeck and Thelen, 2009). Both positions suffer from obvious limitations that are discussed 
later. The diversity of approaches also comes from the fact that authors do not necessarily 
identify the same institutional areas and factors. And even if they do, they tend to disagree on 
the linkages or complementarities between institutions leading to many typologies (Deeg and 
Jackson, 2006). Beyond this diversity of approaches among its various strands, the 
comparative capitalism literature has widened its analysis over the years. From a rather static 
description of institutions and then models, some authors gradually introduced dynamic 
elements, in particular with a reflexion on institutional and model change (Deeg and Jackson, 
2006; Hall and Thelen, 2009). Such an evolution might prove helpful to capture countries like 
France, which has undergone critical changes over the last decades.  
Though very broad, this literature adopts a particular stance as it concentrates on the relations 
between the firm’s actions and a specific national institutional framework (Wood, Dibben and 
Ogden, 2014). Constrained by the shortness of this literature review, we focus on two main 
strands of the comparative capitalism literature, to wit the varieties of capitalism approach 
and the regulation approach. Albeit acknowledging a link between firms’ behaviours and the 
national framework where they operate, each approach emphasizes different explanatory 
variables and highlights different core institutions.  
 
2.2.1.1 The Varieties of Capitalism approach  
 
Initiated by Hall and Soskice (2001) with their seminal book ‘Varieties of Capitalism’, the 
VoC approach, as developed in the introduction of the book, orients its analysis on the firm 
and its presence in various markets (product market, labour market, financial market) 
(Hancké, 2009). Such a level of analysis contrasts with previous studies, which tended to 
position themselves at the macro-level. Hall and Soskice’s analysis is considered as a 
landmark in the comparative capitalism literature and cannot therefore be ignored.  
The VoC approach draws extensively from historical institutionalism, itself inspired by 
rational choice institutionalism, as it relies on common concepts, as well as on a rather 
determinist view of institutions (Morgan and Hauptmeier, 2014). The initial function of VoC 
is to explain differences in firms’ competitiveness and strategies. In that respect, the firm is 
viewed at the centre of a web of economic and social relations (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Firms in other words do not operate in a vacuum, they are embedded in a specific 
environment where information is essential to perform their economic activities. Obtaining 
the correct information is therefore crucial and intricate and may be the source of 
asymmetries of information (Hancké, 2009). Firms are embedded in an institutional 
framework allowing, or restraining, coordination mechanisms in five essential areas (Hall and 
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Soskice, 2001). These areas are: industrial relations; vocational training and education; 
corporate governance; inter-firm relations; inner-firm relations (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Depending on the coordination mechanisms put in place, Hall and Soskice (2001) divide 
national systems into two ideal types: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated-
market economies (CMEs). The authors do not favour one model over the other; both models 
are believed to be equally economically efficient (Amable and Palombarini, 2009). They 
represent typical cases of institutional arrangements and complementarities in the search for 
competitiveness. In LMEs, “firms coordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and 
competitive market arrangements” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 8). On the other hand, firms in 
CMEs ”depend more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate their endeavours 
with other actors and to construct their core competencies” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 8). 
For instance, LMEs are characterized by stock market systems of finance, short-term relations 
with employees, inter-firms arms-lengths relations, whereas CMEs favour a bank-based 
financial system, long-term relationships with employees, and cross-shareholdings 
(Culpepper, 2008).   
Each model, whether it is an LME or a CME, is strictly organised around three fundamental 
concepts: path dependency, institutional complementarities and comparative institutional 
advantage (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Path dependency is not a new concept; Hall and Soskice 
(2001) borrowed it from the traditional institutional theory literature. The concept of path 
dependency builds bridges between previous institutional forms and arrangements within 
political economies and their current form. Put differently, the notion of path dependency 
limits the options of a country in terms of institutional changes, as the country is very likely to 
remain on the path inherited from past institutional arrangements.   
The notion of complementarities comes from economics and the relations between two goods. 
Applied to institutional arrangements, ‘two institutions can be said to be complementary if the 
presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other. The 
returns from a stock market trading in corporate securities, for instance, may be increased by 
regulations mandating a fuller exchange of information about companies’ (Hall and Soskice, 
2001, p. 18). In other words, complementary institutions are supposed to improve national 
economic performance. Yet, Hall (2005) warns that institutional complementarity does not 
provide an answer to the question of institutional creation and evolution. One of the 
difficulties of the concept of complementary institutions lies in the fact that most of the time 
complementarities are discovered afterwards (Hall, 2005; Streeck, 2005). Institutions were 
not created for the specific reason they are complementary and therefore to voluntarily 
increase the overall economic performance. Complementarities may not come out entirely 
randomly but they are at least the results of institutional trials and failures. The last core 
concept connecting the VoC approach deals with comparative institutional advantage. 
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Ricardian in its wording, it is the result of institutional complementarities and reflects the idea 
that countries become more efficient at specific production activities based on their 
institutional combinations. ‘Firms can perform some types of activities, which allow them to 
produce some kinds of goods, more efficiently than others because of the institutional support 
they receive for those activities in the political economy, and the institutions relevant to these 
activities are not distributed evenly across nations’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 37). In 
support to their theory, Hall and Soskice provide the example of innovation that would differ 
based on the mode of coordination. Firms in LMEs would therefore come up with radical 
innovations whereas firms located in CMEs would tend to produce incremental innovations 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). This positive account of institutional complementarities has 
nonetheless been softened by recognising that complementarities can also be the result of 
flawed or weak institutions (Lane and Wood, 2009). Similarly, Lane and Wood (2009) argue 
that sets of institutions may co-exist within a national institutional setting without displaying 
specific complementary.  
 
The VoC approach is considered as a milestone in the socio-economic analysis of capitalism 
models and provides crucial guidelines for the analysis of France and the UK. It is 
nonetheless not the first research project that questions the reasons for the varieties of 
capitalism. From the 1970s, the regulation approach has also tried in a second wave of 
research agenda to provide an account for the diversity of national economies by adopting 
another perspective and initially situating its research ambition in Althusserian discourses 
(Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997). The comparison of the two approaches will enrich our 
understanding of France and the UK.   
 
2.2.1.2 The Regulation approach 
 
The regulation approach, contrary to its UK translation (which would suggest formal 
laws/regulations), is concerned with modes of capitalist production and social relations. It is 
not only about regulation in the sense of rules, but also informal conventions (Jessop, 2001; 
Boyer, 2002b). As opposed to the VoC approach, the regulation approach adopts a macro-
level perspective on institutions. Opposed to the theoretical foundations of neoclassical 
economics and in particular its assumption of homogeneity, regulationists believe that 
economic actors are situated within a specific type of framework, defined by its institutions, 
rules and conventions (Aglietta, 2000). The regulation approach gravitates around three main 
concepts of increasing levels of abstraction: modes of regulation, accumulation regimes and 
institutional forms (Boyer, 2002b). Aglietta (2000) provides a complementary wording where 
the institutional forms are depicted as mediation tools between individuals and society.  
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Modes of regulation, a concept holding up the whole theory, are analysed from a comparative 
historical and geographical perspective. In other words, modes of regulation are embedded in 
historical institutional arrangements that determine the way modes of production and social 
relations take place (Boyer, 2002b). Boyer defines more specifically a mode of regulation as 
‘a construct comprising all the individual and collective procedures and behaviours that 
reproduce basic social relationships, guide active growth regimes, and ensure the accounting 
of a myriad of decentralized decisions – without actors necessarily being aware of these 
system-wide adjustment principles’ (Boyer, 2005b, p. 512). As highlighted by Aglietta 
(1999), a mode of regulation is deeply embedded into national identities, explaining why a 
similar growth regime entails various modes of regulation across countries. National identities 
mirror local beliefs, symbols, and values.  
 
Regulation theory was originally a temporal theory focused on capitalism’s stages before 
introducing an element of scale (Boyer, 2005b). Initially the regulation approach exclusively 
explored the Fordist mode of regulation as Aglietta (1979) forcefully demonstrated in his 
thesis ‘A Theory of Capitalist Regulation’, which takes the example of the United-States to 
characterise the Fordist mode of regulation.  This analysis of the United States was quickly 
followed by an analysis of the French system. Regulationists soon realised that not only are 
there various Fordist modes of regulation but also different institutional arrangements 
triggering a variety of institutional regimes (Boyer, 2005b). As Regulation theory 
concentrates on five explanatory variables or institutional forms, namely “the wage-labour 
nexus, the forms of competition, international relations, money, and public authorities” 
(Amable, 2003, p. 75), regulationists elaborate dissimilar varieties of capitalism than the VoC 
approach. Although the explanatory variables are quite close to the VoC ones, the regulation 
approach comes up with very different conclusions. Regulationists look at national 
institutional coordination with a wider perspective allowing more institutional combinations 
to take place. For instance, the market is not considered as the only coordination mechanism 
that could function alone. The other institutions are as necessary as the market (Boyer, 
2002b). For instance, the state, whose role is almost entirely ignored by the VoC approach, 
can be another useful coordination mechanism. Its role should not be theorised in pure 
opposition to the market coordination; on the contrary, they both work together. Among the 
five institutional forms, a particular emphasis is placed on the labour market institutions as 
well as the national systems of social protection (Boyer, 2005b). As the institutional forms 
considered are wider and more inclusive, the forms of coordination envisaged are themselves 
also more numerous. Besides the classical state and market coordination mechanisms, they 
include lay networks, alliances and communities. 
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The regulation approach usually agrees on at least four models of capitalism, namely market-
led, meso-corporatist, social democrat and state-led capitalism (Boyer, 2005b). Countries 
belong to the same category if they have in common the ‘same regulation mode and 
accumulation regime’ (Boyer, 2005a, p. 521) highlighting the linkages between institutional 
arrangements and economic performance. The market-led category covers principally English 
speaking countries such as the United-States and the United-Kingdom, where the mechanisms 
of coordination are mainly market-oriented. Continental Europe countries, such as France and 
Germany, tend to belong to the state-driven capitalism category, as the role of the state is 
predominant in coordinating economic activities.  
 
Two elements contribute particularly to the specificity and relevance of regulation theory. 
First in trying to explain changes over time, they assume that variability is an inherent 
characteristic of modes of regulation (Boyer, 2002a). As Aglietta (2000, p. 62) states clearly, 
‘capitalism is a force for change that has no inherent regulatory principles’. Changes are 
mainly considered as endogenous contrary to the assumptions of institutional stability and 
exogeneity displayed in the VoC approach. They provide a classification of the possible types 
of crisis giving less emphasis on ‘exogenous or cyclical crisis’ (Boyer and Saillard, 2002, p. 
43). On the contrary, endogenous crisis, that is a crisis rooted within a specific mode of 
regulation, are analysed depending on their seriousness and their ability to transform the 
mode of regulation. Second, they admit the role of politics in the diversity of capitalism 
(Boyer, 2005b). Politics, in the form of social struggles and conflicts, is believed to impact on 
the formation of institutional displays, rejecting any form of determinism. The types of 
struggles and their impact differ from one country to another, from one institutional 
arrangement to another. There is space left for politics to play a role as regulation theory adds 
to the well-known institutional complementarity, extensively present in the VoC approach, an 
aspect of institutional hierarchy. The predominance of one institution over another is the 
result of political struggle (Boyer, 2002b). 
 
Although drawing on the regulationist tradition and combining it with historical 
institutionalism (Wood and Wilkinson, 2014), Amable (2003) goes a step further with a social 
systems approach. The name social systems is not new though as it was borrowed from a 
1997 study by Boyer and Hollingsworth (Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997). Instead of starting 
with ideal models and then examining institutional arrangements and complementarities, he 
focuses on institutions and their complementarities. From comparing a broad range of social 
and economic indicators leading to a cluster analysis, he derives the existence of five types of 
capitalism. The institutional areas under scrutiny are: ‘product-market competition; the wage-
labour nexus and labour-market institutions; the financial intermediation sector and 
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corporate governance; social protection and the Welfare State; and the education sector’ 
(Amable, 2003, p. 14). The five types of capitalism are: 
● the market-based model 
● the social-democratic model 
● the Continental European model 
● the Mediterranean model  
● the Asian model 
 
This approach is praised by Crouch and considered as  ‘by far the best and most sophisticated 
approach to a ‘post-dualist’ typology’ (Crouch, 2009, p. 88) based on ‘a genuinely scientific 
approach’ (Crouch, 2009, p. 89). One could argue though that as Amable derived his 
categories from a cluster analysis of a range of societal features, it is more descriptive than 
meta-theoretical. 
 
Finally, Amable and Palombarini (2009) also support the need to introduce political factors in 
the apprehension of varieties of capitalism and its changes. Institutions are viewed as the 
results of political compromises between unequal actors fighting for different needs, contrary 
to a dominant vision in the comparative capitalism literature that conceptualises institutions as 
the product of rational equal actors (Jackson and Deeg, 2006).  
 
2.2.2 Limitations of the comparative capitalism approach 
 
Despite its innovative and encompassing character in appraising national systems, the 
comparative capitalism literature has been accused of shortcomings and vagueness in its 
analysis. In relation to the present topic, three general criticisms are of particular interest and 
must inform the analysis of France and the UK. The first one deals with the notion of variety 
itself and questions the rationale behind any type of classification. The second challenges a 
specific aspect of this literature, namely its theorisation of institutional changes. Even though 
this study is not a study of change, we cannot ignore this aspect as France has undertaken so 
many institutional changes in the last decades, which need to be accounted for. The way the 
comparative capitalism literature captures change is then relevant as depending on its 
definition of change, theories might analyse differently where France stands today. The last 
general criticism touches the level of analysis. The comparative capitalism literature has 
regularly been accused of neglecting lower and sub-levels of analysis, in order to measure the 
impact of the local, regional level or the impact of the European Union and globalisation 
more generally. We conclude with remarks specifically targeted at the VoC approach as it has 
attracted over the years a greater part of these criticisms.   
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How many varieties? 
 
The first difficulty with comparative capitalisms’ theories lies in the classification itself. What 
would be considered as an accurate, relevant classification? In other words, a typology 
distinguishing two types, such as the VoC approach, can be accused of being too general and 
unable to capture the variety of national economies.  Where can a fine line be drawn between 
a too general and a too specific classification? Crouch (2009) for instance highlights the limits 
of a dual system of political economies. As explained by Howell (2003), a dual approach such 
as the VoC approach has difficulties dealing with countries such as France, Italy or Spain as 
the divide between LME and CME does not apply to them. The limitations inherent in a dual 
typology, force scholars to come up with theoretical plasters in order to cover what they call 
hybrid countries. As an example, Hall and Soskice (2001) come up with a third model of 
capitalism, entitled ‘Mediterranean’ countries. Although valuing the try, Howell (2003) finds 
the effort not convincing enough. Pontusson (2005) is even more disparaging when he 
strongly questions the relevance of grouping Germany, Japan or Sweden in the same CME 
group. By only looking at labour unions in these three countries, the classification is deemed 
nonsensical. Behind this example, Pontusson (2005) raises the argument whether the mere 
existence of two ideal types pushes countries to be grouped together only because they cannot 
fit the other group.  
At the other end of the spectrum, a taxonomy of dozens of political economies would ruin the 
initial advantage of any type of classification to understand and compare systems. A 
classification, containing as many groups as there are countries, would lose any explanatory 
power. Some authors opted for middle-way classifications, recognising on average from three 
to eight varieties of capitalism. As an illustration, Schmidt’s (2002a) categorisation is 
grounded on business, industrial and state relations, which distinguishes three varieties of 
capitalism: market capitalism, managed capitalism and state capitalism. These models are 
respectively epitomised by the UK, Germany and France in Europe. In another vein, business 
systems, developed by Whitley (1999), articulated around eight features, such as governance 
aspects or coordination within and across firms, yields eight ideal-types namely fragmented 
business systems, project network systems, industrial districts, financial conglomerate, 
integrated conglomerate, compartmentalised system, collaborative system and highly 
coordinated system.  
Beyond the very number of models, building up a classification may induce a methodological 
problem as highlighted by Crouch (2009). He argues that as Hall and Soskice try to construct 
ideal types, they pick up empirical characteristics that will later on match their ideal types. In 
other words, ‘the authors are not building their theory deductively, but are reading back 
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empirical detail from what they want to be their paradigm case of an LME – the USA- into 
their formulation of the type’(Crouch, 2009, p. 83).  
 
These criticisms do not entail any theoretical consequences in the case of the UK. Whether 
there are two or ten categories, the UK remains a liberal market economy as does the US. On 
the other hand, they turn out to be crucial when it comes to France, as depending on the 
number of categories in the classification France may be analysed as a coordinated market 
economy, a state enhanced country or even a liberal market economy.  
 
Static description: how to capture changes?  
 
The very existence of ideal types grouping of real political economies based on similar 
institutional arrangements and complementarities and path dependencies bears the risk of a 
static description, unable to identify and take into account changes, and in particular gradual 
changes. This point is key when it comes to classifying a country because some countries, 
such as France but not only, have implemented dramatic institutional changes impacting on 
their classification. Even though this study is not a longitudinal one, the historical and 
institutional changes France and the UK have witnessed over the last decades should, to a 
certain extent, be accounted for.  
 
Aware of that risk, Hall and Soskice wish to elaborate a ‘dynamic conception of national 
political economies in the sense that it anticipates change in them and contains specific 
propositions about the processes through which it will occur’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 62). 
However, scholars tend to agree that they fail to capture changes. This static picture of each 
system comes notably from the use of the concepts of path dependency (Coates, 2005) and 
institutional complementarities (Blyth, 2003). As defined previously, path dependency tends 
to pave the way of a national economy in a manner restricted by previous institutional 
combinations. What has been created and implemented in the past reduces the present and 
future institutional pathways in a rather drastic way. Therefore, the more a comparative 
capitalism approach relies on this concept, the more caught the theory is in a deterministic 
understanding of the model in question. This static perspective prevents observing and 
evaluating changes over time. Deeg and Jackson (2006) point out specifically to four types of 
changes that the comparative capitalism literature has trouble capturing and explaining: 
‘transnationalisation, growing heterogeneity across firms within national economies, 
functional change in institutions despite their formal stability and systematic shifts in national 
business systems (typically from one subtype to another within a broader typology of 
capitalist systems)’ (Deeg and Jackson, 2006, p. 150). There is an uneasy compromise to find 
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between a stable and a flexible institutional model. As Hay (2005) argues, this structural 
approach provides a steady account of national institutions over time. The notion of 
institutional complementarity increases the risk of a static picture insofar as institutions 
reinforce each other in terms of returns (Blyth, 2003). So there is a limited window left for 
institutional changes.  
 
Coates (2005) warns comparative capitalism scholars of the risk of ‘institutional determinism’ 
and the factors reinforcing this danger. According to Coates, some elements are likely to 
increase the level of determinism of the classification. Some classification relies too heavily 
on ideal types as the best way to capture the reality of a system. This reliance may lead 
authors to ignore some critical institutions or factors. For that purpose, Coates (2005) 
provides the example of the US. When considered as a typical LME, authors tend to forget 
the role played by the state with the military industry. This criticism is particularly acute 
when it comes to evaluate the VoC approach as Hall and Soskice (2001) put the concept of 
path dependency at the core of their model. ‘Institutional determinism’ is also reinforced 
when national systems are depicted from the standpoint of the institutions at the macro level 
and their influences on the micro level (corporations and individuals). The same limit could 
be applied to France, where scholars are still obsessed by the role of the state and suffer from 
a certain type of myopia. We may wonder to what extent the French state is still in power in 
2016 France, especially with the waves of decentralisation, the impact of the European Union 
and various forces coming from globalisation.  
 
This methodology tends also to disregard the way institutions are lived and sometimes fought 
against by individuals. It also risks carrying out a sort of institutional fetishism whereby the 
institutions are studied for their own sake no matter what results they produce. Kinderman 
(2005) illustrates this risk by examining the employer institutions in Germany. Contrary to 
one of the VoC claims, he tries to demonstrate that the preferences of German employers are 
not qualitatively different from a typical LME country. He therefore concludes that ‘the 
continued existence of institutions should not be conflated with a continuity of outcomes or 
results’ (Kinderman, 2005, p. 455). The ultimate consequence of this deterministic and static 
view of institutions is the propensity to analyse change as slow and cumulative. Therefore, if 
an expected change comes along, it will be deemed caused by an exogenous shock.  This 
methodological limit should call for a more regular assessment of countries’ variety of 
capitalism. This reason partially justifies the study of France’s variety of capitalism since it 
has dramatically evolved over recent decades.  
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National level of analysis 
 
The majority of the comparative capitalism approaches theorise systems at the national level 
within the boundaries of national states leaving aside other level of analysis whether it be sub-
national or supra national. For instance, for some countries the impact of the supra-national 
level may be crucial. This is typically the case with countries influenced by the European 
institutions. As Hay (2005) notes this is particularly peculiar as many analysts explore 
European countries, such as Germany, France or Italy, without questioning the impact of the 
European Union. Conversely, the level of the region or the firm may also be particularly 
relevant in order to understand and grasp varieties of capitalism (Hay, 2005). Pontusson 
(2005) applies this same criticism to the VoC approach which is accused of being too state 
focused and also unable to subtly measure the influence of globalisation on the one hand and 
the European Union on the other. This weakness accounts for the voluntary inclusion in this 
research project of the company level in order to better appreciate the impact of a variety of 
capitalism at the company level.  
 
Against the VoC approach 
 
Dedicating an entire sub-section to the shortcomings of the VoC approach is justified because 
when the literature starts connecting the national institutional framework and CSR activities 
or forms, the primary framework used is the VoC one. Some weaknesses or limitations of the 
VoC approach are of course shared with the general comparative capitalism literature. Some 
are specific and deserve attention.  
Over the years, many criticisms have blossomed specifically against the VoC approach. 
Scholars have highlighted the generality of the model and the absence of empirical 
investigations, the simplicity of a two-systems approach leading to ignore regional diversities 
or national variations and finally its rigidity in handling changes (Amable and Hancké, 2001; 
Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007; Wood, Dibben and Ogden, 2014). The regulation 
approach strongly opposes the too simplistic formulation of the VoC approach, which 
contrasts market coordination with non-market coordination and so provides a picture where 
the market is the main coordination mechanism. However, other mechanisms exist such as 
companies, the civil society, the state or intermediate actors (associations, networks) (Boyer, 
2005b). The mere domination of market coordination does not prevent other mechanisms 
from taking place (Boyer, 2005b).   
 
Scholars also lament the underplayed presentation of the role of the state (Howell, 2003). The 
state is described in strict opposition to the role of the market. Schmidt (2002b) deplores this 
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theoretical absence of the state in analyses such as VoC that are too focused and therefore 
obsessed by firms’ mechanisms. The state is an actor that cannot be ignored, notably in 
countries that display a state capitalist form despite recent evolutions undermining its 
presence. This drawback affects specifically the categorisation of France, where the state used 
to play a huge part in the economy and still manages to intervene quietly. This can also have 
an impact on the UK, as will be demonstrated later the British state has not entirely 
disappeared. Minimising the role of the state goes hand in hand with an absence of focus on 
political activities, such as political power games within the countries under study. Based on 
the concept of institutional complementarities, the influence of the state would therefore be 
limited within the complementarities and the coordination already existing in a specific 
country.  
 
Based on this criticism, Hancke, Rhodes and Thatcher (2007) expand the range of capitalist 
archetypes from two to four, allowing for a more subtle depiction of the role of the state. 
Their analysis looks at the relations between the state and companies on the one hand, and 
organised interest organisations on the other. In addition to the traditional LME and CME 
categories, the categories of étatisme and compensating state are added. The former is close to 
France pre-1990s where ‘ the sate controlled the strategic levers of the economy through 
outright ownership of many companies and control industrial credit’ (Hancké, Rhodes and 
Thatcher, 2007, p. 25). This category captures a reality where the state plays a central part in 
the organisation of the economy. They leave the question somewhat open ended as to the 
present status of France, although Brewster et al. (2017) point to an abiding statism, which 
interpenetrates the investment ecosystem with direct implications for employees. The 
compensating state category envisages the state as a ‘compensator for coordination deficits 
and provider of political consensus and legitimacy’ (Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007, p. 
27), as observed in Italy or Spain. 
 
More generally, while focusing on coordination mechanisms, the VoC approach ignores 
aspects of conflicts, in particular class conflicts, and power distribution as Pontusson (2005) 
argues.  Watson (2003) also adds the neglect of race and gender differences as a way to 
promote a better socially rooted study of varieties of capitalism. Such an approach is by 
definition rendered impossible in VoC terms because of the national-level lens.  
 
In another vein, the question of heterogeneity within countries remains. Heterogeneity comes 
from a variety of coordination mechanisms at levels lower than the state that influence 
corporate behaviours. Deeg and Jackson (2006) highlight the fact that due to globalisation and 
transnationalisation of companies, the constraining power of national institutional settings 
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may decrease leaving more space to sub-national institutional flexibility and experimentation. 
Crouch (2009) formulates an ever more specific criticism towards the VoC approach when he 
regrets the distinction between organisations and markets. As a consequence, the differences 
among firms within countries, another form of heterogeneity, are totally ignored. Aspects of 
managerial techniques, corporate culture and corporate strategies are left aside.  As there are 
ideal-types at the national level, the VoC approach considers an ideal-type company at the 
firm level. The same criticism can also be addressed to the regulation approach as Boyer 
wonders ‘how to preserve hypotheses of institutional complementarity and isomorphism 
between firms’ organisations and institutional architectures while abandoning the postulate 
of an emblematic firm, one that has been clearly rejected by observing the modern 
distribution of firms (and in a succession of industrial surveys)’ (Boyer, 2005b, p. 546). 
 
When it comes to describing each ideal type, the VoC approach mainly resorts to two 
countries as typical examples: the US for the LME group and Germany for the CME group. 
Some authors challenge the authenticity and usefulness of the model itself. From a 
methodological point of view, some authors argue that looking at only two countries at the 
same time does not provide an enlightening comparison. It would be more beneficial to 
compare simultaneously multiple countries (Boyer, 2005b). Doubts for instance are raised in 
terms of the veracity of the accounts provided for each ideal type. These descriptions are 
usually supported by empirical data, such as trade union density, in order to demonstrate the 
institutional arrangements and complementarities. Nevertheless, scepticism is for instance 
raised in relation to Germany. Blyth (2003) strongly questions the accuracy of the VoC model 
and in particular as far as employers and collective bargaining are concerned. This apparent 
lack of truth makes him wonder more generally to what extent the VoC model can teach us 
anything about varieties of capitalism. He observes another serious flaw of the model itself. In 
its empirical account, the VoC approach only turns to one sector, the manufacturing sector, 
while disregarding the service sector. From there, the theory develops the differences in terms 
of workers’ skills between LME and CME. Therefore, it ‘ignores the fact that manufacturing 
needs less workers the more skilled they are, and that the majority of service occupations, a 
sector that constitutes over 60 per cent of advanced country GDP, does not need skills, just 
workers, seems rather to miss the point’ (Blyth, 2003, p. 224). In other words, how can the 
VoC model theorize the evolution of the post-industrial economy? Directly answering his 
criticism, Hall and Soskice (2003) refute the manufacturing bias and its consequences in 
terms of skilled work. First of all, they reaffirm that their analysis applies to both the 
manufacturing and service industries. Furthermore, they reject the idea that only high-skill 
workers are present in the manufacturing sector, leaving low-skill workers to the service 
sector.  Nonetheless they concede that ‘the field needs more work on how nations adjust to 
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the rise of the post-industrial economy’ (Hall and Soskice, 2003, p. 243). This post-industrial 
evolution criticism resonates particularly strongly in relation to the UK because the country 
went through a strong deindustrialisation.  
 
Finally, Clift (2014), while admitting the embeddedness of national varieties of capitalism, 
advocates the need ‘to recognize a range of rationalities, rooted in societal norms 
surrounding economic activity, and traditions of political economic interventionism at play in 
the reproduction and evolution of embedded market relations. These ideational dimensions 
(and the more nuanced conception of micro-foundations they generate) help to explain 
comparative capitalisms and their on-going particularities’ (Clift, 2014, p. 211). Put 
differently, the analysis of varieties of capitalism needs to go to the roots of each system and 
adopt a more encompassing view.  
 
Following this review of two of the main strands among the comparative capitalism literature, 
it appears clearly that they share in common elements of analysis. Behind a different wording, 
they tend to analyse the same institutional factors. Yet the main difference comes from a 
different way of organising these factors together leading to a more or less complex picture of 
the French and British model of capitalism. The limitations of this literature cannot be 
overlooked and should be overcome. It might therefore be questioned to what extent this 
literature is able to provide a relevant and convincing analysis of the French and British 
model of capitalism.   
 
2.2.3 The UK variety of capitalism 
 
France and the UK are analysed with a different degree of success by the literature on 
capitalism varieties. France tends to be under-analysed compared to the UK, certainly because 
France is less easy to categorise. When it comes to classifying countries and analysing single 
national characteristics, such as corporate governance, the financial system or CSR, as 
previously mentioned, the literature interestingly refers back to the simple LMEs/CMEs 
divide. What this dual typology gains in simplicity of description, it lacks in precision of 
analysis, which can become detrimental when it comes to comparing a particular 
phenomenon across nations. Typically, the problem France faces is that it does not fit the 
LME/CME divide.  
 
The classification of the UK is rather straightforward. Whether it be the varieties of 
capitalism approach or the regulation approach, they reach the same conclusion, that is the 
UK, like the US, displays all the attributes of a liberal market economy where market 
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coordination is the rule (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In Amable’s (2003) terminology, the UK 
belongs to the very homogenous market-based capitalism group. Since the 1980s and the 
three conservative Thatcher mandates (1979-1983; 1983-1987; 1987-1990), the UK has 
shifted towards liberal capitalism putting aside Keynesian politics (Konzelmann and 
Fovargue-Davies, 2012). Initially and since the Second World War, the succession of Labour 
and Conservative governments put into effect similar Keynesian policies dominated by 
demand-oriented policies and incomes policies to reach full employment (Hall, 1986). This 
consensus on the necessity of Keynesian policies started to erode after the first oil shock and 
the severity of the economic crisis that hit the country; the seriousness of the crisis happened 
to be stronger than in other Western economies. Some commentators even raised the 
possibility of a crisis of the UK system itself rather than a general crisis of the model of 
capitalism (Gamble, 2004). Faced with a growth of the unemployment rate, an increase of the 
inflation rate and a stagnation of both the growth and productivity rates, political parties 
provided opposite explanations and solutions. The Conservatives blamed Keynesian policies 
and advocated a return to liberal capitalism, whereas Labour called for an increased role for 
the state (Gamble, 2004).  
 
With the victory of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, the former option took precedence and lead to 
a drastic shift to liberal policies and monetarism. Aligned with a similar move in the US with 
the Reagan administration, the UK put in place neoliberal politics inspired by the works of 
Adam Smith, Friedrich Von Hayek and the Chicago School. In that perspective, the state is 
considered as an allowing actor rather than an active economic actor resulting in a decreased 
role of the central government (Konzelmann and Fovargue-Davies, 2012). Margaret Thatcher 
vigorously attacked the immoderate presence and role of the state, doomed to be inefficient 
and responsible for tax increases (Hall, 1986). The focus has been on measures favouring 
supply-side economics, deregulating labour and financial markets (Schmidt, 2003). Along 
with these, the Thatcher administration severely weakened trade unions and largely privatized 
public companies. Since the reforms conducted by the Thatcher government, the UK model 
has intensified its move towards liberalism from market capitalism towards an intensified 
market capitalism (Schmidt, 2002b). As both the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001) or Amable (2003) generally insist on the same features to qualify a national 
type (namely the role of the financial market and its relation with business; corporate 
governance mechanisms; the organisation of labour), the only difference between the two 
relates to the role of the state. The varieties of capitalism literature tends to overlook the role 
of the state. As a consequence, when it comes to the UK, the following features are classically 
heralded to characterise the UK variety of capitalism: arm’s length financial market; 
maximisation of shareholder value; dispersed ownership; importance of equity funding and 
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notably institutional investors. The labour market is as deregulated as the financial one, ease 
of hiring and firing, weak labour contract protection, and absence of centralised salary 
formation. Wage bargaining takes place at the individual level where employers and 
employees negotiate together. Trade unions do not possess the power to centrally and 
nationally negotiate wages anymore because of their lack of power and presence in 
companies. The education system forms unspecialised workers with general skills, able to 
move from one company to the other according to companies’ needs and markets’ reactions. 
Finally the nature of the state has been transformed in its role to a regulatory state (Gamble, 
2004). These features have been accentuated under both the pressure of globalisation and the 
European Union.  
 
Compared to other types of capitalism, the LME or market-based capitalism countries are 
presented as an extremely homogenous group. The literature tends to overlook differences 
among these countries. According to Amable’s (2003) cluster analysis, the US, the UK, 
Canada and Australia share the highest number of common traits, in comparison to other 
countries. Such homogeneity is yet put into question by a few authors. Some of them for 
instance challenge the Anglo-Saxon variety of capitalism regarding the handling of the 2008 
financial crisis leading to a division between the UK and the US on one side and Canada and 
Australia on the other (Konzelmann and Fovargue-Davies, 2012). These differences are 
rooted in the shift from Keynesianism to liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. Konzelman et al. 
(2012) maintain that the US and the UK on one side, Canada and Australia on the other, have 
apprehended market liberalism in contrasting ways and therefore differently implemented it 
into policies. These variations have impacted on the role and place of financial markets as 
well as on the respective roles of the state and the private sector. At the company level, 
Aguilera et al.(2006) highlight differences in companies’ corporate governance where the UK 
system presents a less dispersed ownership, more constraints on CEOs and higher 
commitment of institutional investors than its US counterparts. Also based on a comparative 
and historical analysis of corporate governance mechanisms, Siepel and Nightingale (2014) 
similarly conclude that the ‘Anglo-Saxon capitalism’ category (only limited to the US and the 
UK) should not even be considered as a homogeneous one. The US and the UK present 
strong differences where the US displays its own variety of capitalism. The extreme apparent 
financialization of both countries does not suffice to mix them up. Even though close, the 
differences visible in their corporate governance systems entail contrasting managerial 
behaviours, unalike agency role as well as divergent relations to corporate and financial risks. 
Konzelmann et al. (2012) indicate a similar contrast in terms of financial market regulation 
and oppose an ‘integrated approach’ on the one hand to a ‘diffused’ system on the other. 
Financial regulation is concentrated in the hands of a unique institution in charge of the whole 
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system in the UK, whereas the American federal constitutional organisation leads to multiple 
levels and bodies of regulation.  
 
However straightforward and easy this description of the UK case is the reality might be more 
complex. The picture seems largely to rely on the institutional theory used to analyse the UK 
case. Put differently, the analysis of a national institutional framework depends on the way 
institutional theories grasp change for instance. As explained earlier, VoC, regulation theory 
or Amable (2003) provide different accounts of institutional change entailing dissimilar 
narratives of the UK’s post-war and present institutional framework. Two main narratives 
dominate the historical analysis of the UK. On the one hand, some institutional theorists insist 
on dividing up post-war UK into periods of stability and crisis with two main shocks in 1945 
and 1979 (Howell, 2007). On the other hand, a VoC approach, due to its myopia on structural 
exogenous changes, comes up with a rather stable evolution of UK institutions (Howell, 
2007). Howell criticises both approaches and argues that ‘the British case, in short, presents 
an image of institutional development at odds with the one that dominates the varieties of 
capitalism approach’ (Howell, 2003, p. 119).  He suggests two possibilities to enrich the 
analysis of the UK case. Considering that the narrative is deeply influenced on the institutions 
resorted to in order to ground the analysis, taking into account the co-evolution of institutions 
should allow a less continuous or crisis/stability picture. Furthermore, following a general 
criticism of VoC, the role of the state needs a better understanding as its role cannot be 
ignored in the institutional construction and evolution of the UK, no matter how liberal it is 
(Howell, 2007).  
 
Beyond the inherent ontological limitations of the institutional theories applied, categorising 
the UK as a liberal market economy relies on an assumption of homogeneity across the 
country. In other words, that would mean that each region of the UK, from the North to the 
South, has been applying the same model of capitalism whatever its historical, sociological, 
cultural, geographical and even demographic disparities. Such an assumption is strongly 
criticised and fought by Hudson (2012). According to him, this assumption is linked to the 
predominance of a state-based analysis of varieties of capitalism. This level of analysis bias 
leaves aside any form of uneven development across a specific country. More specifically, in 
terms of capitalism classification, it demonstrates how uneasy a classification exercise is even 
for a country that looks as easy and homogeneous as the UK to analyse. The level of 
heterogeneity is an empirical question that cannot be determined theoretically. Moreover, 
from this perspective, the interactions between the national and regional level are of utmost 
importance insofar as each level can influence the other. ‘In recognising the potential 
significance of the regional it is also important to acknowledge that relationships between 
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national and regional influences are two-way: if the national shape the regional, so too do 
regionally specific forms and tendencies help shape national trajectories and institutions’ 
(Hudson, 2012, p. 191).  
 
The final factor that can play a role in the UK model of capitalism was the role of the 
European Union until the Brexit vote in June 2016 (Froud, Johal and Williams, 2016; Le 
Galès, 2016; O’Reilly et al., 2016). By pushing countries towards tighter degrees of 
integration and harmonization, national varieties of capitalism can therefore be affected and 
altered in one way or the other. As Gamble (2004) points out, the UK model is the one that is 
likely to lose its own specificities and start gradually resembling continental Europe 
countries.  So far the preservation of the pound against the euro supplies an efficient rampart 
to the remaining distinctiveness of the UK variety of capitalism compared to its European 
counterparts (Gamble, 2004). This distinctiveness should be preserved since the UK voted to 
leave the European Union. Despite the Brexit vote, we should not ignore in the analyses 
changes to the model, even if they seem incremental. Changes can be in the direction of a 
stronger liberalisation or in the borrowing of more continental Europe traits under the 
influence of the European Union.  
 
2.2.4 The French variety of capitalism 
 
The case of France is by contrast more complex and illustrates one of the weaknesses of the 
comparative capitalism literature, to wit the diversity of typologies and the difficulty in 
accounting for national model change (Deeg and Jackson, 2006). A dual typology, such as the 
VoC one, encounters difficulties in envisaging countries that fall behind the two categories, 
and assumes in between countries will be impelled in one direction or the other (Boyer, 
2005b; Wood, Dibben and Ogden, 2014). France went through drastic institutional changes in 
the 1980s-1990s leaving uncertainties regarding its new capitalism model (Hancké, 2001; 
Schmidt, 2003). The literature is debating the classification of France and is undecided 
between two hypotheses. On the one hand, France would be converging from a more 
coordinated market economy towards the liberal market model. On the other hand, it would 
be displaying another type of capitalism in between LME and CME (Schmidt, 2003). This 
latter hypothesis, if true, would entail another inquiry regarding the characteristics of this 
distinct type of capitalism. According to Schmidt’s study, ‘ while internationalization is 
pushing all countries toward a more encompassing form of market-oriented capitalism, 
Germany and France each face distinct sorts of adjustment problems and follow their own 
independent pathways of change’ suggesting a new way (Jackson and Deeg, 2006, p. 28). 
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Since the seminal analysis of Crozier in the 1960s, France is depicted as a state centred 
political economy where ‘French business is caught in a vicious circle of low trust and 
therefore hierarchical workplaces, high state involvement to overcome the problems that 
result from this workplace set-up, and therefore an endemic incapacity of economic actors - 
firms, associations, and trade unions – to change without central state intervention’ (Hancké 
and Goyer, 2005, p. 61). Hancké and Goyer (2005) refute nonetheless this all too common 
analysis, which ignores the ability of firms to adapt to a globalised environment, of a system 
said to be doomed by the overwhelming influence and role of the state. 
 
On the one hand, the convergence hypothesis posits that France is shifting towards the LME 
model, notably in terms of financial system and corporate governance (characterised by the 
presence of independent directors among board members; specialized board committees; 
large use of stock options; ownership dispersion) (Cieply, 2001; Goyer, 2001; Hancké, 2001). 
Some authors contend that France’s financial system has been implementing the 
characteristics of Anglo-Saxon capitalism with the end of the cross-shareholdings system 
from 1996 onwards, the rise of the French stock market and more importantly the wide 
presence of foreign institutional investors into the capital of French firms (Morin, 2000; 
Djelic and Zarlowski, 2005). These traits that make France closer to its British neighbour 
would, according to that view, automatically transform the nature of its capitalism model. In 
parallel that move is reinforced by a shift from an insider towards an outsider governance 
system (Goyer, 2001; Goyer and Jung, 2011). This transformation is, for instance, analysed 
by Morin (2000) as the consequence of the growing presence of Anglo-Saxon institutional 
investors, in particular pension funds, which took over from the state and the banks in 
financing companies. Institutional investors bring with them the implementation of the 
shareholder value system and management practices (Morin, 2000).  
 
However, one might ask if this convergence is total or partial. As far as the diffusion of the 
shareholder system is concerned, Djelic & Zarlowski (2005) insist that it is very present in 
CEOs’ communication or discourses but they doubt its complete translation into practices. 
Amable and Hancké (2001) also argue against a complete identification to the Anglo-Saxon 
model, insisting on the retained specificities of the initial French model.  
 
At the other side of the analytical spectrum, and arguing against any level of convergence, 
Culpepper (2008) contends that neither large French companies nor political parties support 
this alignment towards a liberal market economy. The idea of a third way is directly 
embedded in the inadequacy of the VoC approach. France would not fit into any category, as 
it seems to display a particular ‘mode of coordination, which encompassed elites in the state, 
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business and finance’ (Hancké, 2001, p. 308; Clift, 2004a). Trying to correct this particular 
inadequacy of VoC, Hancke, Rhodes and Thatcher (2007) include France into a new 
category, etatisme.  
 
Following its 1980s shift in model from a state-led economy, scholars are torn between a new 
firm-led economy (Hancké, 2001) or ‘state-enhanced’ capitalism (Schmidt, 2003, p. 527). 
The French state has indeed significantly withdrawn from the economy notably through 
business and financial market deregulation, privatizations of public companies, removal of 
capital control and the decentralization of the labour market (Schmidt, 2003; Goyer and Jung, 
2011). The role of the state in this shift is yet contested. Based on historical events, the shift 
seems to have been decided by the French government as a solution to the economic crisis. 
However, Culpepper (2008) posits that the French state has not even been responsible for the 
1990s drastic change, the European Union has. France is sometimes described as an 
‘institutionally hybrid market economy‘ (Goyer and Jung, 2011, p. 563) alongside with Italy 
and Spain. This characterization is constructed against the VoC framework (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). The main institutions founding the economic life (to wit corporate governance, 
employment relations, and skill training) lack institutional complementarity (Goyer and Jung, 
2011). ‘France, alongside Italy and Spain, constitutes the key representative of advanced 
capitalist economies in Europe where the domestic institutional configuration does not enable 
companies to rely on supporting institutional complementarities across the spheres of the 
economy to coordinate activities’ (Goyer and Jung, 2011, p. 563). In VoC terms, it means that 
this hybrid system supports neither market coordination nor strategic, non-market 
coordination. This absence of a coordination mechanism leads to a state of uncertainty, 
detrimental to each economic actor (Culpepper, 2008). Hybridity also results from the on-
going state coordination of economic activities (Goyer and Jung, 2011). Along with the VoC 
analysis, this hybrid institutional configuration would lead to a sub-optimal economic 
performance. 
 
Facing such a diversity of analysis, examining more closely the changes that France 
underwent since the Second World War might help to highlight the essential characteristics of 
its capitalist system. What is striking about French capitalism is that, in comparison to the 
British or the German, it is one that has dramatically evolved over the years. The question yet 
remains one of intensity: to what extent has the French model evolved? Has it entirely 
transformed itself or has it kept some of it initial features? Its contemporary evolution can be 
split up in two periods: before and after 1983, a year that represents a landmark in French 
history. As Schmidt (2002a) describes this evolution, France was characterised before 1983 
by a large and wide intervention of the state. This Etatiste state reached prominence with the 
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advent of the Fifth Republic by directly intervening in business affairs with the apparatus of 
the Plan and in the handling of wage bargaining leaving no power to unions but the one to go 
on strike (Hall, 1986). Hall (1986) provides a multilevel definition of the Etatiste state where 
two attributes are particularly striking. First, the state is above society and distinctly separated 
from it. Secondly, the state is the only entity able and allowed to represent the public interest, 
leaving behind associations or any other organisation that could represent divergent interests. 
This extreme involvement of the French state lead scholars to label it a Dirigiste state (Clift, 
2004b). Interestingly enough, what the state managed to build in terms of good relations with 
business, it never succeeded in doing so with labour, where relations remained highly 
contentious (Schmidt, 2002a). These close-knit relationships between the state and business 
were notably grounded on nationalised industries, the different tools the state put in place to 
finance industrial investments and the specificity of the French Grandes Ecoles system (Clift, 
2004b). Large companies were managed by CEOs that went to the same Grandes Ecoles after 
serving as high-ranked civil servants. Combined with a game of cross-shareholdings across 
large firms, these elite literally dominated the French economy without having to worry about 
threats of takeovers or shareholder pressures.  
 
Strongly hit by the economic crisis in the 1970s, the French state-led system was not 
economically sustainable anymore and required substantial changes. Contrary to the 
economic and political shifts in the US and the UK, the election of François Mitterrand, head 
of the Socialist party, in 1981 did not bring about the supremacy of liberal market capitalism 
but, rather, shifted the reforms compass towards Keynesian policies rather than the American 
or British capitalism model. As promised during his electoral campaign, François Mitterrand 
launched neo-Keynesian measures embodied by a wave of nationalisation, the increase of the 
minimum wage and reflation policies in the area of monetary policy. These reforms 
exacerbated the dire state of the economy so that from 1983 onwards the government had to 
pull back and reorient its politics towards market-oriented policies. According to Schmidt 
(2002a) , the choice of these reforms with a clearly liberal nature has not turned France into a 
liberal market economy as the implementation was done with the input of the state or as she 
describes them, the reforms were ‘state-led and state-cushioned’ (Schmidt, 2002a, p. 191). 
The privatization movement illustrates a typical example of the state involvement and 
customization, as it did not let market actors buying former state-owned shares. Conversely, 
the state appointed the buyers illustrating its control over the French economy and business 
(Schmidt, 2002a).  
 
The reforms had multiple effects; to describe a few of them, they impacted the relations 
between finance and business, between business and the state as well as on labour. The 
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financial markets were largely opened up and deregulated with the increasing presence of 
international investors and notably American pension funds leading to a change in business 
financing strategies. Henceforth, rather than systematically resorting to public loans or bank 
debts, companies have more and more turned to equity funding with the risk of an intensified 
pressure of shareholders, notably foreign ones with different profitability expectations. The 
status of French firms, or at least the largest ones, has been transformed from national 
companies to international ones with a refocusing on the activities providing them with a 
comparative advantage (Schmidt, 2002a). Put differently, large companies have directed their 
strategy towards their core activities. This international rise of French firms accompanied by 
an improved competitiveness has notably been allowed by successive waves of privatizations 
carried out by the state (the main ones took place between 1986 and 1988 and between 1993 
and 1997). As a result of these diverse reforms and influences, Schmidt considers that 
‘French business had grown tremendously in size, scope, competitiveness, and profitability’ 
(Schmidt, 2002a, p. 189).  
 
Deregulation, that symbolises one of the LME traits, also affected labour and industrial 
relations (Baccaro and Howell, 2011; Palpacuer, Seignour and Vercher, 2011). Wage 
bargaining obeys more to market principles while unions have carried on losing power due to 
privatizations, the increase of unemployment and higher skilled workers (less sensible to 
unions) (Schmidt, 2002a). However, the deregulation of the French labour market is not 
complete and cannot be conformed to the one in a liberal market economy. For instance, laws 
constrain the extent of market coordination by providing rigidity to hiring and firing or 
supervising the types of existing employment contracts. For instance, in order to be lawful 
firing an employee must be justified either by an economic reason, such as downsizing, or a 
personal reason (all the reasons being scrupulously listed by the labour law code) (Palpacuer, 
Seignour and Vercher, 2011). Put differently, as deregulated as the French labour market is, 
there is still a substantial gap between France and a liberal market country, in particular the 
UK. 
 
Finally, the reforms also touched the omnipotent French state which has had to let some of its 
power to other actors such as business. Since the Second World War, it is particularly the role 
of the state that makes the French model so special. We could therefore assume that as soon 
as its involvement diminishes dramatically, France would join either the CME group or the 
LME group. Certainly, due to its initial power, the state has not entirely left the French scene. 
Even though, the French state is not what it used to be during the post-war era, it has not 
completely abandoned its relationship with business notably through many connections with 
the elite clique and support for companies thanks to local or regional agencies or aid. Schmidt 
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(2002a) demonstrates how the state makes use of social policies and benefits to maintain its 
presence in the education and training areas for instance. The passing of the Aubry laws in 
1998 and 2000 instituting the 35 hour week (but paid for 39 hours) is another illustration of 
the intervention of the state (Clift, 2004b).  Its role is therefore subtler but not inexistent, 
contrary to a liberal market country. More generally, the French state intervenes also in order 
to render business and labour relations more ethical (Schmidt, 2002b). If the state manages to 
have a moralising impact on the French economy, what would that mean in terms of CSR? Is 
this fact a sign that France and French business display a specific sense of responsibility and 
morality? In other words, the state is still very involved in organising France’s economy 
(Hancke, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007) and needs to be accounted for. However, the role of the 
French state has evolved alongside the adoption of a certain degree of neo-liberalism. As 
Gualmini and Schmidt argue (2013), France offers an interesting combination of moderate 
neo-liberalism (as opposed to a purer version of neo-liberalism in LME countries) and an 
activist state. Gualmini and Schmidt (2013, p.370) conclude that ‘this “statist liberalism” 
paradoxically violates - in its aspirations as much as in its actions - not only the classical 
neo-liberal ideals of laissez-faire but also the ordo-liberal ideas of rules-based state action. 
This further demonstrates that there are many “liberalisms”, some more neo-liberal than 
others, but all - for the moment at least - highly resilient’. 
 
The way France is depicted by the comparative capitalism literature, whether it is by its VoC 
strand or by the regulation theory approach, is not entirely convincing. Many questions can be 
raised in terms of the degree of institutional borrowing, of the remaining specificities of its 
initial model. For instance, Clift (2004a) argues that institutional convergence is not all, one 
should also question the interpretation behind the mere copying or borrowing of an institution 
from one country to another. In other words, can we still talk of convergence if the role and 
meaning of the borrowed institutions change in the process? Generally speaking, the analysis 
of France suffers from fragmented approaches, which underline some but not all of its 
features. For instance, the historical analysis of the evolution of French capitalism tends to 
focus only on large firms. Even though our focus is on large firms, we may ask to what extent 
this analysis is relevant for small and medium size firms. In line with this fragmented 
argument, the same criticism could also apply when scholars conclude that France has moved 
towards a liberal market model only based on its corporate governance system or financial 
markets characteristics.  
 
Therefore, going a step further than these analyses, one may wonder whether the French 
model presents other features able to characterise it in a more precise and convincing way. 
For instance, the literature on comparative capitalism ignores the root of social cohesion as it 
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only accounts for modes of economic coordination. This line of inquiry, largely indebted to 
sociology, could be a promising avenue of research especially if combined with CSR. CSR 
questions to a certain extent the very root of social cohesion. In that respect, looking at what 
constitutes the social foundation of the French society may be an enlightening avenue for 
research. There might be indeed a specificity of the French society. Social foundation touches 
upon social solidarity or cohesion. Or in other words, how is the French society, as well as its 
members, tied and interconnected? What are the grounds and the degree of 
interconnectedness among French citizens creating social unity and solidarity? In trying to 
understand the foundation of social ties, Durkheim (1960) is still relevant today. He observed 
at the beginning of the 20th century a contradicting evolution of modern societies. As 
individuals grow more and more individualistic, they become more and more dependent 
towards society itself. From a historical point of view, in his first works Durkheim (1960) 
explains that the nature of social solidarity has changed, shifting from mechanical solidarity 
to an organic one. Mechanical solidarity happens with similar individuals in a group, whereas 
the organic one takes place with individualised, autonomous individuals. The first one tends 
to take place in primitive societies. This change is, according to Durkheim (1960), the result 
of the division of labour, which renders people, in their social and working environment, 
increasingly specialised. In other words, the division of labour, as a reflection of a rising 
social complexity, entails a new type of solidarity. When it comes to the French model, the 
type of solidarity or social ties differs from a liberal market economy such as the UK. Social 
solidarity encountered in a society is a long-lasting feature. In VoC terms, it is highly path 
dependent. It is the product of history, evolution of the legal environment, formal and 
informal rules, and social values. Durkheim (1960) believes that the way to witness social ties 
consists of looking at the presence of legal rules, as an indirect indicator. The differentiation 
between repressive law from restitutive law allows him to judge what type of solidarity is at 
stake in a society. More specifically, repressive law or criminal law with the aim of punishing 
the offender would characterise mechanical solidarity. Conversely, restitutive law 
(encompassing civil, commercial and family law to name just a few) indicates an evolution 
towards organic solidarity. Even though, he abandoned in later works this distinction between 
mechanical and organic solidarity, Durkheim’s ideas represent an enlightening perspective to 
consider social solidarity (Johnson et al., 2015). 
 
To summarize, the literature on comparative capitalism provides a helpful insight to 
characterise the French and UK models of capitalism. The limitations of this literature cannot 
be overlooked and in particular in relation to the French case. The French account remains 
patchy and needs additional research in order to be able to evaluate the links between 
varieties of capitalism and CSR practices.  
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2.3 Comparative CSR 
 
As previously underlined, this research project investigates the links between national 
institutional frameworks and CSR practices. More specifically it tries to evaluate the impact 
of a variety of capitalism, the French and the British one, on CSR practices at the company 
level. The literature on CSR is particularly abundant since the emergence of CSR as a popular 
topic in the 1950s. The literature has dealt with the subject from various angles. It has for 
instance looked at its possible definition (Davis, 1960, 1973, Carroll, 1979, 1991; Jones, 
1980); its relation to firm value (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; 
Weber, 2008; Carroll and Shabana, 2010); the notion of corporate citizenship (Waddock, 
2001; Matten, Crane and Chapple, 2003; Moon, Crane and Matten, 2005; Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2011); and the potential relation between responsible and irresponsible behaviours 
(Clark and Grantham, 2012; Stokes, 2012).   
 
Even though the aim of this project is not to study CSR for itself, it will contribute to the 
notion of CSR, as it is a concept still in the making. The first characteristic of CSR deals with 
its ambiguity. Many debates surround its definition and meaning as it will be presented in the 
following section.  
After assessing the terms of the debate around CSR, we will discuss the literature on 
comparative CSR in order to gain a better understanding of the relationships between CSR 
and national institutional settings. Finally, we will gauge the merits and limitations of the 
existing comparative CSR literature.  
 
2.3.1 The notion of corporate social responsibility 
 
CSR is neither an easy nor a clear concept. It is a complicated one because, despite decades of 
study, its definition has not reached a satisfying level of clarity and agreement among 
researchers. We are facing here a conundrum. For the purpose of this research, we need a 
relevant and succinct working definition of CSR in order to be clear on the terms of the study. 
On the other hand, examination of the existing literature renders the task of displaying a 
unique definition close to impossible. Moreover, as we adopt a comparative approach on 
CSR, the variations of CSR practices are entirely part of our research topic and possible 
findings. The definition that we will base our work on cannot compromise the study of 
various manifestations of CSR. Therefore, we have to find a definition among the ones 
available that fit the requirements and objectives of our research questions as well as the aims 
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without jeopardising the objectivity of our research project. Table 2.1 summarizes some of 
the existing definitions of CSR among the abundant literature on the topic.
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Table 2.1 Definitions of CSR 
Reference  Definition 
(Bowen, 1953) CSR refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make 
those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of 
the objectives and values of our society. (p.6) 
(Frederick, 1960) 
 
Public posture toward society’s economic and human resources and a willingness 
to see those resources are used for broad social ends and not simply for the 
narrowly circumscribed interests of private persons and firms. (p.60) 
(Davis, 1960, 1973) The firm’s consideration of, and response to, issues beyond narrow economic, 
technical, and legal requirements. (p.312) 
(McGuire, 1963) The idea of social responsibilities supposes that the corporation has not only 
economic and legal obligations, but also certain responsibilities to society which 
extend beyond these obligations. (p.144) 
(Committee for 
Economic 
Development, 
1971) 
Committee for 
Economic 
Development 
Defined as “three concentric circles”  
The inner circle includes the clear-cut basic responsibilities for the efficient 
execution of the economic function – products, jobs, and economic growth. 
The intermediate circle encompasses a responsibility to exercise this economic 
function with a sensitive awareness of changing social values and priorities. 
The outer circle outlines newly emerging and still amorphous responsibilities 
that business should assume to become more broadly involved in actively 
improving the social environment. (p.11) 
(Steiner, 1971) Business is and must remain fundamentally an economic institution, but… it 
does have responsibilities to help society achieve its basic goals and does, 
therefore, have social responsibilities. The larger a company becomes, the 
greater are these responsibilities, but all companies can assume some share of 
them at no cost and often at a short-run as well as a long-run profit. (p.164) 
(Manne and 
Wallich, 1972) 
To qualify as socially responsible corporate action, a business expenditure or 
activity must be one for which the marginal returns to the corporation are less 
than the returns available from some alternative expenditure, must be purely 
voluntary, and must be an actual corporate expenditure rather than a conduit for 
individual largesse. (pp. 4-6) 
(Eells and Walton, 
1974) 
In its broadest sense, corporate social responsibility represents a concern with the 
needs and goals of society which goes beyond the merely economic. Insofar as 
the business system as it exists today can only survive in an effectively 
functioning free society, the corporate social responsibility movement represents 
a broad concern with business’s role in supporting and improving that social 
order. (p. 247) 
(Sethi, 1975) Social responsibility implies bringing corporate behaviour up to a level where it 
is congruent with the prevailing social norms, values, and expectations. (p.58)  
(Carroll, 1979) For a definition of social responsibility to fully address the entire range of 
obligations business has to society, it must embody the economic, legal, ethical 
and discretionary categories of business performance. (p.499) 
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Reference  Definition 
(Jones, 1980) CSR is the notion that corporations have an obligation to constituent groups in 
society other than stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law and union 
contract. Two facets of this definition are critical. First, the obligation must be 
voluntarily adopted; behaviour influenced by the coercive forces of law or union 
contract is not voluntary. Second, the obligation is a broad one, extending 
beyond the traditional duty to shareholders to other societal groups such as 
customers, employees, suppliers, and neighbouring communities. (pp.59-60) 
(Wood, 1991) A business organisation’s configuration of principles of social responsibility, 
processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable 
outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal relationships. (p.393) 
(Carroll, 1991) It is suggested here that four kinds of social responsibilities constitute total CSR: 
economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic. Furthermore, these four categories or 
components of CSR might be depicted as a pyramid. (p.40)  
(McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000) 
Actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm 
and that which is required by law. (p. 117) 
(Blowfield and 
Frynas, 2005) 
An umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices all of which recognize 
the following: (a) that companies have a responsibility for their impact on society 
and the natural environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the 
liability of individuals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for the behaviour 
of others with whom they do business (e.g., within supply chains); and (c) that 
business needs to manage its relationship with wider society, whether for reasons 
of commercial viability or to add value to society. (p.503) 
(Matten and Moon, 
2008) 
CSR (and its synonyms) empirically consists of clearly articulated and 
communicated policies and practices of corporations that reflect business 
responsibility for some of the wider societal good. (p.405) 
(Aguinis and 
Glavas, 2013) 
Embedded CSR relies on an organization’s core competencies and integrates 
CSR within a firm’s strategy, routines, and operations. In contrast, peripheral 
CSR focuses on activities that are not integrated into an organization’s strategy, 
routines, and operations. (p.315) 
(Donaghey and 
Reinecke, 2017) 
CSR is typically seen as a corporation’s voluntary engagement with its 
stakeholders, including consumers and civil society actors to work towards the 
improvement of social and environmental standards. (p.2) 
 
	These definitions have the following aspects in common. From an historical perspective, the 
first striking feature about CSR relates to its presence under the spotlight since the 1950s and 
the seminal work of Howard Bowen (1953), Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. It 
would, however, be erroneous to believe that the underlying concept only appeared at that 
time. The idea of businessmen, trying to improve their employees’ well-being, to curb child 
labour, to establish welfare systems or giving money to charities had not waited until 1953 to 
bloom but rather can be dated back to the 19th century and the industrial revolution (Carroll, 
2009). John D. Rockefeller, for instance, provides an excellent illustration of the rise of 
philanthropy and the involvement of businessmen as soon as the 19th century. Nevertheless, 
as Carroll (2009) points out, it was already back then difficult to distinguish the core activities 
of these corporations from actions that could be regarded as more social, as well as to identify 
the reasons behind these actions. The development of the idea of social responsibilities for 
businessmen and its conceptualisation, by academics notably, cannot therefore be confused. 
There is a time lag between the two. We owe to Bowen (1953) one of the first theorisations of 
the term and attempt to define it. From the 1950s, CSR has been the subject of countless 
studies both in the academic and business world.  
 
The second noticeable feature about CSR is characterised by its debated nature. Despite its 
popularity in the academic world, CSR remains both a challenging and challenged concept as 
it lies at the frontier between businesses and society. It questions the essence and perimeter of 
corporations as well as its purpose(s). Controversial in its nature, there has been an on-going 
debate on its definition, its relevance and its purpose. CSR can be considered as a smoke 
screen used by companies in order to increase their profits. Companies would not resort to 
CSR in order to improve their employees’ working conditions, especially in developing 
countries, or to be more environmentally friendly in an era of severe global warming. They 
would engage in CSR only for the sake of their shareholders, provided that it is proven that 
the company’s share value will increase, or to attract more customers due to an enhanced 
brand image. Conversely, CSR can bear the potential to make things better, within and 
without the company and in particular for employees (Aguinis and Glavas, 2013). A few 
scholars even consider CSR as a necessary remedy to the drawbacks of globalisation and a 
tool for the creation of a global governance system where multinational corporations would 
live up to their political potential (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011).  
 
Faced with the vagueness of the notion and the area (Garriga and Melé, 2004), CSR has been 
tackled from various angles by the literature. Uncomfortable with its relative and ethical 
components, academics have mainly avoided a straightforward definition of CSR. As 
mentioned earlier, the first one who tried to define CSR was Howard Bowen as he wrote ‘ It 
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(Social Responsibility) refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to 
make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the 
objectives and values of our society’ (Bowen, 1953, p. 6). The generality and imprecision of 
the definition illustrates how uneasy academics are when it comes to defining CSR. For 
instance, what does Bowen imply by ‘objectives and values of our society’? A few years 
later, among many others, Davis (1973) provides his definition by highlighting where CSR 
starts: ‘the firm’s consideration of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, 
technical, and legal requirements of the firm’ (Davis, 1973, p. 312). Carroll (1979) partially 
disagrees with this definition as he states that ‘The social responsibility of business 
encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of 
organisations at a given point in time’ (Carroll, 1979, p. 500). These two definitions typify 
the numerous debates around the notion. As an illustration of these debates, should CSR only 
be recognised beyond the limits of the law? Or is a company socially responsible when it 
abides by the law? What does a society expect from a company? Where should we draw the 
boundaries of corporate responsibility? They also exemplify the relativity and the 
embeddedness of CSR to a specific point in time and space: the societal expectations towards 
companies naturally vary across decades and countries (Sethi, 1975).  
 
In order to avoid the troubles of a precise and encompassing definition, the literature has 
instead concentrated its efforts on corporate duties, to wit the ‘components of CSR’ (Garriga 
and Melé, 2004), and their recipients. Corporate obligations change according to the role 
granted to companies. They range from a pure economic profit-maximising vision (Friedman, 
1970) to a more philanthropic view of businesses (Davis, 1960; Carroll, 1979, 1991). The 
former considers that companies have a sole goal to maximise profits in the interest of 
shareholders, whereas the latter includes a social goal on top of the economic role of business. 
In that sense, CSR is particularly problematic and challenging as it questions the social role of 
business in society. Such a question has become even more critical with the acceleration of 
globalisation since multinationals have gained more and more power; some even say that they 
are now handling actions that used to belong to nation states (Matten and Crane, 2005). CSR 
or its corollary term Corporate Citizenship (CC) is a medium to extend the functions of 
companies beyond their exclusive, traditional economic role.  
 
This uncertainty regarding the role of business within society spills over to the groups 
targeted by CSR actions. The literature has not managed to reach an agreement on the 
recipients of CSR as their identification varies depending on the role attributed to companies. 
At one end of the spectrum, the limited economic vision of the firm limits its recipients to its 
shareholders (Friedman, 1970). At the other end, the encompassing view leads to a wider 
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account of corporate beneficiaries. Based on Freeman’s stakeholders theory (see Wood, 
1991), a company should be responsible towards its workers, customers, suppliers, local 
communities and the society in general. This debate cannot be resolved without first 
providing a clear answer to the role of business in society. Put differently, should businesses 
care only about their economic activity and performance or should they care also about 
societal issues?  
 
From this short review of the existing conflicted literature, we can reach the conclusion that 
CSR deals with corporate behaviours that are not limited to a purely economic goal and that 
incorporate considerations of social and environmental issues. It appears clear from what 
precedes that CSR presents a relativist nature, in the sense that its definition depends on time 
and space. The expectations towards companies are embedded in a specific society and 
therefore one might argue institutional framework. For instance, companies are expected 
today to act in a responsible way towards the environment in order to limit gas emissions. We 
can safely assume that these expectations were less stringent in the 1970s as the dangers of 
global warming and climate change were not publicly known.  The awareness of global 
warming also varies depending on whether a company is located in the US, in Europe or in 
China for instance. This relativist component of CSR prevents us from providing a too 
specific definition as it would erase the impact of the national institutional framework on the 
expectations companies face when it comes to CSR. Put differently, as CSR forms, 
expressions and outcomes are part of the research matter, we follow the line of Matten and 
Moon (2008) who limit themselves to a general definition. ‘CSR (and its synonyms) 
empirically consists of clearly articulated and communicated policies and practices of 
corporations that reflect business responsibility for some of the wider societal good’ (Matten 
and Moon, 2008, p. 405). In other words, within a specific country, CSR practices are actions 
by companies that improve the lot of direct and indirect stakeholders, or at very least, helps 
reduce preclude a worsening of their circumstances. From a utilitarian perspective, the 
rationale for these actions would be irrelevant, although virtue theories would pose a ‘good 
intentions’ test (Mellahi et al. 2011); this thesis follows the former path, and simply explores 
the existence of CSR policies, holding that they represent the outcome of institutional features 
and associated patterns of decision making. It can be for legal reason, ethical reason or 
economic reason. The only thing that matters is that these CSR practices exist. These 
practices can be about employees, shareholders, customers or the local community. They are 
targeting towards direct and indirect stakeholders as illustrated by Dyllick and Hockerts 
(2002, p. 131): ‘corporate sustainability can accordingly be defined as meeting the needs of a 
firm’s direct and indirect stakeholders (such as shareholders, employees, clients, pressure 
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groups, communities ect), without compromising its ability to meet the needs of future 
stakeholders as well’. 
 
The areas covered by CSR are therefore broad given the recipients of CSR. Caroll (1979, 
1991) classifies them into four categories: economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic. The 
legal category means that ‘business is expected to comply with the laws and regulations 
promulgated by federal, state, and local governments as the ground rules under which 
business must operate’(Carroll, 1991, p. 41). Ethical activities are defined as ‘standards, 
norms, or expectations that reflect a concern for what consumers, employees, shareholders, 
and the community regard as fair, just, or in keeping with the respect or protection of 
stakeholders’ moral rights’ (Carroll, 1991, p. 41). Finally, Carroll defines philanthropic 
actions as those promoting human well-being providing the following examples: 
‘contributions to the arts, education, or the community’(Carroll, 1991, p. 42). 
 
Such a conception of CSR presents the advantage of not giving too specific guidelines and 
details on CSR activities and implementations. It recognizes variations according to country 
specificities as well as companies and managers’ creativity in that area. Furthermore, it does 
not elaborate on the societal expectations borne by companies. More importantly this 
definition illustrates that CSR is still a concept in the making. Because of that, CSR is an 
ideological concept whose definition varies depending on the perspective and school of 
thought. This conception allows CSR flexibility at the country and company level. However, 
and it is its main disadvantage, it does not provide a universal and specific definition of CSR. 
It reflects its relative nature as it was explained earlier in this section. Carroll’s dimensions 
remain highly theoretical. But from a practical perspective, a classification listing every CSR 
practices is impossible; such a list is by nature non-exhaustive.  
 
How has the literature tackled the links between CSR and varieties of capitalism? This 
question is dealt with in the next section.   
 
2.3.2 CSR and national institutional frameworks 
 
The core of this study is to investigate the dynamic between national institutional frameworks 
and CSR practices. Questioning the relations between national institutional frameworks and 
CSR practices implies a two-steps inquiry examining first the existence of a connection 
between institutions and CSR, and then qualifying this relation. The following two 
subsections look at the role of institutions in relation to CSR and the ambivalent relations 
between the two.   
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2.3.2.1 The role of institutions in relation to CSR 
 
In contrast with the more general academic interest in CSR, the study of the role of national 
institutions on CSR is relatively recent. Despite this recent  line of study it is already widely 
accepted in the literature that the national institutional framework has an impact on the 
antecedents and forms embraced by CSR (Matten and Moon, 2008; Kinderman, 2009, 2012).  
 
The literature came to the conclusion on the role of institutions in two stages. Looking at the 
reasons for undertaking CSR, Aguilera et al. (2006) provides a multi-layered analysis of the 
different motives for the adoption of CSR. These authors identify three levels, the employee, 
the organisational and the national level. Each level is dominated by the combination of three 
motives, instrumental, relational and moral, that push actors towards CSR. At the national 
level, Aguilera et al. (2006) focus on the types of law and conclude that legislation and 
governments play an influential role in pushing companies towards CSR. It is however 
interesting to notice that at the national level they do not mention the role of the institutional 
framework as an influencing factor of regulation. National institutions are only introduced in 
the theoretical framework at the organizational level in order to justify the variety of 
corporate governance models influencing stakeholders’ expectations when it comes to CSR 
(Aguilera et al., 2007). Drawing conclusions from this analysis, the different models of 
corporate governance, understood as the ‘relationships within the firm and between the firm 
and its environment’ (Aguilera et al., 2006, p. 148), are presented as one explanation of the 
variations of CSR (Aguilera et al., 2006). What does this mean for this study? The authors 
implicitly recognise a role for institutions in the adoption of CSR even though they do not 
clearly mention the words ‘national institutional framework’. They imply them when 
analysing the models of corporate governance as a direct consequence of national institutions. 
The impact of institutions becomes clearer in connection with previous work of Aguilera 
specifically on corporate governance. Indeed in this work, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) seek 
to explain the diversity across countries of corporate governance practices by filling in the 
gaps in both agency theory literature and comparative institutional theories. For that purpose, 
they make sense of this diversity by connecting corporate governance systems with national 
institutional frameworks. In other words, they offer a framework where institutions at the 
national level shape the needs and behaviours of firm-level stakeholders, i.e., financiers, 
workers and management. Such an interconnection between levels of analysis, in particular 
the firm level and the national level, have been highlighted later in a more explicit way to 
explain the role of institutions on CSR companies’ involvement and practices. 
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Campbell (2007) applies a similar multi-level analysis when looking at the reasons why 
corporations act in a responsible way. Despite a limited focus on the determinants of CSR, he 
develops a two steps argumentation where the internal and external economic conditions are 
paramount in order to explain the adoption of CSR practices. More precisely, he recognises 
the role played by institutions while admitting that economic conditions cannot be ignored. 
Resorting to a definition of institutions similar to that provided by North - institutions as 
constraints on individual behaviours (North, 1991) – he concludes that the presence of 
specific institutions, such as state regulation,  provide a more or less favourable framework 
for the adoption of CSR. However, the decision to implement CSR practices is highly 
dependent on the economic conditions of both the country and the company. Put in slightly 
different terms, institutions such as national regulation, work regulation or the presence or 
absence of NGOs, consist of mediating factors rather than automatic triggering factors 
(Campbell, 2007). What is of interest in this approach in relation to our study is the risk borne 
by an institutional approach that would turn a blind eye to firm level characteristics such as 
the economic success or failure of a company. 
 
Following from this, national institutions have a certain impact on the adoption by companies 
of CSR practices. Nevertheless, it remains so far unclear to what extent CSR is influenced 
and shaped by institutions. The literature has tried to answer that question but offers a divided 
front as far as the answer is concerned.  
 
2.3.2.2 An ambivalent influence of national institutional frameworks on CSR 
 
When it comes to CSR practices as shaped or at least influenced by national institutional 
frameworks, there is an underlying question that orients the literature. Is there a national 
system that provides better results in terms of CSR? Could it be assumed for instance that in 
coordinated market economies, because of their non-market coordination, CSR is stronger? 
Or is it the contrary?  
 
As it was observed in the previous sub-section, the first step in the literature was to connect 
CSR and institutions by referring to a limited notion of institutions and to specific types of 
institutions. The connection with a variety of capitalism comes in a second phase. The turn 
taken by the literature presents helpful, though partial, insights for our research since it has 
been convincingly demonstrated that a variety of capitalism shapes the forms embraced by 
CSR at the firm level (Matten and Moon, 2008). However, the literature is incomplete since it 
disagrees on the nature of the connection between variety of capitalism and CSR forms. A 
strand of the literature argues that CSR merely mirrors the existing institutional framework 
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(Matten and Moon, 2008; Kang and Moon, 2011), whereas another strand views CSR as a 
complement to national institutions (Kinderman, 2009, 2012; Jackson and Apostolakou, 
2010). In other words, as the former claims that CSR is widely developed in coordinated 
market economies, the latter contends that CSR is stronger in liberal market economies. The 
implications of this debate for our research are crucial for the following reasons. We are 
interested in characterising the link between a variety of capitalism and CSR outcomes in a 
specific geographical context, in France and in the UK. These two countries, as 
aforementioned, embody different varieties of capitalism. The UK is a typical LME, while 
France presents a debated variety of capitalism, in between a LME and a CME. Unveiling the 
connection between a variety of capitalism and CSR will allow us to make assumptions 
regarding the level and extent of CSR observed in France and in the UK. Before examining in 
detail the question of CSR in these two countries, we analyse the general literature on the link 
between national institutional framework and CSR. 
 
2.3.2.2.1 CSR: an institutional mirror? 
 
The first study that explicitly connects varieties of capitalism and CSR is the one conducted 
by Matten and Moon (2008) where they strive to explain the variety of CSR across countries 
as the result of national institutional frameworks, and in particular as the result of institutions 
such as ‘industrial relations, labour law, and corporate governance’ (Matten and Moon, 
2008, p. 409).  The authors resort to the LME/CME distinction and the business system 
approach (Whitley, 1999) to explain the varieties of CSR forms. The business system 
approach precedes the VoC approach. In order to understand better the theoretical angle 
Matten and Moon adopted, one should recall the definition of a business system. Whitley, 
defines it as ‘distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary in their degree and mode 
of authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the organization of, and 
interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and other employees’ (Whitley, 1999, 
p. 33). A business system is organised around four key institutions whose characteristics vary 
across them: the role and actions of the state; the type of financial system (market or bank-
based); the nature and type of skill development and control; the norms and values creating 
trust and authority. According to that firm centred theory, the relations with and among a 
firm’s stakeholders are central. It is one of the reasons why this theory has been selected in 
the first place. Matten and Moon (2008) assert that CSR expectations from each stakeholder 
varies depending on the variety of capitalism.  
 
After observing diverse CSR forms based on corporate language and intent, Matten and Moon 
(2008) categorize two distinct forms of doing CSR: an explicit way and an implicit one. This 
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divide follows the separation between the United-States on the one hand and European 
countries on the other. The former has historically developed an explicit form of CSR 
founded on ‘corporate decisions, rather than reflecting either governmental authority or 
broader formal or informal institutions’ (Matten and Moon, 2008, p. 409) whereas the latter 
has witnessed an implicit form of CSR. Implicit CSR rests on obligations, rules that 
companies have to abide by (Matten and Moon, 2008). However, this division between 
countries conducting implicit or explicit CSR is moving; countries would adopt a more and 
more explicit way of doing CSR.  
 
Nevertheless, the explanation provided, that is the distinction between explicit and implicit 
CSR, is less convincing and is actually criticised by some authors. Kinderman (2009), for 
instance, believes the divide to be useless. Arguing that one form of CSR is implicit would 
make believe that companies agree with these practices, whereas they are only compelled to 
apply them (Kinderman, 2009). This criticism is somehow rooted in the definition of implicit 
CSR provided by Matten and Moon (2008) where CSR seems to be limited to its purely legal 
component. In other words, companies engage in CSR not because they have a choice, but 
only because the law obliges them to do so. This definition of CSR is problematic and seems 
to run counter the initial definition given by Matten and Moon (2008, p. 405) of CSR as 
‘clearly articulated and communicated policies and practices of corporations (…)’. Is not 
implicit CSR the actual opposite of such visible and unambiguous corporate behaviours? The 
study of Matten and Moon is also questionable in the way they use the comparative 
capitalism literature, as we will contend in a forthcoming sub-section. 
 
Once the hypothesis of a link between varieties of capitalism and CSR has been supported by 
the data, what does that actually imply for CSR? Answering this question requires 
clarification of the actual nature of that link. The literature is divided on that nature since part 
of it argues that CSR is a mirror of a country’s institutional framework (Gjølberg, 2009b; 
Kang and Moon, 2011). Another strand believes the contrary, that is, CSR is a substitute to a 
country’s institutional framework (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). Even though, Matten and 
Moon (2008) do not plainly elaborate on the connection between national institutional 
frameworks and forms of CSR, it is suggested that the form embraced by CSR, whether it is 
an implicit or explicit one, is the result of the variety of capitalism. Going a step further and 
utilising corporate governance as the missing link between the institutional framework and 
CSR, Kang and Moon (2011) defend the theory according to which in both LMEs and CMEs, 
CSR motivations are a complement to the corporate governance model. The notion of 
complementary institutions is borrowed from institutional theory. ‘CSR complements 
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corporate governance systems by a logic of similarity (a link based on similar properties)’ 
(Kang and Moon, 2011, p. 87). For instance, LMEs are dominated by a shareholder system 
where CSR is motivated by competition and market-based solutions. On the contrary, CMEs 
are led by non-market logic as induced by their stakeholder system. Evidence seems to 
support that complementarity in the case of France – if considered as a traditional CME - 
where the state (central and regional) has strongly influenced the CSR debate and from an 
early stage regulated CSR reporting (Delbard, 2008; Sobczak and Martins, 2010; Sobczak and 
Havard, 2014).  
 
By looking at CSR motives and success for companies, Gjølberg (2009b) offers two different 
but cumulative explanations. The first one explains the rise of CSR by global factors, namely 
the degree of anti-globalisation feelings in countries. CSR behaviours would mirror the 
degree of globalisation of a country. The other one, based on comparative capitalism, defends 
another form of mirroring but this time through social embeddedness, rather than corporate 
governance. In Gjølberg’s (2009b) view the degree of social embedding can be represented 
by the presence and development of the following three institutions: welfare state, corporatist 
arrangements and political culture. According to her conclusions, CSR is not only a product 
of national institutions, but also the result of global forces that can limit or stimulate the 
development of CSR and therefore its effectiveness (Gjølberg, 2009b). In other words, 
another explanatory variable is added to explain the link between a country’s situation and the 
development of CSR.  
 
In a nutshell, the mirror theory indicates for the present study that CSR is a complement to 
existing institutions. It acts as a complement in the sense that the current institutions are 
already supportive of social concerns or corporate social behaviours. Linked to varieties of 
capitalism, that would mean that countries closer to a CME would engage more in CSR. 
Germany, for instance, a typical CME according to VoC, would be a champion of CSR. 
Conversely, the US or the UK, symbols of the LME category, would not possess the 
institutional environment suitable for the development of CSR.  
 
 
2.3.2.2.2 CSR: an institutional substitute? 
 
This strand of the literature is contradicted by other studies promoting the idea that CSR fills 
the voids of national institutional frameworks. It tends to demonstrate how CSR is a substitute 
of the institutional framework in LMEs and in parallel how it does not mirror the institutional 
settings in CMEs (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). More specifically, Jackson and 
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Apostolakou (2010) study CSR practices across various European institutional frameworks in 
order to pinpoint the impact of institutional factors both at the national and sectoral levels. 
Based on a quantitative analysis, the authors conclude that CSR practices are principally a 
substitute of existing liberal capitalist institutions. More specifically, the study shows a 
correlation between the model of corporate governance and the rise of CSR. In countries 
where corporate governance mechanisms are oriented towards the satisfaction of 
shareholders, such as the UK, CSR practices are widely developed in order to respond to 
stakeholders’ demands. Contrarily, countries promoting strong stakeholders’ rights observe 
lower levels of CSR practices. CSR would therefore work as a substitute mode of social 
coordination. Based on that explanation, how can the shift from an implicit to an explicit 
mode of CSR be explained, or in other words, a shift towards an American way of doing CSR 
(Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007; Matten and Moon, 2008)? Indeed, according to the literature 
on comparative capitalism, varieties of capitalism do change and evolve. It seems that 
countries, such as Germany, which offer the characteristics of a CME, have been borrowing 
more and more features of LMEs. This shift in model towards the LME type followed by a 
change in the nature of CSR, seems to support the argument according to which CSR is a 
substitute to national institutions. What does this mean in practice? The more a country relies 
on market coordination, the more explicit CSR will become.  
 
If these findings are put in perspective with the present study, they lead to a completely 
opposite picture to the one previously mentioned. According to the substitute argument, in 
LMEs CSR would be more present because it fills in an institutional void in terms of social 
coordination. In CMEs, as social coordination already exists through other forms and 
institutions, the need for CSR would not be that acute, hence a lower level of CSR 
behaviours.  
 
In conclusion, the comparative CSR literature underlines three main points about CSR. First, 
national institutions influence and shape the reasons why companies engage in CSR as well as 
companies’ practices in the area of CSR. Second, the literature is divided on the actual link 
between these institutions and CSR practices. CSR acts either as a substitute of the existing 
institutional framework or as a mirror. Finally, from a theoretical perspective, it was noted 
earlier, in relation to the Matten and Moon (2008) study linking CSR and institutional 
framework, a limitation concerning the definition of CSR. There seems though to be an 
evolution in the definition of CSR in the comparative CSR literature, where CSR should also 
include corporate behaviours that merely follow the law (Matten and Moon, 2008; Gjølberg, 
2009b; Brammer, Jackson and Matten, 2012). Indeed, initially CSR was considered as only 
encompassing voluntary behaviours, going beyond the national legal requirements (Davis, 
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1973). It appears relevant for a study linking CSR and institutions accordingly to widen the 
definition of CSR, and not to exclude corporate behaviours that would simply abide by the 
law. It can be argued that the extent of a legal corpus represents another aspect about the 
institutional environment of a country. That fact cannot be left aside. Whether a country 
legislates a lot, or not, such as France, is not insignificant and should be taken into 
consideration. As a final point, the following caveat needs to be noted. These studies do not 
provide any information on the efficiency of CSR practices. The connection between the 
extent of CSR practices and their social efficiency and effectiveness is not clear.  
 
2.3.3 Critical evaluation of the comparative CSR literature 
 
The literature on comparative CSR is not exempt from limitations and gaps, which can be 
divided into theoretical and practical ones. From a theoretical perspective, three limitations 
can be identified: in relation to the literature on comparative capitalism, the real mechanisms 
between the company level and the national level, and the question of agency. When it comes 
to the practical limits of the comparative CSR literature, the aspect of CSR outcomes is rarely 
mentioned. Furthermore, the literature has not provided specific comparative studies 
comparing CSR practices.   
 
2.3.3.1 Theoretical limitations  
 
When CSR is explained by varieties of capitalism, two limits are particularly striking and 
shared in common with the literature on comparative capitalism. Whether the authors support 
the mirror or the substitute theory, they rely on ideal type categories, which are far from 
reality. There are pedagogical and theoretical advantages of resorting to ideal-types such as 
LME or CME. However, the use of such ideal-types in order to explain a corporate 
phenomenon and its consequences introduce too many uncertainties and unknowns in the 
explanation. Moreover, the comparative CSR literature fails to take into account the varieties 
of capitalism and the diversity within each category. For instance, the distinction between 
implicit and explicit CSR follows the divide between European countries on one hand and the 
USA on the other (Matten and Moon, 2008). Countries in Europe do not form a homogenous 
group with a similar variety of capitalism. Germany cannot be assimilated to Sweden or Italy. 
This limitation is even more acute for this study as two countries are to be investigated, one 
falling in between an ideal-types category (France). It may therefore be wondered whether the 
comparative capitalism literature can actually account for the link between varieties of 
capitalism and CSR considering this vagueness on one side of the model.  
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Moreover, despite emphasizing a link between the institutional framework and CSR, the 
literature fails to explain the real mechanisms whereby the institutional framework coupled 
with companies’ characteristics yield CSR practices. Gjolberg (2009b) as well as Kang and 
Moon (2011) highlight precisely this limit as to the absence of research on the causal 
mechanisms between institutional framework and CSR. The studies so far suffer from being 
too descriptive. Kang and Moon (2011) tried to address this shortcoming, yet they fail to 
convincingly unveil the mechanisms between the macro level of analysis (institutions) and the 
micro level (firms). Their study remains in that respect too theoretical, without any 
quantitative or qualitative comparative analysis. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) offers a 
quantitative analysis of the impact of national institutions but on CSR performance or 
outcomes. They found that the most influential institutions are the political system, labour and 
education and the cultural system.  
 
Examining the real mechanisms implies questioning the following phenomena. At the 
company level, it may be argued that specific company characteristics are more prone to 
trigger CSR practices. The same could be argued at the national level. Some institutions may 
lead more efficiently to CSR practices. At both levels, these mechanisms need to be unveiled. 
It is not satisfying to contend that CSR is either a substitute or a mirror of national 
institutions. It is necessary to know what actually happen in practice. Moreover, the role of 
the sector can be raised as another explanatory variable. Put differently, within a specific 
industry, the behaviour of competitors might have an impact on a company’s CSR practices. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) defined an organisational field as ‘those organisations 
that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, 
resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce 
similar services or products’. Within this field, organisations become more and more similar. 
How far are these isomorphic pressures, whether they are coercive, mimetic or normative, 
active in the case of CSR? Caprar and Neville (2012, p.233) advise researchers to be cautious 
as a ‘limited isomorphism’ would appear to take place in the case of CSR (Caprar and 
Neville, 2012, p. 233). 
 
Finally, the relations between institutions and companies must be examined. Institutions 
define a perimeter of actions for actors. Recalling the New Institutional theory distinction 
between ‘the presence of pressures and an actor’s agency in responding to these pressures’ 
(see DiMaggio 1988; Caprar & Neville 2012, p.238), companies can display a variety of 
responses. In other words, the role of agency should not be ignored, as seems to be the case 
for the literature on comparative CSR. The approach adopted by Aguilera and Jackson 
(2003), though applied to corporate governance across national settings, could provide an 
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interesting perspective in the present study. They indeed advocate for the combined 
application of both the institutional literature and agency theory literature in order to embed 
corporate practices in broader social settings. Putting back agency theory at the core of CSR 
studies could provide another perspective on companies’ CSR behaviours and their 
interactions with the institutional framework.  
 
2.3.3.2 Empirical limitations 
 
The comparative CSR literature also suffers from empirical limitations. An evaluation of CSR 
outcomes on stakeholders is currently missing, as well as the right tools to measure them 
(Aguinis and Glavas, 2013). This lack leads to an incomplete picture of CSR insofar as it is 
not clearly assessed how beneficial CSR is to stakeholders. Similarly, studies comparing CSR 
outcomes across institutional settings are also missing. This gap leads to the impossibility of 
predicting which institutional framework, combined with companies’ characteristics, is more 
conducive to CSR efficiency.  
 
It cannot be argued that companies have no impact on society, in particular in the domains of 
employment, consumption, environment, social inequality as well as the making of culture 
(Brammer, Jackson and Matten, 2012). How far can specific companies’ behaviours impact 
on society? Despite this impact on society and the growing number of studies examining CSR 
from a comparative perspective, only a few of them actually attempt to measure companies’ 
CSR performance across institutional frameworks. When it comes to measuring CSR, as 
previously mentioned, the majority of the literature has tried to demonstrate a connection 
between CSR activities and companies’ financial performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; 
Garriga and Melé, 2004; Barnett and Salomon, 2012). Regardless of the obvious difficulties 
of measuring outcomes, it is essential to investigate whether companies are actually doing any 
good when launching CSR activities depending on the national institutional framework in 
place. When CSR outcomes are mentioned, it can be helpful to refer to the concept of 
corporate social performance as defined by Wood (1991, 2010). Corporate social 
performance is ‘a business organisation’s configuration of principles of social responsibility, 
processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they 
relate to the firm’s societal relationships’ (Wood, 1991, p. 693). For the first time in the 
literature, the notion of outcomes is introduced in the model of corporate social performance 
(Wood, 2010). There is then a manifest gap in the comparative CSR literature regarding the 
impact of CSR behaviours across national frameworks. Jackson & Apostolakou (2010, p. 
387) highlight the fact ‘that our article provides no evidence about the relative effectiveness 
of CSR or other types of institutions in delivering desirable outcomes’. Gjølberg (2009b, p. 
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609) assumes, without demonstrating it, that ‘stronger institutions for the social embedding of 
the economy will result in stronger CSR performance’. 
From an empirical perspective, the comparative CSR literature fails to present precise studies 
that compare practices and then outcomes across countries and would then support the 
hypothesis that the stronger the social embedding is, the wider CSR outcomes are.  
 
There are a few studies focusing on a single country, usually displaying the characteristics of 
either a CME or a LME. For instance, some researches have surprisingly demonstrated that 
UK companies are considered as leaders of CSR in Europe, whereas Germany, for instance, 
seems to lag behind. It is a rather ironic finding as the UK is the symbol of market liberalism 
in Europe, where the mantra maximising shareholder value is at its peak (Kinderman, 2009; 
Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). In order to explain the wide involvement of British 
companies in CSR, Kinderman (2012) defends the substitute argument. CSR would have 
appeared in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s to fill in the gaps created by liberalisation, 
privatisations and deregulations (Moon, 2004; Kinderman, 2012). Studies using in-between 
categories countries, such as France, cannot be found, not to mention studies comparing CSR 
outcomes across countries.  
 
Finally, as highlighted by a recent study (Favotto, Kollman and Bernhagen, 2016), the overall 
impact of varieties of capitalism on CSR practices and reporting in companies might be 
overlooked, or call for further investigation, to clearly differentiate between CSR practices. 
Favotto et al. (2016) seem to indicate a difference between environmental issues, where no 
significant differences are noticed between LME and CME, and labour and human rights 
issues where CME offer a stronger case.  
 
2.4 Companies’ characteristics as drivers of CSR 
 
In practice, companies, embedded in a particular national environment, decide to implement 
or not CSR practices. The following questions remain therefore: Why do firms make this 
decision? What are the antecedents of their CSR behaviours? Answering these questions 
requires examination of various factors as presented by different branches of the literature. As 
previously mentioned, a branch of the literature finds determinants in institutional factors 
(Matten and Moon, 2008; Kinderman, 2009; Brammer, Jackson and Matten, 2012). In other 
words, the general environment as constructed by institutions influence the firm level local 
practices of CSR. On the other hand, CSR is one of many companies’ practices. The literature 
in that case refers in general either to strategic or moral motives (Udayasankar, 2008). 
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However, the motivations to engage in CSR practices are complex and cannot be limited to 
one only.   
 
One might look at another level of analysis and question the impact of companies’ 
characteristics on CSR behaviours. More specifically, is the presence of certain companies’ 
characteristics such as company’s size, organisation or activities a preliminary condition to 
CSR behaviours? Put differently, what are the company determinants of socially responsible 
practices?  
 
A systematic study of the CSR literature reveals that the vast majority of the literature is 
preoccupied by the determinants of CSR reporting or disclosure, rather than determinants of 
CSR practices. For instance based on a systematic review of the existing literature, Fifka 
(2013)  notes that between 1972 and 2011, 186 studies on the determinants of CSR reporting. 
A review of the literature shows that firms’ size, industry, corporate governance and activity 
are relevant company level factors.  
 
2.4.1 Influence of company size on CSR practices 
 
A first company characteristic that should be examined relates to the company size. Does 
company size matter when engaging in CSR projects? A common assumption reveals that the 
larger a company is, the more visible it is and therefore constrained to engage in CSR 
(Udayasankar, 2008). In contrast, small companies would be less inclined to do so. Size itself 
is an important characteristic as it provides companies with other advantages such as greater  
resources that companies can decide to devote to non-productive activities (Brammer and 
Millington, 2006; Amann, Jaussaud and Martinez, 2012), or better internal organization 
(Brammer and Millington, 2006) that small companies lack.  It has been argued that corporate 
philanthropy, a form of CSR activity, is influenced by size, corporate visibility and industry 
(Brammer and Millington, 2006). It must be underlined that this contribution only covers 
corporate charity expenses, which may constitute a significant limitation in terms of 
generalisation of the results. In other words, are the results applicable to other types of CSR 
activities? In his study, Udayasankar (2008) presents a more nuanced explanation of the 
relation between CSR participation and firms’ size as he defends the theory of a U-shaped 
relationship. Because size would have an impact on three company attributes (visibility, 
resource access and scale of operation), the combination of these factors would make CSR 
engagement attractive for both small and large companies (Udayasankar, 2008). Nevertheless, 
Udayasankar’s (2008) study must be accepted with some caveats, as it is not based on any 
empirical investigation of this U-shaped relation between CSR engagement and firm size. 
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Other studies also confirm that small companies engage in CSR practices (Lepoutre and 
Heene, 2006; Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013; Arend, 2014), although the implementation may 
nevertheless differ between MNCs and SMEs (Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013).  
 
More generally, the issue of size hides another problem when it comes to CSR 
implementation: the potential gap between CSR communication and real implementation. 
Based on a case study of Swiss companies, it seems that MNCs are better at promoting their 
CSR efforts than implementing real programmes, whereas SMEs put in place serious and 
consistent CSR measures (Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013). The original theoretical explanation 
offered by the scholars rests within the relative costs associated with communication and 
implementation (Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013).  
 
2.4.2 Existence of an industry effect  
 
Part of the literature has questioned the impact of the industry sector on CSR practices. For 
instance, it could be hypothesized that companies in high environmental impact industries 
would be more willing to improve their carbon footprint than companies with a lower 
negative impact on the environment. The literature has demonstrated that the level of CSR 
activities is influenced by an industry factor (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ziegler, Schröder 
and Rennings, 2007; Block and Wagner, 2010; Moura-Leite, Padgett and Galan, 2012). In 
their study, Moura-Leite (2012), for example, try to explain  the  extent to which the 
variations between US companies in CSR practices are due to an industry or firm factor. 
Their study, even though geographically limited, observes quantitatively both the influence of 
firm and industry factors on CSR.  
 
2.4.3 The role of corporate governance 
 
The way companies are internally organised can also have an impact on CSR decisions and 
implementation. The underlying assumption relates to the way decisions are made within the 
company, to whom managers and directors are liable. The literature highlights a link between 
firms’ corporate governance mechanisms and the adoption of CSR measures. Harjoto and Jo 
(2011) demonstrate in the American context that corporate governance has an impact on the 
decision to engage or not in CSR. They specifically investigate both internal and external 
measures of corporate governance, namely ‘ownership concentration and board structure’ as 
well as ‘takeover pressures, institutional ownership, and monitoring by security analysts’ 
(Harjoto and Jo, 2011, p. 46). Such a connection was confirmed in a later study, where better 
corporate governance mechanisms were found to be  accompanied by a higher propensity of 
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CSR activities (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). In their study, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) 
specifically investigate the impact of the following corporate governance variables: ‘the 
quality of a company’s internal governance mechanisms, as measured by a CG disclosure 
index; ownership variables (government ownership, block ownership, and institutional 
ownership); and board characteristics (board size, independent directors, and board 
diversity)’ (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013, p. 471). The study finds that the type of ownership 
plays a role in CSR practices as well as the nature of board membership (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013).   
 
A specific aspect of corporate governance has been examined in whether or not a family is 
running the business. Examination of the role of family business organisation has  led  to 
contradictory results (Amann, Jaussaud and Martinez, 2012). Part of the literature finds that 
family business tends to demonstrate a higher level of social responsibility, as family 
businesses are more dependent on reputation and a stronger inclination towards long-term 
orientation (Block and Wagner, 2010). A distinction between family ownership and family 
management has emerged in the literature where only the former seems to be positively 
correlated with CSR activities (Block and Wagner, 2010). Some studies, on the contrary, have 
noticed the absence of impact of a family business organisation (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; 
Amann, Jaussaud and Martinez, 2012). Amann et al. (2012), for instance, consider the 
connection between CSR and family and non-family businesses. The results of this study 
should be read with some care as, beyond a possible doubt of the representativeness of the 
sample, the research takes place in Japan. Therefore as the authors suggest, the Confucian 
values of the Japanese society might lead to a general treatment of employees as family 
members leading to suppressing the differences between family and non-family businesses 
(Amann, Jaussaud and Martinez, 2012).  
 
Corporate governance is an interesting factor as some of its aspects are directly influenced by 
the legal system where the company operates. Corporate governance is in other words at the 
frontier of characteristics that are entirely dependent on the company and characteristics 
determined by the national institutional framework. For instance, the nature of the 
composition of the board may be a legal requirement.  
 
2.5 Summary  
 
The comparative study of CSR practices in France and the UK is situated in two main strands 
of literature: the comparative capitalism literature and the comparative CSR literature. The 
comparative capitalism literature brings clarity regarding the variety of capitalism displayed 
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in the UK and in France. The answer is straight-forward for the UK analysed as a LME. 
France remains a problematic case whose type varies depending on the selected 
characteristics. It is either regarded as a CME, LME-to-be or a state-led economy. Whatever 
the answer, the comparative capitalism literature shows the inherent differences in the type of 
capitalism between France and the UK. These differences in model will be later crucial when 
comparing and contrasting the effect of national institutions on CSR practices.  
The links between the development of CSR and its forms and national institutions are 
partially explained by the comparative CSR literature. CSR is either viewed as a mirror or a 
substitute of national institutions. Finally, explaining the variations in CSR practices requires 
investigation at the company level, where company characteristics such as company size, 
financial success, industry or corporate governance exert an influence on CSR.  
 
The study of the literature leads to the following main research questions:  
1. What types of CSR practices do we observe in French and UK companies? Are they 
different or do we observe a homogenisation of CSR practices? 
2. What is the impact of key institutional features on CSR practices? Do they differ 
between France and the UK? 
3. What is the impact of key companies’ characteristics on CSR practices? Do they 
differ between France and the UK?  
 
Specifically, Chapter 4 aims at answering the first point based on the formulation of 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 and 6 address the next two research questions. In these chapters, 
different sets of hypotheses will be formulated in order to address the relevant research 
questions.  
 
The following chapter presents the research methods adopted in this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This study investigates the impact of national institutional configurations and corporate 
characteristics on CSR activities undertaken by companies. By its nature, the study examines 
two levels of analysis: a macro or national level characterised by national institutions, and a 
micro or corporate level characterised by companies’ characteristics and CSR practices. 
Moreover, another layer of analysis needs to be added as the study consists of a comparison 
between two countries: France and the UK. As previously detailed in the literature review 
chapter, these two countries were chosen for their different type of capitalism as well as for 
the domination of Anglo-Saxon studies in the realm of CSR. This chapter sets out the 
research methods employed to collect the data in order to conduct the empirical analysis. The 
definition and operationalization of variables, the relevant literature and research hypotheses 
are detailed in each of the respective empirical chapters that follow.  
 
Considering the scope of the study, two types of data are necessary for both countries: 
secondary and primary data. The former involves the characterisation of national institutions 
in France and in the UK, in order to describe better the type of capitalism present in each 
country. The latter focuses on the company level where a self-administered questionnaire is 
used to obtain primary data from both UK and French companies.  
 
 
3.2 Secondary data collection 
 
Secondary data aims at characterising national institutions in France and in the UK as 
embodiment of a particular variety of capitalism. Before presenting in detail the institutional 
variables used in this study, a few words of warning seem necessary. The task of measuring 
institutions presents many obstacles and difficulties widely debated by the literature (Glaeser 
et al., 2004; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008; Voigt, 2009). In a nutshell: how do we measure 
institutions? What is actually measured by these institutional indicators? Is the indicator 
clear? Is the presence of a rule measured or is it the outcome of the institution? These debates 
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lead to the distinction between rules-based indicators and outcomes-based indicators (Glaeser 
et al., 2004). Kaufman and Kraay (2008, p. 13) underline clearly the distinction in nature 
between the two (despite a specific focus on governance indicators, their comment can be 
generalised to every measure of institution): ‘outcome-based governance indicators, as 
distinct from indicators of specific rules that we have discussed above, provide direct 
information on the de facto outcome of how de jure rules are actually implemented: the 
distinction between rules “on the books” and practices “on the ground” ’.  We should 
therefore remember that no indicator is perfect and flawless. An indicator is only a proxy for 
a reality it tries to measure and apprehend. With this caveat in mind, we rely on existing 
measures based on the literature to capture the way in which institutional characteristics may 
impact CSR practices. 
 
The legal system needs to be accounted for since France and the UK each belong to a 
different legal system, where France is a civil law country and the UK a common law one. As 
demonstrated by La Porta et al.(2008), the legal origin impacts (for a selective range of years) 
economic outcomes, in particular the dichotomous relation between investor rights and 
employee rights. CSR measures involve employee rights; the legal origin may therefore result 
in differences in CSR practices.  
 
Pagano and Volpin’s (2005) proportionality index is used to assess the type of electoral 
system (proportional or majoritarian). They demonstrate a connection between the electoral 
system and employee rights:  a proportional system leads to stronger employee rights and 
weak investor protection, and conversely in a majoritarian system (Pagano and Volpin, 2005). 
Employee rights is measured by the OECD index on the strictness of employment protection 
legislation in one country (OECD, 2015), as used in the Pagano and Volpin study (2005). The 
index ranges from 0 to 6 with higher scores representing stricter employment protection 
regulation. CSR deals with various stakeholders, in particular employees and investors. The 
electoral system may, as a consequence, impact the way employees and investors are treated 
through CSR measures.  
 
The Worldwide Governance indicators compiled by the World Bank are used to describe 
differences in political governance in France and the UK. These composite indicators portray 
six dimensions of governance, as explained below:  
• Voice and Accountability: it ‘captures the perceptions of the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media’ (Kaufmann and 
Kraay, 2014). 
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• Political Stability and Absence of Violence: it ‘measures perceptions of the likelihood 
of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism’ 
(Kaufmann and Kraay, 2014).  
• Government Effectiveness: it ‘captures perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to such policies’(Kaufmann and Kraay, 2014).   
• Regulatory Quality: it ‘captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development’ (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2014). 
• Rule of Law: it ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence’ (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2014). 
• Control of Corruption: it ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests’ (Kaufmann and Kraay, 
2014). 
 
Finally, indications of economic regulations are provided by  the economy wide product-
market regulation (PMR) dataset (Koske et al., 2015). The OECD constructs and reviews 
every five years a composite indicator to describe economy and sector-wide regulations 
(Koske et al., 2015). We use the latest version (2013) where the coverage rate defined as ‘the 
number of non-missing values as a proportion of the total number of questions’ (Koske et al., 
2015, p. 7) is respectively 99 per cent for France and 98 per cent for the UK. Based on a 
bottom-up approach, it measures objective laws and regulations, therefore it does not fully 
capture the informal economy as well as administrative guidelines or self-disciplinary 
measures by professional organisations (Koske et al., 2015). As summarised in Figure 3.2, the 
PMR indicator aggregates eighteen low-level indicators into three high-level indicators: state 
control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade and investment. The initial eighteen 
indicators cover the following areas:  
• ‘Scope of state-owned enterprises (SOEs): pervasiveness of state ownership across 30 
business sectors measured as the share of sectors in which the state controls at least 
one company. 
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• Government involvement in network sectors: government stakes in the largest 
companies in six network sectors (electricity, gas, rail, transport, air transport, postal 
services and telecommunications). 
• Direct control over business enterprises: existence of special voting rights by the 
government in privately-owned companies and constraints to the sale of government 
shares in publicly-controlled companies (based on 30 business sectors). 
• Governance of state-owned enterprises: degree of insulation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) from market discipline and degree of political interference in the 
management of SOEs. 
• Command and control regulation: extent to which the government uses coercive (as 
opposed to incentive-based) regulation.  
• Licenses and permit systems: use of ‘one-stop-shops’ and the ‘silence is consent’ rule 
for issuing licenses and accepting notifications. 
• Communication and simplification of rules and procedures: the government’s 
communication strategy and efforts to reduce and simplify the administrative burden 
of interacting with the government.  
• Administrative burdens for companies: administrative burdens on creating a public 
limited company. 
• Administrative burden for sole proprietor companies: administrative burdens on 
creating an individual enterprise. 
• Barriers in services sectors: entry barriers in professional services, freight transport 
services and retail distribution. 
• Legal barriers to entry: pervasiveness of barriers to entry in 30 business sectors as 
share of sectors in which there are explicit legal limitations on the number of 
competitors. 
• Antitrust exemptions: scope of exemptions from competition law for public 
enterprises. 
• Barriers in network sectors: entry barriers in eight network sectors (gas, electricity, 
water, rail transport, air transport, road freight transport, postal services and 
telecommunication) and degree of vertical separation in three network sectors (gas, 
electricity and rail transport). 
• Barriers to FDI: restrictiveness of a country’s FDI rules in 22 sectors in terms of 
foreign equity limitations, screening or approval mechanisms, restrictions on the 
employment of foreigners as key personnel and operational restrictions (e.g. 
restrictions on branching and on capital repatriation or on land ownership). 
• Tariff barriers: simple cross-product average of effectively applied tariffs.  
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• Differential treatment of foreign suppliers: discrimination of foreign companies with 
respect to taxes and subsidies, public procurement, entry regulation and appeal and 
procedures. 
• Barriers to trade facilitation: recognition of foreign regulations, use of international 
standards and international transparency of domestic regulation’  (Koske et al., 2015, 
p. 9). 
 
Figure 3.1 Tree structure of the economy-wide PMR indicator 
 
In other words, the economy-wide PMR indicator emphasizes the differences, if any, in 
market regulation between France and the UK.  
 
The type of capitalism, as presented by the VoC literature, is assessed by a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if the respondent belongs to an LME country (that is, in this study the UK) 
and 0 if the respondent does not (that is, in this study France). 
 
Table 3.3 provides a definition of the institutional variables used as independent variables.  
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Table 3.2 Definitions of the variables 
Variable name Variable definition 
COMMON LAW  Dummy variable which is equal to 1, if the respondent 
is from a country with English law (based on La Porta 
et al., 1998) 
FRENCH LAW Dummy variable which is equal to 1, if the respondent 
is from a country with French law (based on La Porta 
et al., 1998) 
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS Measures the strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) in one country. Index from the OECD 
indicators on employment protection ranging from 0 to 
6 with higher scores representing stricter regulation. 
PROPORTIONALITY INDEX Pagano and Volpin’s proportionality index. The index 
ranges from 0 if no seats are assigned proportionally to 
3 if 100% of seats are assigned proportionally. It is 
based on an average over 1986-1990 data obtained 
from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
VOICE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
‘It captures the perceptions of the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media’. Measure 
constructed on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with a standard 
deviation of 1.0 using standard unobserved components 
model.  
POLITICAL STABILITY AND 
ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE 
‘It measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically motivated violence, 
including terrorism’. Measure constructed on a scale of 
-2.5 to 2.5, with a standard deviation of 1.0 using 
standard unobserved components model. 
GOVERNMENT 
EFFECTIVENESS 
‘It captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies’. Measure constructed on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, 
with a standard deviation of 1.0 using standard 
unobserved components model. 
REGULATORY QUALITY ‘It captures perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development’. Measure 
constructed on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with a standard 
deviation of 1.0 using standard unobserved components 
model. 
RULE OF LAW ‘It captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence’. Measure constructed 
on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with a standard deviation of 
1.0 using standard unobserved components model. 
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Variable name Variable definition 
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests.’ 
Measure constructed on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with a 
standard deviation of 1.0 using standard unobserved 
components model. 
PMR Measures a country’s regulatory structures and 
policies. Objective indicators based on a bottom-up 
approach, leading to three high-level indicators: state 
control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to 
trade and investment.  
STATE CONTROL Measures the role (direct and indirect) of the national 
state in the economy. 
BARRIERS TO 
ENTREPRENEURSHP 
 
Measures the administrative and legal procedures and 
barriers to set up a business. 
BARRIERS TO TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT 
Measures the explicit and implicit hindrances to trade 
and investment. 
LME Dummy variable which is equal to 1, if the respondent 
is from the UK, liberal market economy (LME) 
 
 
In conclusion, these variables provide us with information on market regulation, the role of 
the state in the economy, labour regulation, governance mechanisms, political constraints, the 
level of economic development and the legal origin of the country. These data are essential to 
offer an institutional profile of France and the UK and allows comparison based on various 
institutional factors. 
 
3.3 Primary data collection 
 
Primary data on companies are complementary to national level secondary data and follows 
two main objectives: characterising companies’ CSR practices; evaluating the impact of 
company level characteristics such as a company’s size, industry, and financial performance.  
 
The questionnaire needs to be tailored to the needs and objectives of the study. It was not 
possible to rely on existing datasets for two reasons. First, this is a bespoke study with very 
specific research questions. Existing datasets, such as the Cranet survey (Parry, Stavrou-
Costca and Morley, 2011)for instance, do not provide answers to all aspects. Second, the 
dataset would need to cover France and the UK. Using two different datasets, one covering 
France, another covering the UK, would have made comparisons difficult. The combination 
of those two conditions explains the creation of a bespoke questionnaire. 
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There are many ways to collect primary data. The method chosen should be the most 
appropriate and relevant, depending on the research objectives, research questions and 
hypotheses to be tested. The issues of relevance, validity, reliability and generalizability are 
critical to any research project and should guide the researcher in choosing the most 
appropriate data collection research method (Guthrie, 2010). Guthrie (2010, p. 11) defines the 
terms as follows:  
• ‘the relevance of collecting data is established by the usefulness of research to 
consumers of the results’;  
• ‘validity refers to the correctness of the data collected. Is it really measuring what we 
think it is measuring?’; 
• ‘reliability is defined as the ability to replicate the same results using the same 
techniques, that is, to provide results that other researchers could repeat’; 
• ‘generalizability is the ability to predict accurately from a sample to the whole 
population from which it is drawn’.  
 
The research questions are driven by the search for connections or correlations between 
variables. It is aimed at unveiling links between CSR practices (the dependent variable) by 
examining institutional factors and companies’ characteristics (the independent variables). 
The research design is correlational in essence, as it is defined as the ‘one that searches for 
associations or correlations between various variables of interest to the researcher’ (Ruane, 
2005, p. 87). Surveys provide the most accurate research tool for such a goal as well as being 
one of the most versatile instruments. Questionnaires transcend limits of time and space and 
potentially can ask any question (Ruane, 2005).  
 
There exist different techniques to conduct a survey: in-person interview, telephone, mail and, 
with the rise of the Internet, online survey. Each method has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Given the features of the study, an Internet survey appears to be the best 
method for the following reasons. First, data collection can be an expensive process 
depending on the method chosen, especially if that method involves traveling abroad. The 
current study does not receive any funding, therefore, the data collection method has to be as 
economical as possible. Compared to telephone, mail or in-person interview, an Internet 
survey entails the lowest cost of administration. Second, this project constitutes a doctoral 
research project, which is time-constrained. For the reliability and generalizability of the 
study, the targeted population needs to be a large group. Conducting phone and/or in-person 
interviews of a large sample of people is time-consuming. An Internet survey allows sending 
the questionnaire to a large group of respondents quickly.  Moreover, the questionnaire is a 
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combination of perception questions and questions requiring a precise knowledge of the 
company’s activities. Respondents may not have the answers to the latter readily to hand and 
may need to consult databases or company documents. An Internet survey provides 
respondents with some flexibility in response time and allows them to search for this 
information. Lastly, the questionnaire covers questions on CSR, which is known to be a 
debated, controversial and possibly confidential topic for companies. Respondents are more 
likely to be more willing to offer their opinions and describe their company’s CSR practices 
without the presence and pressure of an interviewer. Guaranteeing anonymity may also 
partially remove that pressure. 
 
One of the main criticisms in the literature against an Internet survey lies with the fact that the 
use of the Internet might not result in a representative sample and lead to non-response and 
coverage errors (Lee, 2006; Baker et al., 2010). This argument is only valid when part of the 
population may not have access to a computer and the Internet. Such a risk is very unlikely 
for our targeted population, who are company employees, and where computers and the 
Internet are used daily.  
 
3.3.1 Development of the questionnaires 
 
The purpose of the study is to gain a deeper understanding of corporate CSR activities and 
factors influencing them. For that reason, questionnaires are addressed to employees that are 
based in France and in the UK. Questionnaire design can be a difficult exercise. In order to 
avoid common flaws or errors, the research instrument was constructed bearing in mind the 
guidelines proposed by Dillman (2009) and Ornstein (2013). A review of the literature on 
CSR practices provided an initial outline of key questions to be asked (see, for example, 
David, Kline, & Dai (2005); Lindgreen & Johnston (2009); Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult (1999)). 
After further developments of the questions, the questionnaire instrument was discussed with 
two academics with prior experience and knowledge of both the survey method and the area 
of research. Based on their comments, the draft questionnaire was modified several times to 
arrive at its final version. The questionnaire is only composed of closed questions, seeking 
either quantitative data or qualitative information. The former is answered either by numerical 
values that the respondent has to provide (such as the number of employees, or the number of 
national competitors) or by selecting answers from a list provided. The qualitative answers 
are transformed into quantitative data by assigning a numerical value to each category of 
response.  
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Considering the cross-country comparison element of the study, the questionnaire needed to 
be set in two languages: English and French. As the research project takes place in an 
English-speaking environment, the questionnaire was first written in English. It was then 
translated into French by the researcher, who is a native French speaker. In order to verify the 
quality and accuracy of the translation, another native French speaker then translated it back 
into English. Any discrepancies between the English and French language versions were 
corrected in order to produce the same questionnaire in both languages. 
 
The questionnaire was piloted in both countries in order to confirm and guarantee its clarity 
and the absence of ambiguous questions, as well as a respondent-friendly structure and 
layout. Five managers in each country were asked to take the survey, which led to some 
minor corrections, mainly in relation to the general structure and layout of the questionnaire. 
For instance, some questions appeared to be visually too long to a professional audience and 
therefore tedious, and so needed to be separated into shorter components. 
 
The final questionnaire is organised in three sections: (1) company practices in relation to 
CSR, (2) organisation questions on the respondent and the company, (3) performance of the 
company and performance in relation to its competitors. The first part of the questionnaire is 
itself divided between real CSR activities, respondents’ perceptions of their company CSR 
practices and general perceptions on the role of CSR. The questionnaire consists of a total of 
48 questions, with most questions being composed of multiple parts. It was decided to 
provide a general title to the study rather than indicating from the start that the topic of the 
study is CSR. This is because CSR may be conceived as being contentious, so an attempt was 
made to limit biases towards CSR as far as possible.  Regarding the internal organisation of 
the questionnaire itself, the questionnaire starts with demographic questions about the 
respondents, then performance of their company and finally questions about CSR practices.  
A copy of the questionnaire in French is in Appendix 1, the English version of the 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
3.3.2 Respondent selection 
 
Since the desired information is highly specific in nature, the study requires respondents with 
detailed knowledge of the company’s practices in relation to its employees, to the 
environment, and to more general implications of CSR practices. HR managers appear to be 
the best target for this questionnaire in the absence of a dedicated CSR department in the 
company for two reasons. First, HR managers’ actions have a direct effect on a central 
internal stakeholder, employees. HR managers are at the centre of human resource 
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management which covers for instance employment contract, selection and retention of 
employees, working conditions, working time and employee voice and participation (Wood, 
Brewster and Brookes, 2014). In that respect, many aspects of CSR directly involve 
employees and HR managers, as decision makers or implementers (Lam and Khare, 2010). 
Furthermore, CSR and HR are linked within a company. Gond et al. (2011) identify three 
ways CSR and HR are connected with each other. CSR can either be the product of the HR 
department. CSR can also be shared between the HR function and other departments, such as 
communication or marketing. CSR decisions and actions are the combined product of HR and 
other relevant departments. Or, CSR is completely separate from the HR function but relies 
on the HR department to implement CSR actions related to employees. Regardless the 
internal specificities of the HR/CSR interface, HR managers play an important part in either 
deciding or implementing CSR actions, that will then have an impact on internal and external 
stakeholders. Given their role, HR managers will develop a view about CSR, that may or may 
not represent the view of other employees. But their views matter given their role in relation 
to CSR (Lam and Khare, 2010; De Stefano et al., 2018). 
 
A difficult methodological issue is whether the questionnaire should be sent to a single 
respondent or to multiple respondents in a particular company. Since CSR information is 
highly specialised not every manager may have access to the requisite information. However, 
given the difficulty of identifying and contacting multiple respondents in a company and in 
line with the time constraints of the research project, where obtaining multiple respondents 
would be very time-consuming, it was decided to rely on one respondent per company.  
 
3.3.3 Web survey 
 
Web surveys in comparison to telephone or mail surveys present several advantages in terms 
of cost, time and administration of the questionnaire (Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2009). 
Furthermore, the use of emails and web survey match a current trend in organisations where 
modes of communication have shifted towards an electronic medium (Dillman, Smyth and 
Christian, 2009).  
 
To summarize the nature of the data collection procedures used in this study:  Two data 
collection strategies were undertaken. The first strictly follows Dillman’s total design survey 
method (Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2009). However, despite following Dillman’s method 
and advice, resistance from the sample population was encountered, leading to an insufficient 
and disappointing response rate. These difficulties led to the need to find an alternative 
solution with the use of an online panel.  
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The following sub-sections discuss in detail both methods. 
 
3.3.3.1 First method: self-administered surveys  
 
Identification of potential respondents: Once the best recipient for the questionnaire is 
identified, one hurdle still remains. Use of a Web survey requires obtaining the email address 
of the potential respondent. HR managers, often due to their position of gatekeeper of the 
organisation, are not easily reachable. There is no publicly available directory of HR 
personnel either in France or in the UK. Consequently, different techniques were used to 
collect email addresses of HR managers, such as, sending emails to a generic company email 
address requesting the email of the HR manager, contacting HR professional bodies in both 
countries, and contacting the Alumni Department of the researcher’s University. 
 
Initial email invitation: To improve both the quality of the responses and the response rate, an 
initial email invitation to participate in the survey was sent to HR managers at the beginning 
of September 2015. The email identified the researcher and the institution where the research 
is taking place. It also explained the purpose of the study and its academic and managerial 
importance. It described the use of an Internet software (Qualtrics) to conduct the survey and 
ensured participants of total anonymity and confidentiality. A sample copy of the email 
invitation is produced in Appendix 1 for the French version and in Appendix 2 for the English 
version. 
 
Follow up emails: Sending follow up emails is essential to improve the response rate. A 
follow-up email was automatically sent after 10 days of non-response to the questionnaire. A 
third follow-up email was sent after a similar amount of time in the case of persistent non-
response. 
 
Survey sponsorship: The likelihood of taking part in the survey increases when the study is 
sponsored by an organisation valued by the respondents. The study benefits from Warwick 
Business School sponsorship.  
 
Questionnaire design: The literature has not reached a consensus on the impact of the length 
of the questionnaire on the response rate (Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2009). A rather long 
questionnaire does not necessarily jeopardise the success of the survey. The layout of the 
questionnaire is essential and must be respondent-friendly as well as the formulation of the 
questions.  
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Anonymity/Confidentiality: Assurances were provided that all responses would remain 
confidential and anonymous. Neither the respondent nor his/her organisation would be 
identified during the report stage of the study. These reassurances were incorporated in the 
email invitation. The final question of the questionnaire asks for the respondent’s company 
name, which could be viewed as running against the confidentiality principle. It was noted 
though that the respondent remained free either to answer or not to answer that question, and 
that the name of the company would never be alluded to in any further reports. The name of 
the company could prove useful in the construction of the dataset to include further 
information on the company such as its financial performance.  
 
Non-monetary incentives: Monetary incentives are believed to increase the response rate 
(Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2009). The study does not receive any specific funding which 
initially ruled out any type of monetary compensation. At that time, the only incentive 
available was a non-monetary one with the offer of a summary of the study’s findings. As 
explained in the next sub-section, the second data collection method relied on a small 
monetary incentive.    
 
Two types of difficulties were encountered. First, collecting HR managers email addresses 
revealed to be much more difficult than initially anticipated. As noted above, HR managers 
are not easily accessible. In France and the UK there is no HR directory. In order to collect 
email addresses, I phoned and emailed companies asking for the email address of their HR 
manager. Companies were very reluctant to give away the HR email address, even when I 
described to them the study. At the end, only a small number of email addresses were 
collected implying a small sampling frame. Nevertheless, that sampling frame was used to 
administer the questionnaire.  
 
Second and more importantly, despite having followed Dillman’s total design method 
(Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2009, 2016) with three rounds of follow-up reminders, 
potential respondents were not willing to complete the questionnaire. There are many reasons 
why potential respondents do not want to complete a survey: lack of time, especially when the 
targeted sample is professional; numerous and increasing survey solicitations by phone and 
email; lack of interest; sensitive topic covered by the survey; survey climate; individual mood 
(Michle et al., 2016). No matter what the individual explanation is, this reaction is in line with 
a general and well-documented rise in survey non-response rates (Atrostic et al., 2001; Brick 
and Williams, 2013).  
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3.3.3.2 Second method: online panels 
 
At this stage, given the very small and insufficient response rate, an alternative data collection 
method had to be found, otherwise, the whole study would have to have been abandoned. 
Considering the existing constraints, including the limited time of a PhD project, very limited 
budget, high non-response rate of traditional survey methods, it was decided that the use of 
online panels to supplement the existing responses was the best (and only feasible) form of 
action. As will be explained below, the use of online panels guarantied the collection of 
sufficient good quality data in a short amount of time for a small cost. 
 
Online panels are defined by ISO 26362: Access Panels in Market, Opinion, and Social 
Research as ‘a sample database of potential respondents who declare that they will cooperate 
with future (online) data collection if selected’ (see in Callegaro and Disogra, 2008, p. 718). 
These potential respondents register their interests with market research companies and are 
then contacted on a survey basis. They receive monetary compensation provided they 
successfully qualify for the individual study and fully complete the questionnaire.  
 
Before detailing the choice of the company and the data collection, some issues need to be 
clarified. Indeed, notwithstanding a rising use of online panels by academic research (Baker 
et al., 2010; Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2014), the general questions of payment of 
respondents, representativeness of the sample and quality of the data need to be addressed.  
 
Monetary incentives and their impact:  
The use of incentives has received a great deal of attention in the literature, which generally 
views them positively. The relation between survey participation and incentives is 
enlightened in the context of economic-exchange theory and social-exchange theory 
(Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2009, 2016; Michle et al., 2016). Both theories reach the 
same conclusion on the positive impact of incentives, however, their justifications are 
opposite. The former points to the cost-benefit calculation made by potential respondents. The 
benefit has to outweigh the cost of taking a survey. If the incentive is high enough, in 
particular in the case of monetary incentives, it will increase the response rate. On the other 
hand, Dillman (2009, 2016) views incentives in the context of an exchange of reciprocate gift 
and counter-gift. The initial incentive creates a perceived obligation on the part of the 
potential respondent to take part in the survey. Incentives can be monetary or non-monetary, 
prior to survey participation or conditional on survey participation. Analysing these four types 
of incentives, Church (1993) found that including compensation (monetary or not) prior to 
survey participation lead to a higher response rate. When comparing the impact on mail 
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surveys of various monetary incentives, Warriner et al. (1996) demonstrate that only cash 
incentives have an impact on response rates. Donations to charity and the possibility of 
winning a lottery prize do not have an effect on the response rates.  
 
Some scholars in Economics and Psychology warn that monetary incentives may have a 
negative impact on study participation and response rates (Lacetera and Macis, 2010). In 
particular, Sauermann and Roach (2013, p. 275) explain that ‘contingent pay may undermine 
actors’ intrinsic or social motivations to engage in a task, potentially resulting in a negative 
net effect. Such “motivation crowding-out” may occur if individuals feel that incentives are 
controlling, if pay is interpreted as a sign that the task cannot be “fun”, or if pay leads actors 
to focus their cost-benefits analysis narrowly on financial aspects’. 
 
Overall the literature views monetary reward as a positive incentive to increase response 
rates. Online panels are a consequence of these findings in that they try to incentivise people 
by rewarding them with a small amount of money. 
 
Question of the representativeness of the sample 
Traditionally, surveys rely on probability sampling which means that each respondent in the 
population has the same (known) probability to be included in the sample as any other  
member of the population (Vehovar, Toepoel and Steinmetz, 2016). Probability sampling 
guarantees the representativity of the sample and allows generalisation of the results to the 
population. However, when it is difficult to know about the population, this makes probability 
sampling impossible, and other sampling technique need to be employed (Uprichard, 2013). 
Online panels deviate from probability sampling as market research companies use non-
probability sampling to build their samples with ‘snowball sampling, banner ads, direct 
enrolment’ techniques (Callegaro et al., 2014, p. 24). To what extent is this deviation 
detrimental to the quality of the results?  
 
Before answering that question, Uprichard (2013, p. 7) warns that in any case ‘there needs to 
be greater acknowledgement that any sample will necessarily fall short of the ideal simply 
because the praxis of sample design is limited by the possibilities set by the three-pronged 
configuration of issues, which itself becomes clearer in the context of the research itself’. 
Some studies have compared results obtained from probabilistic and non-probabilistic 
samples in order to discover whether the two sampling methods yield similar results. 
Comparing results from surveys on climate change and the Kyoto Protocol, Berrens et al. 
(2003) conclude that there is no difference in representativeness and findings between 
probability and non-probability sampling. A similar conclusion was reached by Sanders et al. 
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(2007) while comparing survey results from probabilistic and non-probabilistic samples as 
part of the 2005 British election study.  
 
Quality of the data in the case of online panels:  
Following the use of incentives, the question of the quality and reliability of the answers has 
been raised. Are these respondents only completing surveys to receive money? If so, to what 
extent are their answers impacted? To what extent does monetary payment attract specific 
types of respondent leading to the over-representation of specific categories of the population 
over the rest of the population? Following the rising use in online panels, these concerns have 
been extended to this mode of data collection.  
 
The main concern relates to what has been referred to as ‘professional respondents’; 
respondents who answer as many surveys as possible in order to receive monetary 
compensation (Comley, 2005; Hillygus, Jackson and Young, 2014). It is assumed that 
professional respondents are only motivated by the incentives, compromising the quality of 
the data (Matthijsse, De Leeuw and Hox, 2015). However, the literature has offered 
contradictory findings. It should also be noted that so far the literature has failed to agree on a 
definition of a professional respondent, more specifically on the threshold transforming a 
survey taker into a professional respondent (Hillygus, Jackson and Young, 2014). Some argue 
that professional respondents answer questionnaires more quickly than new respondents, and 
randomly pick answers (Baker et al., 2010). Garland et al. (2012) claimed that professional 
survey takers use ‘don’t know’ answers more frequently than non-professionals. It is also 
argued that professional respondents would be more likely to satisfice. Krosnic (1991), the 
first one to apply the term ‘satisfice’ to survey respondents’ behaviour, defines it as the 
various strategies a respondent puts in place to limit the cognitive effort in answering a 
survey. For instance, a weak satisficing strategy is the selection of the first plausible response 
among a list of alternatives (Krosnick, 1991). Satisficing would therefore be stronger in 
professional respondents due to the high number of surveys taken. 
 
However, another strand of the literature contends the opposite, arguing that there is no loss 
in data quality with professional survey takers. By comparing telephone interview and web 
survey, Chang and Krosnic (2009) argue that they are actually less likely to satisfice 
compared to inexperienced survey takers. Professional survey takers are also found to use less 
frequently ‘don’t know’ answers (Biswanger, Schunk and Toepoel, 2006). Overall, De Wulf 
and Berteloot (2007) demonstrate that professional survey takers are more inclined to answer 
questionnaires and are more positive towards the whole process in general.  Looking at 
political attitudes and behaviours, Hillygus et al. (2014) found that there are no actual 
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differences in answers between professional and non-professional survey takers. Finally, 
Ansolabehere & Schaffner (2014) analysed the results of a similar survey issued at the same 
time over the Internet (opt-in online panel), by telephone using random digit dialing and by 
mail (based on a national sample of residential addresses). They found that ‘comparing the 
findings from the modes using a Total Survey Error approach, (…) a carefully executed opt-
in Internet panel produces estimates that are as accurate as a telephone survey and that the 
two modes differ little in their estimates of other political indicators and their correlates’ 
(Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2014, p. 1). In other words, professional respondents do not 
threaten the quality of the data. 
 
The data obtained from online panels offers a similar quality than traditional survey methods. 
It can be asked though: who are these participants taking part in online panels? Four 
categories of online panel respondents have been identified: altruistic nonprofessionals, semi-
altruistic, semi-professionals and professionals (Comley, 2005; Matthijsse, De Leeuw and 
Hox, 2015). Online panels are not only composed of professionals survey takers, altruistic 
and curious people also join these panels. A study of 90% of the respondents taking part in 
online panels in the Netherlands reveals that there  are no differences in demographic 
characteristics between professionals and altruistic respondents (Matthijsse, De Leeuw and 
Hox, 2015). Furthermore, the study showed that monetary reward was not the only incentive 
for professional survey takers, fun had to be present too (Matthijsse, De Leeuw and Hox, 
2015). 
 
 
In conclusion, , the literature does not provide sufficient evidence to substantiate doubts about 
data quality obtained from online panels. The presence of professional respondents, for 
instance, is not a legitimate threat to the quality of the data. Ultimately, the researcher has to 
exercise a similar level of caution and common sense as with traditional survey methods. 
 
Selection of the market research company: There are several market research companies 
providing data collection services. I contacted four that are well-known and whose services 
have been used by academics for their research in social science and behavioural economics. 
The selection was based on three criteria: a) the market research company needed to have 
participants in France and the UK; b) the presence of HR managers in their database; c) the 
total cost needed to be within the allocated budget of £1170.  
 
Administration of the online panels: Contrary to the self-administered questionnaires, 
payment had to be made to the respondents. With the selected market research company, 
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participants are rewarded £9 per fully answered questionnaire. The budget of £1170 allowed 
the collection of a total of 130 questionnaires.  
 
In practice, two specialty panels were used. A specialty panel is defined as a group of people 
with specific characteristics/profession: one panel was located in France and one located in 
the UK. Each panel was composed of current HR managers, irrespective of the industry. For 
each panel, the market research company sent the questionnaires to every French and UK HR 
manager in their database and kept sending them until the agreed outcome of 130 completed 
questionnaires was reached.  
 
Administering the questionnaire by a market research company offered several advantages. 
First, it is a time efficient technique, as it took only 15 days to collect responses. Second, the 
objective of reaching HR managers is achieved by relying on a specialised panel. Third, by 
adding an introductory screening question to the questionnaire guaranteed that the potential 
respondent matched the criteria of being an HR manager.  
 
 
3.3.4 Response rate  
 
It follows from the previous sections that the primary data was collected using two different 
techniques. Therefore, it is relevant to treat separately the response rate for each method given 
that they raise separate issues and calculation methods.  
 
3.3.4.1 Response rate for the self-administered surveys 
 
When using the survey method, response rates play a central part. Nevertheless, the concept 
and implication of response rates should be handled with care. Response rates are commonly 
used as a way to assess the quality of a study, the reliability of its data and its generalisability. 
It is ‘typically calculated as (a hundred times) the number of questionnaires returned to the 
number of questionnaires sent out. As a rule of thumb, the higher the response rate the better; 
high response rate provides confidence in the representativeness of the data, and dampens 
concerns over non-response bias’ (Mellahi and Harris, 2016, p. 427). Despite the apparent 
simplicity of this definition, there is no agreement among scholars on what is considered a 
sufficient response rate leading to flexible expectations across areas of study and journals 
(Mellahi and Harris, 2016). Due to the variations in study and context, setting a definite 
threshold is not relevant as argued by Mellahi and Harris (2016) in their study of 1093 
survey-based studies. Indeed, response rates should be evaluated in relation to the specificities 
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of each study. Trying to introduce some perspective in the use of response rates, some studies 
have shown the absence of correlation between a low response rate (below 20%) and the 
accuracy of studies’ results (Visser et al., 1996). A lower response rate does not mean 
anything in absolute terms, it is not a stand-alone measure of the quality of a study. Morton et 
al. (2012, p. 107) summarized this argument in an Editorial in the Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Public Health noting that ‘a low response rate does not automatically 
mean the study results have low validity, they simply indicate a potentially greater risk of this. 
Response rates remain informative, but on their own are not good proxies for study validity’.  
 
Based on the above definitions and caveat, the first wave of data collection relying 
exclusively on traditional Internet survey techniques triggered respectively a 13.23 per cent 
response rate for the UK sample and a 14.37 per cent response rate for the French one, in 
other words, a low response rate. This represents a total of 10 fully completed UK 
questionnaires and 15 fully completed French questionnaires. A total of 56 questionnaires 
were excluded from the sample as they were partially completed, rendering them unusable.   
 
 
3.3.4.2 Response rate for the online panels 
 
The second method used brings about a different issue. The online panel precludes calculation 
of a traditional response rate because the market research company does not provide details of 
the size of the specialised panels for confidentiality reasons. Furthermore, due to the total 
amount available to spend on data collection, the market research company could only 
guarantee a total number of fully completed questionnaires of 130.  
 
As a result:  
 
Ø For France:  
o 1233 online participants opened the questionnaire. 
o 1199 started to complete the questionnaire.  
o 1120 did not pass the first screen-out question regarding being an HR 
manager. 
o 79 qualified and were able to complete the questionnaire entirely.  
 
Ø For the UK:  
o 460 online participants opened the questionnaire. 
o 443 started to complete the questionnaire. 
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o 392 did not pass the first screen-out question regarding being an HR 
manager. 
o 51 qualified and were able to complete it entirely. 
 
The two methods used to administer the survey lead to a total sample size of 162 respondents. 
Based on the literature and in particular on Bailey (2008), the size of the sample is large 
enough to be representative of the population as 100 cases seems to be the minimum, 
allowing a study of the French and UK subpopulation, with respectively  95 and 67 
respondents. 
 
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
The study investigates the impact on CSR practices of two independent set of variables: 
national institutions, and company characteristics, such as, the size of the company, its age, its 
industry or the type of ownership. The remainder of this chapter presents both national 
institutional- level variables and company-level variables.  
 
3.4.1 Institutional variables 
 
As previously explained, national level variables inform the type of capitalism of the country 
where the respondents’ company is based. Table 3.4 provides a summary of the institutional 
variables used in the study to characterise France and the UK. An examination of these 
variables underlines the institutional differences between the two countries – differences 
occur for each variable. The UK and France differ when it comes to the legal system, 
employee rights and political institutions (electoral regime and governance).  These 
dissimilarities may therefore bear an impact on CSR practices, as the literature has implied so 
far.   
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Table 3.3 Institutional variables for France and the UK 
VARIABLES UK France 
Common Law 1 0 
French Law 0 1 
Employee rights 1.59 2.82 
Proportionality Index 0 1 
Corruption 1.73 1.27 
Government Effectiveness 1.62 1.40 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
0.44 0.36 
Regulatory Quality 1.83 1.09 
Rule of Law 1.89 1.47 
Voice and Accountability 1.29 1.22 
PMR 1.08 1.47 
State Control 1.04 2.43 
Barriers to 
Entrepreneurship 
0.97 2.81 
Barriers to Trade and 
Investment 
0.28 0.43 
LME 1 0 
Aggregated measure 1.05 1.25 
 
 
3.4.2 Characteristics of the respondents 
 
As previously detailed, the survey was sent to companies located either in France or in the 
UK. The geographical location was coded in the dataset as a dichotomous variable: 0 for the 
UK and 1 for France. The French sample contains 95 observations, the UK 67 observations. 
Given the data collection method, all respondents belong to the same job category, that is HR 
manager.  
 
On average, the number of years spent in the respondent’s company is longer for French 
respondents (11 years to 8 years). Respondents from the UK sample are on average slightly 
more senior than the French ones, the former having on average 34 subordinates to 32 for the 
latter. 
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Table 3.4 Professional experience of respondents 
  UK respondents French respondents 
  Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max 
Years of experience of 
respondents 
8.73 7.73 1 47 11.31 8.95 1 40 
Number of subordinates 34.75 96.61 0 700 32.76 97.74 0 820 
 
n = 67       n = 95       
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3.4.3 Characteristics of respondents’ companies  
 
3.4.3.1 Size and age of the companies 
 
The survey provides information on the size and the age of the company that respondents 
work for. Table 3.6 shows that the UK and the French sample present many variations in 
terms of age and size, as illustrated by the standard deviation of both measures. On average, 
UK companies in the sample are older than the French ones (57 years to 49 years) but the 
standard deviation is higher in the UK sample compared to the French one (126 to 53). The 
result is the opposite when it comes to the size of the company: On average French companies 
are larger with 13 436 employees (8 876 UK sample), with both samples very dispersed as 
shown by the standard deviation (63 438 for the UK and 43 753 for France). 
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Table 3.5 Size and age of companies in the sample 
 
UK respondents   French respondents 
 
Mean S.D Min Max n Mean S.D Min Max n 
Number of 
employees 
8876 63438.43 0 500000 67 13436 43753.87 1 300000 95 
Age of the 
company 
57 126.04 1 95 67 48 53.86 1 86 95 
	 84	
 
In order to gain visibility, companies’ size was ordered based on the guidelines of a EU 
Commission Recommendation (2003/361), resulting in the following table: 
• Micro companies: number of employees ≤ 10 
• Small companies: number of employees between 10 and 50 
• Medium companies: number of employees between 50 and 250 
• Large companies: number of employees   ≥ 250 
 
Table 3.6 Summary of companies' size in the sample 
 
UK respondents French respondents 
Company size Number Percent Cum. Number Percent Cum. 
Micro company 9 13.43 13.43 8 8.42 8.42 
Small company 7 10.45 23.88 15 15.79 24.21 
Medium company 25 37.31 61.19 22 23.16 47.37 
Large company 26 38.81 100 50 52.63 100 
Total 67 100 
 
95 100 
  
In both countries, medium and large companies dominate the sample. About 53 per cent of 
French companies have more than 250 employees, 39 per cent for the UK sample. Both 
samples have cumulatively approximately the same percentage of micro and small 
companies: 23.88 per cent for the UK, 24.21 per cent for France.  
 
3.4.3.2 Industry 
 
Another company characteristic that bears an importance on CSR, as detailed in the previous 
chapter, relates to the industry sector. The primary sector was excluded from the study. The 
French sample and the UK sample present similarities in terms of economic sector. The 
tertiary sector strongly dominates both samples (UK: 42.86 per cent; France: 47.37 per cent) 
with a lower secondary sector (UK: 34.92 per cent; France: 36.84 per cent). 
 
Table 3.8 provides more detailed information on the respondents’ industry. This table was 
simplified, for clarity purposes, between the secondary and the tertiary sectors as follows. The 
secondary sector comprises: food/ beverage manufacturing; metals and minerals; energy; 
construction; chemicals; pharmaceuticals and biotechnology; IT; technology; 
telecommunications; other electrical; automobiles and parts and other manufacturing. The 
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tertiary sector encompasses the other categories apart from the category “Other”, that is: 
transport; distribution; travel and leisure; financial services and other services.
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Table 3.7 Industry characteristic of the companies 
 
UK respondents French respondents 
Industry        Number Percent Cum. Number Percent Cum. 
Food/Beverage 
manufacturing 
3 4.76 4.76 6 6.32 7.37 
Metals and minerals 1 1.59 6.35 1 1.05 8.42 
Energy 1 1.59 7.94 5 5.26 13.68 
Construction 5 7.94 15.87 2 2.11 15.79 
Chemicals 1 1.59 17.46 1 1.05 16.84 
Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology 
2 3.17 20.63 8 8.42 25.26 
IT 1 1.59 22.22 1 1.05 26.32 
Telecommunications 2 3.17 25.4 2 2.11 28.42 
Other Electrical 1 1.59 26.98 2 2.11 30.53 
Automobiles and 
Parts 
1 1.59 28.57 3 3.16 33.68 
Other Manufacturing 4 6.35 34.92 3 3.16 36.84 
Transport 5 7.94 42.86 2 2.11 38.95 
Distribution 3 4.76 47.62 8 8.42 47.37 
Travel and Leisure 6 9.52 57.14 8 8.42 55.79 
Financial services 6 9.52 66.67 5 5.26 61.05 
Other services 7 11.11 77.78 22 23.16 84.21 
Other 18 22.22 100 15 15.79 100 
Total 67 100 
 
95 100 
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3.4.3.3 Ownership 
 
Table 3.9 illustrates the diversity of ownership types in both samples. They both share an 
underrepresentation of public companies (9.52 per cent for the UK sample; 8.4 per cent for 
the French sample).  
Family companies are more represented in the UK sample (38.1 per cent against 24.21 per 
cent in the French sample). Private individuals and managers represent 26.9 per cent of the 
UK sample and 28.42 per cent of the French one. Private Equity corresponds to 6.35 per cent 
of the UK sample and 8.42 per cent of the French one. Joint Venture amounts to 3.17 per cent 
of the UK sample and 0 per cent in the French one. It should be noticed that the French 
sample does not contain any joint ventures. Finally, the presence of multinational companies 
(MNCs) appears more often in the French sample (12.63 per cent) than in the UK one (4.76 
per cent). 
 
Table 3.8 Ownership characteristic of the companies 
 
UK respondents French respondents 
Type of company's 
owner 
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
Founder and/or 
Family member 
24 38.1 38.1 23 24.21 24.21 
Private individuals 9 14.29 52.38 24 25.26 49.47 
Managers 8 12.7 65.08 3 3.16 52.63 
Private Equity or 
Venture Capital 
4 6.35 71.43 8 8.42 61.05 
Joint Venture 2 3.17 74.6 0 0 61.05 
Multinational 
company 
3 4.76 79.37 12 12.63 73.68 
Government 6 9.52 88.89 8 8.42 82.11 
No large shareholder 5 7.94 96.83 13 13.68 95.79 
Other owner 6 3.17 100 4 4.21 100 
Total 67 100 
 
95 100 
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3.4.3.4 Domestic and international competitors of respondents’ companies 
 
Table 3.10 below illustrates the variations of domestic and international competitors in the 
UK and French sample. The competitors’ variables give us an insight on the economic 
involvement and success of the company at the national and international level. Nonetheless 
keeping an exact record of the number of competitors might prove difficult. This variable 
should therefore be handled with care as rough estimates cannot be excluded.   
 
Table 3.9 Average number of competitors 
 
Domestic competitors International competitors 
UK 393 792 
France 299 1070 
 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the methods employed to collect the primary and secondary data 
necessary for this study. The secondary data collection methods involved the use of three 
existing databases: the economy wide product-market regulation database by the OECD 
(Koske et al., 2015), the regulation of labour database (Botero et al., 2004) and the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators established by the World Bank. Primary data were 
collected by surveys sent to HR managers located in France and the UK. The use of the 
survey method matches the cost and time constraints of the study as well as the sensitive 
nature of the information sought.  As the purpose of the study is to evaluate the impact of 
company characteristics and national institutions on CSR practices, the questionnaire was 
organised in three distinct parts: (1) company practices in relation to CSR, (2) organisation 
questions on the respondent and the company, (3) performance of the company and 
performance in relation to its competitors. 
 
The analysis of the data is presented in the following chapters. Chapter 4 provides a 
comparative approach of CSR practices as observed in the sample. Chapter 5 examines the 
antecedents of CSR practices in France and the UK, using factor analysis and regression 
methods. Chapter 6 focuses on the impact of HR managers’ perceptions on CSR practices.   
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CHAPTER 4 
A Comparison of CSR practices 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The main aim of this study is to investigate CSR practices and their connections with two 
levels of analysis: the micro or corporate level and the macro or national level. The study and 
comparison of the antecedents of CSR practices in both countries calls first for a descriptive 
account whereby CSR practices are presented and portrayed. Observing and understanding 
any differences between the CSR practices observed in France and in the UK, is essential. 
This study is based on the underlying assumption that there are persistent differences between 
CSR practices in France and the UK, reflecting variations in institutions and institutional 
mediation; the nature and extent of these variations constitutes the core area of investigation. 
The hypothesis is that these differences can be explained by two categories of factors: 
company characteristics and institutional features.  
 
From the primary data, the first question is: does the sample present any differences in CSR 
practices between France and the UK? Secondly, are these differences statistically 
representative and significant? The differences can be of two kinds: one of nature and one of 
extent. Companies in the sample depending on their geographical location may implement 
similar or dissimilar types of CSR practices or focus on one type over the others. There is a 
need to understand if there is any pattern of CSR practices and what are the governing forces 
of the observed pattern. Differences could also be of extent: are British or French companies 
more likely to undertake CSR?  
Figure 4.1, presented in the previous chapters, shows in the part highlighted in bold the focus 
of this chapter, i.e. CSR practices.
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Figure 4.1 Research model 
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Assessing the differences, if any, between the samples will lead in the next chapter to an 
analysis of their antecedents. Regression analysis will be employed to identify and classify 
the key antecedents at the micro and macro level.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. We first present the practices 
investigated by the survey. Then, we compare the results obtained for each sample regarding 
employees, shareholders, customers, suppliers, the environment and finally the local 
community. Next, based on these findings, we question the existence of two different CSR 
models. The last section of this chapter provides a summary of the main findings.  
 
4.2 Practices investigated by the survey 
 
4.2.1 Presentation of the practices 
 
As suggested by the literature (Wood, 1991), CSR practices can be organised in terms of 
orientation towards stakeholders, differentiating between direct/indirect or primary/secondary 
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995). Direct stakeholders include employees, 
investors, customers, suppliers. Indirect stakeholders are, as the name suggests, those not 
directly affected by the company’s actions such as the local community and general actions 
towards the safeguard of the environment. The previous chapter explains how the 
questionnaire was created: a review of the existing literature (see, for example, David, Kline, 
& Dai (2005); Lindgreen & Johnston (2009); Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult (1999)) provided an 
initial set of questions that were further developed. In particular, the study of CSR practices 
based on a survey administered to American companies by Lindgreen & Johnston (2009) was 
used as a base in its evaluation of CSR practices towards each category of stakeholders.  
 
As a consequence, the questionnaire is designed in order to investigate practices towards four 
direct stakeholders: employees, customers, investors or shareholders, and customers. As for 
indirect stakeholders, questions target the involvement of the company towards the local 
community, charities and the environment. The aim is to capture the actions and involvement 
of companies in all aspects of CSR to come up with a clearer picture of CSR practices in 
France and the UK, in line with the bottom line vision of CSR. Respondents were asked to 
what extent they agree or disagree with practices in the area described below. Responses were 
then assessed using a five-point Likert-type scale (anchored from 1=’Strongly Disagree’ to 5= 
‘Strongly Agree’). 
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Employees 
CSR practices towards employees include the following: 
• Fair treatment of employees irrespective of ethnic origin 
• Fair treatment of employees irrespective of sexual orientation 
• Provision of health benefits 
• Fair treatment of employees irrespective of gender 
• Company’s support to employees’ training and development 
• Training programmes set up in the company 
• Importance of employees’ well-being 
• Fair salaries to employees 
• Integration of employees’ interests 
• Help employees to reach work life balance 
• Provision of health benefits 
 
Shareholders 
CSR practices towards shareholders include the following: 
• Integration of shareholders’ interests 
• Information to shareholders about changes in corporate policy 
• Full information to shareholders 
• Accurate information to shareholders 
 
Customers 
CSR practices towards customers include the following: 
• Customers’ complaints addressed 
• Integration of customers’ interests 
• Customers’ information 
 
Suppliers 
CSR practices towards suppliers include the following: 
• Fair treatment of suppliers 
• Respectful treatment of suppliers 
• Information to suppliers about corporate policy changes 
• Integration of suppliers’ interests 
 
Environment 
CSR practices towards the environment include the following: 
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• Awareness of environmental regulation 
• Exceeds environmental regulation 
• Environmental concerns integrated 
• Environmental performance objectives incorporated in strategy  
• Financial support to environmental initiatives 
 
Communities 
CSR practices towards the local community include the following: 
• Integration of local community interests 
• Financial support to local education 
• Financial support to local economic development 
• Improvement of quality of life of local community 
• Financial support to local cultural and leisure activities 
• Substantial donations to charities 
 
The types of CSR practices implemented in French and UK companies are considered in the 
following sections reviewing each stakeholder.  
The initial hypotheses are grounded on the existence of differences in CSR practices between 
French and UK companies. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the institutional environment of the 
country is a leading force triggering the implementation of CSR practices. The literature 
argues that France and the UK present various models of capitalism and therefore institutions. 
The literature disagrees on the relation between these institutions and CSR; either CSR acts as 
a substitute or as a complement to the national institutions. In any case, there should be 
differences in CSR practices leading to the following hypotheses:   
 
H1: UK and French companies present differences in CSR involvement 
H1a: CSR is greater in the UK than in France, as suggested by the substitute theory of CSR. 
H1b: CSR is greater in France than in the UK, as suggested by the complement/mirror theory 
of CSR. 
 
The differences in practices will be studied with respect to each category of stakeholder by 
considering statistical tests of means. Given the relatively large sample size and the 
reasonable assumption that the sample is close to a normal distribution, the use of parametric 
tests is considered legitimate. Differences in CSR practices are therefore tested by conducting 
two sample t-tests. The nature of the data makes it relevant to supplement this parametric test 
by a z-test as a check on its interpretation. The non-parametric test (not reported here) 
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confirms the findings of the parametric test reported below. The tests are conducted for each 
individual practice. However, for purpose of clarity, the results are presented for each 
category of stakeholder in the following sections, allowing an immediate comparison between 
the two countries.  
 
 
4.2.2 Measures of CSR practices 
 
Before considering the results of the analysis, one caveat should be kept in mind when it 
comes to measuring CSR practices. Going back to the initial definition provided at the 
beginning of this study, CSR ‘(and its synonyms) empirically consists of clearly articulated 
and communicated policies and practices of corporations that reflect business responsibility 
for some of the wider societal good’ (Matten and Moon, 2008, p. 405). This definition 
illustrates how CSR is still in the making, and mainly the product of companies’ actions and 
communication plans. However, it does not give much indication on its extent, and how to 
evaluate CSR in practical terms. The comparison of CSR between France and the UK calls 
for a complementary definition, one that covers a measurement aspect.  The literature 
confirms that CSR is not only difficult to define but also difficult to measure. Scholars have 
not been able so far to come up with a single indicator able to measure CSR practices 
(Gjølberg, 2009a; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010).  
 
4.3 A comparison of practices towards employees 
 
4.3.1 Findings 
 
The study focuses first on CSR practices towards employees. As mentioned above, the initial 
hypothesis relates to the existence of differences in the practices implemented by companies 
depending on their geographical location. Whether these differences are produced by the 
national institutions or companies’ characteristics will be explored in the next chapter. In 
order to test the existence of significant differences between the two samples, two-sample t-
tests are performed. The results of the two-sample t-tests are presented in Table 4.2, which 
also provides the rank order of CSR practices towards employees implemented by companies 
based on the mean measure.  
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Table 4.2 CSR practices towards employees 
 
UK France 
CSR PRACTICES 
towards employees 
Rank of UK 
practices 
mean SD 
Rank of 
French 
practices 
mean SD t-value 
Fair treatment of 
employees irrespective of 
sexual orientation 
1 4.19 0.12 2 4.11 0.08 0.64 
Fair treatment of 
employees irrespective of 
ethnic origin 
2 4.10 0.12 1 4.13 0.08 -0.15 
Fair treatment of 
employees irrespective of 
gender 
3 4.04 0.13 4 3.80 0.09 1.59 
Fair salaries to 
employees 
12 3.91 0.13 19 3.43 0.10 3.05* 
Company's support to 
employees' training and 
development 
14 3.90 0.15 10 3.65 0.09 1.44 
Training programmes set 
up in company 
17 3.75 0.14 11 3.63 0.09 0.72 
Integration of employees' 
interests 
20 3.70 0.13 23 3.32 0.09 2.54* 
Help employees to reach 
work life balance 
23 3.60 0.13 27 3.26 0.09 2.22* 
Provision of health 
benefits 
28 3.42 0.17 3 3.83 0.09 -2.32* 
Notes 
1. 162 respondents.	
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’).	
3. SD = standard deviation.	
4. z-values were also calculated but with little difference in significance with t-values, 
therefore z-values are not reported here.	
5. * Results statistically significant at a significance level of p< 0.05.	
 
At first glance, Table 4.2 supports hypothesis 1. French and UK companies do not implement 
similar employees CSR practices both in terms of nature and extent. Similarities do exist 
nonetheless. They cover the equal treatment of employees irrespective of gender, ethnic 
	 96	
origin or sexual orientation. These three practices rank in the top 3 in the UK and top 4 in 
France. What differs is the way these practices are ordered. For instance, in UK companies 
the fair treatment of employees irrespective of their sexual orientation is ranked first with a 
mean of 4.19; this practice comes is ranked second in the French sample with a mean of 4.11. 
The fair treatment of employees irrespective of their ethnic origin is ranked first in the French 
sample (mean of 4.13). The provision of health benefits is ranked third in France with a mean 
of 3.83, whereas this practice is ranked 28 (out of 30 with a mean of 3.42) in the UK.  
 
Stark differences between the two samples are noticeable in relation to employees’ training 
and employees’ well-being. Ranking in these instances varies significantly. More precisely, 
there are four practices where the differences in mean between the two samples are significant 
(at a significance level of 0.05). The practices in question are: fair salaries to employees, 
integration of employees’ interests, helping employees to reach work life balance, where the 
mean for the UK sample is higher than for the French sample, and provisions of health 
benefits, where the mean is higher in the French sample. The latter shows the most striking 
difference between the samples with a p-value of 0.02. In France providing health benefits 
appears to be one of the most widespread practice (ranked third), whereas in the UK it is 
ranked 28 out of 30.  
 
UK employers seem to be more aware and concerned by their employees’ well-being as 
illustrated by the integration of employees’ interests as well as helping them reaching work-
life balance (ranked respectively 20 and 23, with a mean of 3.70 and 3.60). In France, these 
practices are implemented less, respectively ranked 23 and 27, with a mean of 3.32 and 3.26. 
Both in terms of ranking and means, the French sample is behind the UK one. Conversely, the 
French sample supports more intensively employees’ training insofar as support to external 
training and in-house training programmes rank 10 and 11. These practices are ranked 
respectively 14 and 17 in the UK sample. However, in terms of means the UK sample scores 
higher: respectively 3.90 and 3.75, whereas the French companies have means of 3.65 and 
3.63. Although it should be noted there are no statistically significant differences in means. 
 
Nevertheless, this observation about higher means in the UK sample can be extended to each 
practice. Generally, UK companies implement to a larger extent employee related CSR 
practices than their French counterparts supporting hypothesis H1a.  
 
This observation becomes more apparent when looking at each sample individually. Tables 
4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the different ranking and means in practices within each sample. Based 
on the means, the comparison of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 exhibits that UK companies are more 
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likely to implement more CSR practices than French ones, irrespective of the ranking order. 
In the French sample, means vary from 4.13 to 3.26, contrary to a variation from 4.19 to 3.42 
in the UK sample.  
 
Table 4.3 Ranking of practices of French companies towards their employees 
CSR practices Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Fair treatment of employees 
irrespective of ethnic origin 1 4.13 0.78 2 5 
Fair treatment of employees 
irrespective of sexual 
orientation 2 4.11 0.78 2 5 
Provision of health benefits 3 3.83 0.91 1 5 
Fair treatment of employees 
irrespective of gender 4 3.80 0.88 1 5 
Company' support to 
employees' training and 
development 5 3.65 0.92 1 5 
Training programs set up in 
company 6 3.63 0.90 1 5 
Importance of employees' 
well-being 7 3.59 0.86 1 5 
Fair salaries to employees 8 3.43 0.94 1 5 
Integration of employees' 
interests 9 3.32 0.89 1 5 
Help employees to reach 
work life balance 10 3.26 0.87 1 5 
Notes:  
1. 95 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 4.4 Ranking of practices of UK companies towards their employees 
CSR practices Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Fair treatment of employees 
irrespective of sexual orientation 1 4.19 0.99 1 5 
Fair treatment of employees 
irrespective of ethnic origin 2 4.10 1.02 1 5 
Fair treatment of employees 
irrespective of gender 3 4.04 1.07 1 5 
Importance of employees' well-
being 4 4.01 1.07 1 5 
Fair salaries to employees 5 3.91 1.04 1 5 
Company's support to employees' 
training and development 6 3.90 1.22 1 5 
Training programs set up in 
company 7 3.75 1.13 1 5 
Integration of employees' interests 8 3.70 1.03 1 5 
Help employees to reach work life 
balance 9 3.60 1.05 1 5 
Provision of health benefits 10 3.42 1.36 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 67 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
 
Part of the questionnaire was designed in order to check whether there is a coherence between 
what respondents identify as their company’s CSR practices and specific questions on precise 
aspects of CSR.  
In particular, Table 4.2 underlines the importance of non-discriminatory practices in both 
countries with the frequency of lawsuits over the last five years as a direct measure of 
discrimination. This finding is supported by Table 4.5 where 87.37% of French respondents 
and 79.10% of UK respondents answered that over the last 5 years their company has had no 
lawsuit for discrimination.   
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Table 4.5 Frequency of lawsuits against the respondent’s company 
 
France UK 
 
YES NO YES NO 
Lawsuit for unlawful termination of 
employment contract 
28.42 71.58 19.40 80.60 
Lawsuit for harassment (e.g. verbal, physical, 
sexual…) 
15.79 84.21 17.91 82.09 
Lawsuit for discrimination 12.63 87.37 20.90 79.10 
Note: 
1. 162 respondents 
 
It was previously found that France, in terms of ranking, favours training and supports 
training more than UK companies among all listed practices. Yet, UK companies implement 
them more widely as suggested by the means. Table 4.6 summarises the results in terms of 
training offered to employees in the areas of safety, mental health, well-being and diversity. 
The questionnaire asks respondents whether the listed training is offered in the company or 
not. Responses vary greatly between France and the UK. Employee safety awareness training 
is by far carried out most: 82.09% of UK respondents and 71.58% of French respondents 
acknowledge its presence in their company. Well-being awareness training and employee 
diversity training are on average available in UK companies (respectively 52.23% and 
61.19%). On the contrary, they are largely not available in French companies (respectively 
62.11% and 70.53%). Finally, when it comes to mental health awareness, on average 
companies do not offer special training. A negative answer dominates more strongly the 
French sample compared to the UK sample with a frequency of 63.26% against 50.74%.  
 
Table 4.6 shows that UK companies in our sample are generally more involved in training 
their employees about workplace health and safety issues than French ones.   
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Table 4.6 Frequency of training offered by companies to employees 
 
France UK 
 
YES NO YES NO 
Employee safety awareness training 71.58 28.42 82.09 17.91 
Employee mental health awareness training 36.84 63.26 49.25 50.74 
Employee well-being awareness training 37.89 62.11 52.23 47.76 
Employee diversity training 29.47 70.53 61.19 38.80 
Note: 
1. 162 respondents 
 
 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 display information regarding the organisation of work in companies. 
Table 4.7 summarises the corporate facilities available to employees. These facilities as 
diverse as a gym, a nursery or a hairdresser are believed to increase the well-being of 
employees at work or as a way to tie workers to their job. By far, there are not implemented 
in both samples as shown by the high frequency of ‘no’. The only facility that is slightly more 
present concerns gyms. In order to improve employees’ well-being and work-life balance, 
companies can also allow their employees to work flexible hours. Such a practice is on 
average allowed in French and UK companies in a relatively similar percentage, as shown in 
Table 4.8.   
 
Table 4.7 Frequency of corporate facilities available to employees 
 
France UK 
 
YES NO YES NO 
Gym 19 76 35.82 64.18 
Hairdresser 3.16 96.84 11.94 88.06 
Drycleaner 8.42 91.58 14.93 85.07 
Supermarket 5.26 94.74 20.9 79.1 
Nursery 11.58 88.42 20.9 79.1 
Note: 
1. 162 respondents 
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Table 4.8 Flexible hours option 
 
France UK 
 
YES NO YES NO 
Flexible hours 56.84 43.16 62.69 37.31 
Note: 
1. 162 respondents 
 
 
4.3.2 Discussion 
 
The French and the UK samples display differences in the way that employees are treated, 
supporting hypothesis H1. The existence of differences does not come as a surprise, but the 
nature of the surprise was unexpected. The comparative capitalism literature, in particular 
VoC, study closely the areas of employee relations and vocational training and education 
(Hall & Soskice 2001) emphasising differences between LME and CME. In that vein, the 
presence of variations in the sample is coherent with that literature. However, it is the 
converse of what would be expected. The unforeseen result comes from the fact that UK 
companies appear to be more involved with their employees than French companies, 
supporting H1a. In particular, the fluid employment market, the ease to hire and fire, the 
weakness of trade-unions (an aspect that France and the UK share) should lead to less 
involvement in human resource management. In addition, UK workplaces are generally 
associated with low trust work, weak security tenure, lower real wages than the rest of Europe 
(Goergen et al., 2013; TUC, 2016). Conversely, the situation of employees is usually better 
perceived in France, in particular with the work councils, the civil law system issuing clearer 
worker rights (Johnson et al., 2015) and a relatively rigid employment market. The findings 
indicate the opposite: French companies generally have lower rank of CSR practices than UK 
companies. 
 
The higher investment of UK companies in employees’ training runs counter to the argument 
that in LME employees have general skills and employees do not train them (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). One should bear in mind that spending on training can be ambiguous. A large 
spend on induction training does not necessarily denote much investment in people, rather it 
may be a means of compensating for or coping with high turnover rates. 
Furthermore, in comparative studies the UK generally performs poorly when it comes to 
working time and work-life balance.  
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4.4 A comparison of practices towards shareholders 
 
4.4.1 Findings 
 
The next step in the analysis deals with the way companies engage with their shareholders. 
We initially stated the initial hypothesis (H1) of differences in CSR practices between France 
and the UK. Is this hypothesis supported when it comes to shareholders?  
The two-sample t-test reveals differences between the two samples. Out of the four practices 
investigated, three demonstrate statistically significant differences in the mean. In a nutshell, 
UK companies pay more attention to their shareholders as highlighted both by the ranking of 
the practices and the overall mean for each of them supporting hypothesis H1a (Table 4.9). 
The practices that present significant differences (at a significance level of p<0.05) are the 
integration of investors’ interests, information to investors about changes in corporate policy 
and full information to investors. These practices rank notably higher in the UK sample than 
in the French one; these are ranked respectively 5, 8 and 9 for UK companies and 16, 13 and 
15 in the French case.   
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Table 4.9 CSR practices towards shareholders 
 
 
UK France 
CSR PRACTICES 
towards 
shareholders 
Rank of UK 
practices 
mean SD 
Rank of 
French 
practices 
mean SD t-value 
Integration of 
investors' interests 
5 4.03 0.11 16 3.52 0.09 3.61* 
Information to 
investors about 
changes in 
corporate policy 
8 3.98 0.10 13 3.62 0.10 2.65* 
Full information to 
investors 
9 3.97 0.11 15 3.56 0.10 2.68* 
Accurate 
information to 
investors 
11 3.92 0.11 7 3.75 0.09 1.29 
Notes 
1. 162 respondents	
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’).	
3. SD = standard deviation.	
4. z-values were also calculated but with little difference in significance with t-values, 
therefore z-values are not reported here.	
5. * Results statistically significant at a significance level of p< 0.05.	
 
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 further substantiate hypothesis H1a. Practices are ordered in a 
completely different way indicating that French and UK companies view differently 
obligations towards shareholders. Accurate information for shareholders is ranked first for 
French companies, but is ranked last for UK companies. Whereas, integrating shareholders’ 
interests is ranked first in UK firms but is ranked last in French companies.  
 
Another noticeable feature relates to the variation in means between Tables 4.10 and 4.11. 
The means are statistically higher in three cases for the UK sample, leading to the conclusion 
that in CSR terms UK companies are more active towards their shareholders.   
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Table 4.10 CSR practices of French companies towards shareholders 
 
Rank Mean SD  Min  Max 
Accurate information 
to shareholders 1 3.75 0.85 1 5 
Information to shareholders 
about changes in corporate 
policy 2 3.62 0.94 1 5 
Full information 
to shareholders 3 3.56 0.96 1 5 
Integration of  
shareholders’ interests 4 3.52 0.83 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 95 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
 
Table 4.11 CSR practices of UK companies towards shareholders 
 
Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Integration of  
shareholders’ interests 
1 
4.03 0.94 1 5 
Information to  
shareholders about  
changes in corporate policy 
2 
4.00 0.85 1 5 
Full information  
to shareholders 
3 
3.96 0.89 1 5 
Accurate  
information to shareholders 
4 
3.93 0.91 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 67 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
 
4.4.2 Discussion 
 
The two-sample t-test analysis reveals pronounced differences between France and the UK in 
the way companies treat their shareholders. UK companies present a stronger involvement 
with their shareholders in contrast to French companies. These findings are not surprising 
when it comes to the UK. The VoC model highlights the importance of profitability at the 
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root of the financial system and corporate governance of LME countries (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). The structure of the financial market in the UK explains therefore why UK companies 
have put in place stronger relations with their shareholders. The results for France are 
somehow surprising, where more similarities with UK companies might be expected. Part of 
the literature on French capitalism defends the view of a shift from state-led economy to 
LME, in particular when it comes to the financial system (Morin, 2000; Djelic and Zarlowski, 
2005; Goyer and Jung, 2011). Such a shift does not seem to have produced the same outcome 
as in the UK in terms of shareholder relations. On the other hand, one could argue that the 
findings do not mean that French companies ignore shareholders. It could simply illustrate 
that French companies treat shareholders as part of the company and not as an external force.  
 
 
4.5 A comparison of practices towards customers 
 
4.5.1 Findings 
 
So far, the French and UK samples display several significant differences in CSR practices 
towards employees and shareholders. The analysis of the practices towards customers reveals 
another set of differences between the two countries. Table 4.12 shows that out of the three 
practices investigated, two present significant differences (p<0.05), where the means are 
higher for UK firms. The practices in question are addressing customers’ complaints and 
integrating customers’ interests. As previously noticed with other stakeholders, when looking 
at all the CSR practices the order and means attached to each individual practice are 
dissimilar between France and the UK. By the means, UK companies invest more in the 
customer relationship. France again is behind. The practice that comes first in the UK sample 
concerns customers’ complaints with a mean of 4. The higher ranked practice in the French 
sample only receives a mean of 3.75 and relates to the information of customers.   
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Table 4.12 CSR practices towards customers 
 
  UK France 
CSR PRACTICES 
towards customers 
Rank of 
UK 
practices 
mean SD 
Rank of 
French 
practices 
mean SD t-value 
Customers' complaints 
addressed 
7 4.00 0.12 8 3.68 0.09 2.11* 
Integration of customers' 
interests 
10 3.94 0.13 12 3.62 0.09 2.08* 
Customers' information 13 3.90 0.13 6 3.75 0.10 0.93 
Notes 
1. 162 respondents.	
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’).	
3. SD = standard deviation.	
4. z-values were also calculated but with little difference in significance with t-values, 
therefore z-values are not reported here.	
5. * Results statistically significant at a significance level of p< 0.05.	
 
Tables 4.13 and 4.14 also show that when considering practices towards customers, practices 
are ordered in a dissimilar fashion. French companies favour first customers’ information, 
then addressing customers’ complaints and finally integration of customers’ interests. 
Conversely, UK companies consider addressing customers’ complaints as the main priority. 
Integrating customers’ interests is ranked second, whereas customers’ information is ranked 
last.  
 
Table 4.13 Practices of French companies towards customers 
 
Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Customers’ information 1 3.75 0.94 1 5 
Customers’ complaints addressed 2 3.68 0.88 1 5 
Integration of customers’ interests 3 3.62 0.87 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 95 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation.  
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Table 4.14 Practices of UK companies towards customers 
 
Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Customers’ complaints addressed 1 4.00 1.02 1 5 
Integration of customers’ interests 2 3.94 1.09 1 5 
Customers’ information 3 3.90 1.07 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 67 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
 
4.5.2 Discussion 
 
Differences have been unveiled in the way French and UK companies treat their customers, 
supporting hypotheses 1 and 1a. UK companies, as the case for employees and shareholders, 
appear to be more dedicated than their French counterparts. This greater involvement with 
customers by UK companies can be explained by the greater market coordination in an LME 
type country compared to France, leading to better care of customers (Hall and Soskice, 
2001).  
 
 
4.6 A comparison of practices towards suppliers 
 
4.6.1 Findings 
 
The last direct stakeholder covers the way companies treat their suppliers, which is analysed 
as an important aspect of CSR. Four practices are under scrutiny. The results are presented in 
Table 4.15. The two-sample t-test analysis indicates that three practices present significant 
differences (p<0.05). French and UK companies behave in a contrasting way when it comes 
to the fair treatment of their suppliers, providing them with information about corporate 
policy changes and integrating their interests. Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported. The fair 
treatment of suppliers is nevertheless prioritised by both samples over the other practices. The 
least favoured practices are information and integrating interests. As indicated in Tables 4.16 
and 4.17, aside from the fair treatment of suppliers, the practices receive the same ranking. 
The main differentiation comes from the mean attached to each practice, with the means for 
the UK sample again exceeding those of the French sample. This finding supports hypothesis 
1a. 
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Table 4.15 CSR practices towards suppliers 
 
  UK France 
CSR PRACTICES 
towards suppliers 
Rank of 
UK 
practices 
mean SD 
Rank of 
French 
practices 
mean SD t-value 
Fair treatment of 
suppliers 
4 4.03 0.12 5 3.77 0.09 2.50* 
Respectful treatment of 
suppliers 
6 4.01 0.12 5 3.77 0.09 1.69 
Information to suppliers 
about corporate policy 
changes 
15 3.87 0.12 18 3.43 0.08 3.08* 
Integration of suppliers' 
interests 
19 3.70 0.11 21 3.36 0.09 2.45* 
Notes 
1. 162 respondents	
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’).	
3. SD = standard deviation.	
4. z-values were also calculated but with little difference in significance with t-values, 
therefore z-values are not reported here.	
5. * Results statistically significant at a significance level of p< 0.05.	
 
Table 4.16 CSR practices of French companies towards suppliers 
 
Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Respectful treatment of suppliers 1 3.77 0.88 1 5 
Fair treatment of suppliers 2 3.68 0.78 1 5 
Information to suppliers about  
corporate policy changes 
3 
3.43 0.81 1 5 
Integration of suppliers’ interests 4 3.36 0.85 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 95 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 4.17 CSR practices of UK companies towards suppliers 
 
Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Fair treatment of suppliers 1 4.03 0.98 1 5 
Respectful treatment of suppliers 2 4.01 0.96 1 5 
Information to suppliers about  
corporate policy changes 
3 
3.87 0.98 1 5 
Integration of suppliers’ interests 4 3.70 0.92 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 67 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
 
4.6.2 Discussion 
 
When it comes to suppliers, variations in means are observed leading to the conclusion that 
UK companies take into account their suppliers more than French companies.  
 
With respect to the VoC model, Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that in LME countries inter-
firm relations (including with suppliers) are at arm’s length and coordinated by the market. 
This suggests for UK companies a limited involvement with suppliers, or at least nothing 
beyond business contractual relations. The fact that for UK companies the fair and respectful 
treatment of suppliers is ranked first of the practices indicates either, that is the way 
businesses should treat each other, or, it demonstrates that the way companies treat their 
suppliers has evolved. The close results between France and the UK corroborates a general 
move towards the (forced) inclusion of CSR practices down the supply chain (Quarshie, 
Salmi and Leuschner, 2016).  
Finally, the treatment of suppliers may also depend on the size of the respondents’ company 
and the distance with the suppliers (whether geographical and/or cultural). The closer a 
company is to its suppliers, the better and more respectful the relationship will be (Goffin, 
Lemke and Szwejczewski, 2006).  
 
4.7 A comparison of practices towards the environment 
 
4.7.1 Findings 
 
After evaluating differences in treatment of direct stakeholders, the study next considers the 
relation between companies and their environment. The results of the two-sample t-tests are 
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less convincing than for other stakeholders, as shown in Table 4.18. Five practices were 
examined with only two showing significant differences (p<0.05): exceeding the 
environmental regulation and financial support to environmental initiatives. The UK sample 
is more involved in both practices than French companies supporting hypothesis H1a. 
 
It should be noted though that the environment does not come as a priority in both samples as 
illustrated by the low ranking of the five practices.  The one that is the most widespread is not 
surprisingly the awareness of environmental regulation. For the rest, the order varies between 
France and the UK, as Table 4.19 and 4.20 demonstrate. It is interesting to note that the 
means for each practice are as it was observed for other stakeholders very different between 
the two samples. Once again, the UK means are greater than those for France in the extent of 
the practices. However, the gap is less wide than in the case of direct stakeholders.  
 
Table 4.18 CSR practices towards the environment 
 
  
UK France 
CSR PRACTICES 
towards the environment 
Rank of 
UK 
practices 
mean SD 
Rank of 
French 
practices 
mean SD t-value 
Awareness of 
environment regulation 
16 3.87 0.12 14 3.61 0.10 1.74 
Exceeds environmental 
regulation 
21 3.69 0.13 22 3.32 0.10 2.37* 
Environmental concerns 
integrated 
22 3.69 0.13 20 3.38 0.10 1.94 
Environmental 
performance objectives 
incorporated in strategy 
26 3.58 0.13 25 3.30 0.10 1.82 
Financial support to 
environmental initiatives 
29 3.40 0.14 29= 3.04 0.10 2.14* 
Notes 
1. 162 respondents.	
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’).	
3. SD = standard deviation.	
4. z-values were also calculated but with little difference in significance with t-values, 
therefore z-values are not reported here.	
5. * Results statistically significant at a significance level of p< 0.05.	
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Table 4.19 CSR practices of French companies towards the environment 
 
Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Awareness of environment regulation 1 3.59 0.98 1 5 
Environmental concerns integrated 2 3.37 0.97 1 5 
Environmental performance objectives  
incorporated in strategy  3 3.28 0.96 1 5 
Exceeds environmental regulation 4 3.20 0.96 1 5 
Financial support to environmental initiatives 5 3.03 1.02 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 95 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
 
Table 4.20 CSR practices of UK companies towards the environment 
 
Rank Mean SD Min 
Ma
x 
Awareness of environment regulation 1 3.87 1.01 1 5 
Exceeds environmental regulation 2 3.69 1.08 1 5 
Environmental concerns integrated 3 3.69 1.10 1 5 
Environmental performance objectives  
incorporated in strategy  
4 
3.58 1.10 1 5 
Financial support to environmental initiatives 5 3.40 1.17 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 67 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
 
4.7.2 Discussion 
 
The results indicate that UK companies are more active than French companies in relation to 
the environment. One could nonetheless ask whether HR managers are the most 
knowledgeable employees in the area of the environment and environmental sustainability. 
There is a nascent but growing literature examining the connections between HRM and 
environmental sustainability (Renwick et al., 2015). The literature underlines that even 
though HR managers and HR departments are not where the environmental strategy is 
designed (Harris and Tregidga, 2012), HR managers still have an impact as well as a role to 
play via HRM practices (Zibarras and Coan, 2015). For instance, interviews of 11 HR 
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managers in New-Zealand demonstrate they are aware of the actions of their company in the 
area of environmental sustainability (Harris and Tregidga, 2012). The use of HRM practices 
has a positive impact on employees’ and companies’ involvement in environmental 
sustainability  (Zibarras and Coan, 2015).  
 
 The findings may also be influenced by the industry in which the company operates. Some 
sectors are more sensitive to environmental sustainability, in particular when considered as 
polluting industries such as oil companies. The French and UK samples present similarities 
with a strong domination of the tertiary sector (UK: 42.86 per cent; France: 47.37 per cent) 
and a lower secondary sector (UK: 34.92 per cent; France: 36.84 per cent). These similarities 
are unlikely to support this potential explanation. 
 
Finally, and more interestingly, the results contrast with prior studies that establish the poor 
environmental record of the UK, with a much lower take up of alternative energy sources than 
in most coordinated markets (Blyth, McCarthy and Gross, 2015; Carrington, 2016; Harrabin, 
2016). The implications of these findings will be dealt in greater length in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
4.8 A comparison of practices towards the local community 
 
4.8.1 Findings 
 
The final aspect covered by the questionnaire deals with the relations between companies and 
their local community. Table 4.21 shows that the two-sample t-tests supports the initial 
hypothesis (H1), with three practices (out of five) significantly different between the two 
samples (p<0.05). UK companies tend to fund more the local economic development with a 
mean of 3.60, whereas the French sample has a mean of 3.30. UK companies are also more 
involved in improving the quality of life of the local community (UK mean of 3.60, French 
mean of 3.28). Finally, UK companies give more donations to charity than French companies 
(UK mean of 3.49, French mean of 2.85). These findings support hypothesis H1a related to a 
greater involvement of UK companies in CSR. 
Table 4.21 also underlines the fact that companies in both countries place the local 
community after other stakeholders in terms of mean rank.  
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Table 4.21 CSR practices towards the local community 
 
  
UK France 
CSR PRACTICES 
towards the local 
community 
Rank of 
UK 
practices 
mean SD 
Rank of 
French 
practices 
mean SD t-value 
Integration of local 
community interests 
18 3.72 0.14 17 3.51 0.08 1.53 
Financial support to 
local economic 
development 
24 3.60 0.13 24 = 3.30 0.09 2.06* 
Improvement of quality 
of life of local 
community 
25 3.60 0.14 26 3.28 0.10 2.09* 
Substantial donations to 
charity 
27 3.49 0.14 30 2.85 0.12 3.60* 
Financial support to 
local education 
30 3.36 0.14 28 3.22 0.10 0.95 
Notes 
1. 162 respondents.	
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’).	
3. SD = standard deviation.	
4. z-values were also calculated but with little difference in significance with t-values, 
therefore z-values are not reported here.	
5. * Results statistically significant at a significance level of p< 0.05.	
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Table 4.22 CSR practices of French companies towards the local community 
 
Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Integration of local community interests 1 3.48 0.82 1 5 
Financial support to local economic development 2 3.27 0.92 1 5 
Improvement of quality of life of local community 3 3.25 0.97 1 5 
Financial support to education 4 3.20 0.96 1 5 
Financial support to local cultural and leisure activities 5 2.94 1.05 1 5 
Substantial donations to charities 6 2.83 1.15 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 95 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
 
Table 4.23 CSR practices of UK companies towards the local community 
 
Rank Mean SD Min Max 
Integration of local community interests 1 3.72 1.11 1 5 
Financial support to local economic development 2 3.60 1.07 1 5 
Improvement of quality of life of local community 3 3.60 1.12 1 5 
Substantial donations to charities 4 3.49 1.16 1 5 
Financial support to education 5 3.36 1.14 1 5 
Financial support to local cultural and leisure activities 6 3.33 1.17 1 5 
Notes: 
1. 67 respondents 
2. The mean is the average of 1 (= ‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (= ‘Strongly agree’). 
3. SD = standard deviation. 
 
4.8.2 Discussion 
 
Not surprisingly, companies on both sides of the Channel are not that involved in their local 
community. It is no surprise as taking into account the local community is really not essential 
to businesses and far from their core activities. The relationship between a company and its 
local community tends to be a passive one, where the company refrains from committing any 
wrong doing. However, the fact that again the mean scores for the UK companies are greater 
than for the French companies, is contrary to expectations. Although the greater participation 
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of UK companies in charity donations is somewhat anticipated because charity donations, 
generally labelled as philanthropy, have always been widespread and visible in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; Brammer and Millington, 2006). This helps 
substantiate the theoretical distinction between explicit and implicit CSR (Matten and Moon, 
2008). Nonetheless, one could have expected a higher ranking for charity donations in the UK 
sample. The aftermath of the global economic crisis may mean that firms have less profit to 
spend with consequent budget cuts. Or it might be explained by the qualifications of the 
respondents themselves. The general involvement in the local community belongs more to the 
communication/public relations department of a company rather than the HR department, 
referring back to the distinction between implicit and explicit CSR (Matten and Moon, 2008).  
 
4.9 Two CSR models implemented? 
 
The previous sections have established that French and UK companies behave differently 
when it comes to CSR and their stakeholders. Table 4.24 provides a summary of 
stakeholders’ relationships in both samples. Based on the overall weighted-mean obtained by 
each stakeholder, stakeholder management differs between the two countries. In France, 
customers, employees and shareholders attain the highest mean scores. In the UK, without 
surprise shareholders attain the highest mean, followed by customers and suppliers. The only 
commonality between the two countries concerns those with the lowest means: the 
environment and the local community. 
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Table 4.24 Summary view of CSR practices in France and the UK 
CSR practices: French sample 
 
Overall mean 
Customers 3.68 
Employees 3.67 
Shareholders 3.61 
Suppliers 3.56 
Environment 3.29 
Local Community 3.16 
 
CSR practices: UK sample 
Overall 
mean 
Shareholders 3.98 
Customers 3.95 
Suppliers 3.90 
Employees 3.86 
Environment 3.64 
Local Community 3.51 
 
Figures 4.25 and 4.26 provide a visual representation of the CSR practices as deduced from 
the questionnaires. Whether in terms of direct or indirect stakeholders, the results suggest that 
the UK is more involved in CSR than France. This finding confirms the explicit-implicit 
theory where LME countries are explicitly more active in CSR compared to CME countries 
(Matten and Moon, 2008). This finding also suggests that with regard to CSR, France does 
not classify as a LME country, contradicting the theory of France as a LME-to-be. 
However, this distinction is mainly about communicating about CSR. It does not necessarily 
mean that companies in CME countries, or in France for instance, are less involved in CSR, it 
can only mean that they communicate less about it. These structural differences substantiate 
the more elaborated theory of CSR as a substitute for the institutional framework (Jackson 
and Deeg, 2008; Kinderman, 2009).  
In her attempt to construct a single indicator to measure CSR practices, Gjolberg (2009a) 
compares practices across 20 developed countries. At first glance, France and the UK rank 
positively on this indicator, with the UK dominating France (Gjølberg, 2009a).  Once CSR 
results-oriented practices and CSR process-oriented practices are differentiated, France and 
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the UK present contrasting relationships to CSR. The UK scores higher on the results-
oriented element of the indicator, whereas France scores high on the process-oriented aspect. 
The next chapter will test whether these differences in CSR are indeed the product of the 
institutional framework or the product of companies’ characteristic.
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Figure 4.25 CSR practices towards direct stakeholders 
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Figure 4.26 CSR practices towards direct and indirect stakeholders 
 
Note: 
1. Direct stakeholders is the mean of the practices towards employees, customers, suppliers and shareholders. 
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4.10 Summary 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the CSR practices and identify differences between the 
French and UK samples. The findings confirmed the existence of differences in terms of the 
type of practices as well as their extent.  
 
Regarding direct stakeholders, the interesting finding relates to the greater involvement of UK 
companies in CSR towards their employees, in contrast to France. The VoC literature, 
supplemented by research on the situation of the French and UK labour markets, indicates 
better treatment of French employees compared to UK ones. This study’s results indicate the 
opposite situation. The results regarding the treatment of shareholders are as anticipated. 
Indeed, as a typical LME, the UK presents a stronger involvement in the way shareholders are 
handled. The finding in relation to France questions the strand of the literature arguing that 
France is embracing the characteristics of an LME in the CSR area (Morin, 2000; Djelic and 
Zarlowski, 2005; Goyer and Jung, 2011). Finally, the treatment of suppliers highlights again a 
greater involvement of UK companies than French ones. Nonetheless, these differences are 
not substantial. 
 
When it comes to indirect stakeholders, the findings are also unanticipated. Indeed, they show 
that the UK is more active in the area of the environment than France. This is a surprise 
because the UK has one of the worst environmental records in Europe. Therefore, one might 
wonder why respondents’ answers indicate the contrary. The following chapters will explore 
this. The local community is the area where CSR involvement is relatively low in both 
countries, albeit with a greater presence of UK companies compared to French ones.  
 
Overall, the findings point to a more substantial involvement of UK companies in CSR, 
which seems to validate one strand of the comparative CSR literature, that is, the 
complementarity of CSR to the type of capitalism. It indicates that CSR is greater where 
neoliberal capitalism is stronger, that is, in the UK, an LME country. The next chapter will 
examine the validity of the substitute theory of CSR (Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Kinderman, 
2009) by investigating further the relative impact of national institutions and companies’ 
characteristics on CSR practices.  
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CHAPTER 5 
The determinants of CSR practices 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The literature has examined separately the impact of the type of capitalism and companies’ 
characteristics on CSR. This chapter aims at reconciling these studies by offering a multilevel 
approach of the determinants of CSR practices.  
The previous chapter established differences in the degree and type of involvement of French 
and UK companies in CSR, finding in general greater participation of UK companies in CSR 
than French companies. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate these observed 
differences and to examine the validity of CSR as a substitute to national institutions  
(Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). Recognising that companies’ characteristics may also 
provide an alternative explanation to the greater involvement of UK companies, this chapter 
investigates both explanations. 
 
The parts in bold in Figure 5.1 summarise the objectives of this chapter, i.e. understanding the 
correlation and potential causation between both institutions and companies’ characteristics, 
and CSR practices.
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Figure 5.1 Research model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL  
ENVIRONMENT 
COMPANIES’  
CHARACTERISTICS 
THE UK 
CSR PRACTICES 
FRANCE 
	 123	
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section develops the 
hypotheses. The statistical method used to conduct the data analysis is explained in the 
following section. The results of the analysis are then presented and discussed before 
providing a general discussion. The limitations and a summary of the chapter are in the final 
section. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses development 
 
CSR practices can be explained by various factors. From the prior literature, two main groups 
of explanations were identified in Chapter 2. Some studies are located at the macro-level and 
examine the links between a type of capitalism or the presence of specific institutions and 
CSR form and practices within a specific country (Midttun, Gautesen and Gjølberg, 2006; 
Aguilera et al., 2007; Albareda et al., 2008; Matten and Moon, 2008; Gond, Kang and Moon, 
2011). Other studies adopt a micro perspective by evaluating the impact of companies’ 
characteristics on CSR (Lepoutre and Heene, 2006; Moura-Leite, Padgett and Galan, 2012; 
Brower and Mahajan, 2013; Sobczak and Havard, 2014). This study examines both the 
country level and the company level characteristics.  
 
At the macro level, the comparative CSR literature is divided when it comes to explaining the 
development of CSR practices and the forms embraced by it across countries. Two 
contradictory explanations are suggested to elucidate the link between national institutions, 
i.e. varieties of capitalism, and CSR.  
Firstly, CSR is viewed as a substitute to the institutional framework, which means that CSR 
has developed to fill an institutional gap. The rise of CSR has been explained as a reaction 
against globalisation and big corporations (Gjølberg, 2009b). Coupled with the business case 
for CSR literature, companies have used CSR to buy themselves a social license to operate 
and to legitimise liberalisation (Gjølberg, 2009b; Kinderman, 2009).This view entails that the 
presence of CSR is greater in countries displaying a higher degree of liberalism and being 
active players in globalisation. The UK, following the US model of capitalism since the 
Thatcher era, should prompt more anti-globalisation reactions from the civil society than 
France leading then to a greater CSR in the UK.  
The substitute theory is justified by another line of argument. Based on the comparative 
capitalism theories, and in particular the National Business System theory of Whitley (1999), 
the rise of CSR is explained by the way core institutions (namely the political, financial, 
education and cultural system) define the nature and role of companies, the organisation of 
markets and coordination mechanisms (Matten and Moon, 2008). Based on this analysis, 
Matten and Moon (2008) conclude that LME countries offer a better institutional match for 
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CSR in comparison to CME countries. Specifically, the leading role of the US in that area is 
rooted in its individualism, democratic pluralism, moralism and utilitarianism. While 
industrial relations, labour law and corporate governance institutions as found in continental 
Europe slow down CSR progression in Europe (Matten and Moon, 2008). Therefore, whether 
conceived as a reaction to globalisation and capitalism or as an outcome of the type of 
capitalism, CSR should be greater in a LME, and consequently in the UK. Conversely, 
because France is not yet classified as a pure LME, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, CSR should 
be implemented less.  
 
 
Secondly, CSR is also construed as a complement to the institutions present in a particular 
country, as elaborated by the mirror theory of CSR. The overall idea is that CSR presence and 
forms reproduce and follow the existing institutions in a country: CSR involvement should 
therefore be greater in CME than in LME. CSR involvement is connected to institutions 
allowing ‘social embedding’. Gjølberg (2009b) pinpoints three particular institutions 
responsible for greater CSR, namely a strong welfare state (with strict policies and firm 
enforcement mechanisms), labour unions and employers’ associations, and a strong political 
culture. Gjølberg (2009b) widens Campbell’s thesis (2007), who argues that CSR is stronger 
in countries where institutionalised dialogue with unions and employees are in place, as well 
as trade or employees’ associations. Considering the differences between LME and CME 
countries as portrayed by VoC (Hall and Soskice, 2001), CME countries present these 
characteristics as opposed to LME countries. As a consequence, the UK, as an LME, presents 
a lower level of coordination compared to CME countries (Hall and Soskice, 2001) France on 
the other hand, despite being somewhere in between an LME and CME, should present a 
higher degree of CSR. This leads to the first hypothesis:  
 
H1a: CSR is greater in the UK than in France as suggested by the substitute theory of CSR. 
H1b: CSR is greater in France than in the UK as suggested by the complement/mirror theory 
of CSR. 
 
Moving on to the micro-level of analysis, firm-centred analysis of CSR suggest other types of 
factors to explain variations in CSR practices and forms between companies.  
 
The first factor relates to the size of the company. Size is an important factor whose effect has 
been examined in depth by the literature without providing a clear answer. On one hand, 
company size has a direct and positive impact on CSR. Based on the globalist hypothesis 
previously mentioned, CSR is a reaction to anti-globalisation protests and sentiments in 
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developed countries. Large companies resort to CSR to establish a licence to operate, to 
justify their actions (Gjølberg, 2009b; Kinderman, 2009). Size becomes directly connected to 
the involvement in CSR. In their quantitative study of 274 European companies, Jackson and 
Apostolakou (2010) demonstrate that size is positively correlated with CSR in its economic, 
social and environmental components. Indeed, the larger a company, the more susceptible it 
will be to stakeholders’ scrutiny and expectations, notably expectations in terms of 
responsible behaviours (Roberts, 1992). Brammer and Pavelin (2004) add that with size 
comes a multiplicity and variety of stakeholders. Hence, it is very likely that some of them 
will request the company to engage in CSR. In a nutshell, company size acts as a proxy for 
organisational visibility and scrutiny by stakeholders, where reputation can be increased or 
decreased by CSR involvement (Brammer and Millington, 2006). The shape of the 
relationship between company size and CSR is debated. The literature has demonstrated both 
the existence of a linear relation between size and involvement in CSR (Brammer and 
Millington, 2006; Amann, Jaussaud and Martinez, 2012) and a U-shaped relation between 
size and CSR (Udayasankar, 2008). Arguing that company size impacts three company 
attributes, namely visibility, resource access and scale of operation, Udayasankar (2008) 
concludes that both small and large companies engage in CSR. CSR is a powerful tool for 
small companies to gain visibility and reputation, to gain access to new resources and 
competitive advantages (Udayasankar, 2008). This argument is confirmed by studies whose 
focus is only on small companies. They conclude that in spite of constraints faced by small 
companies,  they still engage in CSR practices (Lepoutre and Heene, 2006; Baumann-Pauly et 
al., 2013; Arend, 2014). Their internal characteristics allow them to be involved more 
strongly in CSR than MNEs: ‘SMEs have little routine in reporting CSR and ‘‘talking- the-
CSR-talk’’ but, provided an SME is committed to CSR, our evidence suggests that they are 
‘‘walking-the-CSR- walk’’ by aligning managerial functions comprehensively with CSR’ 
(Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013, p. 700).  
These divergences are reflected in hypothesis 2: 
 
H2a: Company size has a direct positive impact on company’s involvement with CSR 
activities based on a linear relation between size and CSR. The larger a company is, the more 
involved it will be with CSR activities.  
H2b: Company size does not have an effect on CSR as small, medium or large companies 
present specific characteristics allowing their involvement in CSR. Size is not an explanatory 
factor of CSR involvement.  
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• Industry 
Part of the literature has questioned the impact of the industry sector on CSR practices. For 
instance, it could be hypothesized that companies in high environmental impact industries 
would be more willing to improve their carbon footprint than companies with a lower 
negative impact on the environment. The literature has demonstrated that the level of CSR 
activities is influenced by an industry factor (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ziegler, Schröder 
and Rennings, 2007; Block and Wagner, 2010; Moura-Leite, Padgett and Galan, 2012). In 
their cross-national studies of CSR practices, Jackson and Apostolackou argue that ‘CSR is 
more extensive in sectors where firms have a strong negative impact upon 
stakeholders’(Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010, p. 372). More specifically, Jackson and 
Apostolakou (2010) identify an industry effect based on the impact the sector has, this effect 
being stronger for the environmental aspect of CSR. Sectors that have an high impact on the 
environment are, for instance, chemicals, resources, or metals whereas newer manufacturing 
or services are characterised as low impact (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). Industry and CSR 
are positively connected. High-impact companies are under rigorous scrutiny by their 
stakeholders pressuring them to do good which then impacts their reputation. Doing CSR 
becomes useful to maintain or build a company’s reputation  (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). 
Conversely, companies in low-impact sectors are less incentivised by reputational gain or loss 
to engage in CSR (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). Furthermore, companies evolving in the 
same industry tend to develop homogenous practices due to isomorphic pressures in order to 
gain legitimacy from their primary stakeholders (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). These 
isomorphic pressures would incentivise companies within a similar industry to be responsible. 
The effect of high-impact industry on CSR, combined with institutional isomorphism, should 
lead to increased CSR involvement in high-impact sectors. In their study, Moura-Leite 
(2012), for example, try to explain to what extent the variations between US companies in 
CSR practices are due to an industry or firm factor. Their study, even though geographically 
limited, documents the direct positive impact of industry on CSR involvement.  
  
Hypothesis 3: the greater the environmental impact of a particular industry, the more a 
company will be involved with CSR activities.  
 
• Age of company 
The age of a company is a common organisational factor included in studies on CSR. Using 
an organisational life cycle approach, McLaughlin et al. (2001) associate evolving company 
life cycle stages with  prioritisation of stakeholders. They identify four critical stages in the 
life of a company: Start-up, Emerging Growth, Mature, and Decline/Transition. Each stage is 
associated with specific needs. For instance, at the start-up stage a company needs funds and 
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cash flow to assure its survival. These needs push the company to favour stakeholders with 
resources essential to the survival of the company (namely shareholders and creditors) at the 
expense of other stakeholders (such as employees and suppliers). This contrasts with the 
success encountered by a company at the mature stage. Confident of its position and in no 
need of essential resources, the company deals with all of its stakeholders in a proactive 
manner. ‘Community, trade association, government, environmental, and supplier 
stakeholders will also be addressed proactively because of the availability of excess cash and 
management's motivation to live up to the leadership self-image’ (McLaughlin and Jawahar, 
2001, p. 408). Able to answer to its stakeholders’ various needs and expectations, a company 
in an advanced stage will be more sensitive to CSR involvement pressures. This argument is 
reinforced by Roberts (1992, p. 605), who argues that a firm's ‘reputation and history of 
involvement in social responsibility activities can become entrenched’.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Company age has a direct positive impact on CSR involvement. The older a 
company becomes, the more involved it will be with CSR activities. 
 
• Economic success of the company. 
In the CSR literature, the link between economic success of a company, its financial 
performance, and CSR has been envisaged from two different angles. On the one hand, CSR 
is an independent variable predicting a company’s financial performance. The exact opposite 
has also been tested, that is, CSR is studied as a dependent variable predicted by the 
company’s financial performance. The commonality of the two types of study is the absence 
of conclusive results on both sides (Margolis and Walsh, 2003).  
The first aspect of the alternative, that is financial performance as a predictor of CSR, has 
been widely scrutinised in the literature. In other words, does it pay for companies to act well 
with regard to CSR? So far and despite decades of empirical research, the answer depends on 
the study and the model used by the researchers (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). The idea 
behind the business case of CSR is quite simple: by doing good, i.e. by setting up CSR 
actions, companies are also taking care of their shareholders because these actions will 
produce positive returns for them in the short term but also in the medium and long run. In 
practical terms, there is the belief and hope that by engaging with its stakeholders in a 
responsible manner, a company will achieve medium and long-run targets of lower costs, 
higher revenues, improved reputation and ultimately increased share values (Carroll and 
Shabana, 2010; Porter and Kramer, 2011). Although desirable from an utilitarian perspective, 
scholars have not managed to prove without doubt the business case of CSR (Vogel, 2005a). 
In reality, findings are contradictory, where CSR measures have either a positive, negative or 
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no impact on the financial performance of companies (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Crifo, 
Diaye and Pekovic, 2015).  
 
Only the second side of the alternative matters in the context of this study. Engaging in CSR 
practices can be costly for a company, in particular for activities that are not part of a 
company’s strategy, such as charity giving. Similarly, trying to improve the environmental 
record of a company can prove costly in terms of changing norms, production processes, 
materials, etc. Due to this possible cost increase, economically successful companies are more 
likely to engage in CSR (Brammer and Millington, 2006).  
Based on this perspective, the next hypothesis reads:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The economic performance of a company has a direct positive effect on CSR 
involvement. 
 
• Number of national and international competitors 
One might wonder to what extent the number of competitors may impact corporate 
involvement in CSR. The level of competition in a particular market depends on the number 
of companies or competitors. Competition is absent in monopoly markets with only one 
company and high barriers to entry. Competitive markets, in economic terms, are the ones 
where competition is the fiercest as many players are involved and entry is facilitated. In that 
situation, companies need to differentiate from their competitors if they want to survive. 
Companies can offer products or services with different characteristics; they can play with 
prices; or they can use CSR as a way to differentiate. Stakeholders, in particular customers, 
request companies to be more and more responsible (Cantrell, Kyriazis and Noble, 2014). 
Building an image of a responsible company can be strategically motivated in order to attract 
more customers. Therefore, in line with the business case for CSR, managers can decide to 
implement CSR to gain a competitive advantage. CSR is therefore used as a strategic medium 
(Porter and Kramer, 2011). McWilliams and Siegel (2010, p. 1481) define ‘strategic CSR as 
any “responsible” activity that allows a firm to achieve sustainable competitive advantage, 
regardless of motive’. It can be hypothesised that in a highly competitive market, symbolised 
by a large number of competitors, a company will be more involved with CSR actions than 
one on a less competitive market (Du, Bhattacharya and Sen, 2011). 
 
Hypothesis 6: The greater the number of competitors the more a company will be involved 
with CSR activities. 
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5.3 Data analysis  
 
Analysing the antecedents of CSR practices required first to reduce the available data and 
then to carry out ordinary least square regressions. The survey covers many aspects of CSR, 
some of them overlapping. There is therefore a risk of conceptual and statistical overlap. An 
attempt was made to reduce this risk and to identify a smaller number of unique, separate 
aspects of CSR practices. Due to the absence of preconceived ideas regarding the underlying 
assumptions of the variables, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis. Factor analysis is a 
statistical technique of data reduction used to uncover underlying aspects or dimensions of a 
phenomenon. Before conducting the factor analysis, two preliminary tests must be conducted 
to confirm that factor analysis is the appropriate statistical method to use. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure (or KMO measure) is generally considered by researchers as the best way to 
check the suitability of the correlation matrix (Cleff, 2011). The data obtains a K-M-O 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy of 0.9033 confirming its suitability for factor analysis. This 
test was supplemented by the Bartlett test (sphericity test) which verifies that the variables 
correlate as suggested by a result of 3705.66 (p< 0.000). Using factor analysis is therefore 
justified by our data.  
Among the different types of factor analysis, principal component factor analysis with 
varimax rotation was chosen yielding four factors explaining 87.12% of the variance. 
Principal component analysis, as opposed to principal factor analysis, “assumes that 
individual variables can be described by a linear combination of the factors, i.e. that factors 
represent variables in their entirety”(Cleff, 2011, p. 185). This technique allows to better 
represent each item independently rather than the correlation between them. 
 
Table 5.2 presents the factors with the corresponding loadings. Only factors with an 
eigenvalue greater than 1 are kept as prescribed by the agreed-upon Kaiser criterion (Cleff, 
2011). Each variable is assigned to one factor. If a practice was allocated to several factors 
with a factor loading of less than 0.5, the practice was assigned to the factor with the highest 
loading as suggested by Cleff (2011).
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Table 5.2 Factor analysis 
Factors Factor  
Loads 
Eigenvalue % of 
Variance 
explained 
Cumulative  
Per cent 
Factor 1: compulsory components of 
CSR 
 12.60 60.72 60.72 
Fair treatment of employees irrespective of 
sexual orientation 
 
0.7432    
Fair treatment of employees irrespective of 
gender 
0.7072 
 
   
Accurate information to investors 0.6872    
Fair treatment of employees irrespective of 
ethnic origin 
0.6678    
Company’s support to employees’ training 
and development 
0.6199    
Information to investors about changes in 
corporate policy 
0.6143    
Customers’ complaints addressed 0.6033    
Full information to investors 0.5897    
Customers’ information 0.5279    
Investors’ interests incorporated 0.5124    
Fair salaries to employees 0.4505    
Training programmes set up in the 
company 
0.4667    
     
Factor 2: Environment and 
philanthropy 
 3.05 14.72 75.44 
Environmental concerns incorporated 0.8369    
Exceeds environmental regulation 0.8294    
Environmental performance objectives 
incorporated in strategy 
0.7888    
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Factors Factor  
Loads 
Eigenvalue % of 
Variance 
explained 
Cumulative  
Per cent 
Financial support to environmental 
initiatives 
0.7528    
Substantial donations to charity 0.6134    
Awareness of environment regulation 0.5738    
     
Factor 3: Involvement with the local 
community 
 1.34 6.47 81.91 
Improvement of quality of life of local 
community 
0.6871    
Financial support to local economic 
development 
0.6696    
Financial support to local education 0.6502    
Incorporation of local community interests  0.6467    
Help employees  to reach work life balance 0.5472    
Incorporation of employees’ interests  0.4819    
     
Factor 4:Suppliers  1.08 5.21 87.12 
Fair treatment of suppliers 0.7550    
Respectful treatment of suppliers 0.6944    
Incorporation of suppliers’ interests 0.6378    
Information to suppliers about corporate 
policy changes 
0.5878    
 
Notes: 
1.Principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. 
2. K-M-O Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.9033 
3. Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 3705.66; p< 0.000 
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The remainder of this section discusses the interpretation of each of these factors. 
 
Factor 1: Compulsory components of CSR. This factor relates to different, though primary or 
direct, stakeholders (employees, investors and customers) (Waddock, 2001). These elements 
of CSR are rooted in the core activities of companies. They are most likely compulsory 
dimensions of CSR, the ones that are incorporated in national laws such as regulations 
regarding the treatment of employees, the information provided by companies to investors, 
and customers. In other words, Factor 1 is directly defined by the national institutional 
background of the country. It can be mentioned at this stage that the regulatory environment 
of each country is also influenced by the European Union. For instance, in the area of 
employment law, the European Union passed regulations and directives that need to be 
translated and transposed into national legislation contributing to a certain degree to 
homogenisation among European countries.  
 
Factor 2: Environment and philanthropy. This factor deals with peripheral stakeholders – the 
ones that are further away from companies. In this instance, it concerns philanthropic 
activities with donations to charities and actions/awareness in the realm of the environment. 
These CSR activities are peripheral to the core business of the company- as illustrated by the 
traditional conceptualisation of CSR as concentric circles and a pyramid (Committee for 
Economic Development, 1971; Carroll, 1991), or the more recent categorisation of CSR 
between embedded CSR and peripheral CSR (Aguinis and Glavas, 2013). These activities are 
not compulsory to companies and depend on other factors, which will be investigated later in 
this chapter.  
 
Factor 3: Involvement with the local community. This factor covers only one specific 
stakeholder: the local community. It depicts the impact of companies on community and 
stakeholders’ lives. It involves CSR activities that are peripheral to the core activities of the 
companies. These actions are not sanctioned by the law as they are purely voluntary. 
Moreover, these actions can appear fuzzier, softer in terms of direct involvement of the 
company. The main mode of action seems to involve financial support. The local community 
is part of secondary stakeholders as it is not directly influenced by companies (Waddock, 
2001). 
 
Factor 4: Suppliers. The fourth factor portrays companies’ relationships with one stakeholder 
only: suppliers. This factor reflects the way in which companies treat their suppliers, taking 
into account both compulsory and voluntary measures. This factor relates to a primary, direct 
stakeholder (Waddock, 2001). 
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The four factors present a conceptual coherence embracing the existing CSR literature, 
differentiating between primary and secondary stakeholders as well as the distinction between 
core and peripheral activities. The four factors capture well the broad and multi-faceted nature 
of CSR:  “the obligation (of CSR) is a broad one, extending beyond the traditional duty to 
shareholders to other societal groups such as customers, employees, suppliers, and 
neighbouring communities” (Jones, 1980, pp. 59–60). 
The core-peripheral distinction echoes the old debate surrounding CSR, whether it should 
incorporate or not economic activities of companies. Early on, scholars acknowledged that 
businesses have plural types of responsibilities, starting with an economic one (Davis, 1960). 
In the same line, Carroll (1979) views economic activities as not only in the interest of 
companies themselves but also in the interest of society as a whole. A successful company is 
indeed able to offer jobs to unemployed people, to procure services and objects, to pay taxes 
useful for the community. 
 
For the purpose of the analysis, the four factors are also used to construct a unique composite 
indicator reflecting the four aspects of CSR derived from the factor analysis. This new 
indicator is called General CSR. It is constructed as the mean of each factor. Put differently, 
means were calculated for each factor leading to the calculation of a general mean. This new 
measure provides a picture of the global level of involvement in CSR by companies surveyed 
in this research. 
The relations between General CSR and the four factors are presented in Figure 5.3.
	 134	
 Figure 5.3 CSR components 
 
General	CSR
Philanthropic/Environmental	
CSR
Local	Community	CSRSuppliers	CSR
Compulsory	CSR
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To further investigate the underlying relations between CSR practices and companies’ and 
countries’ characteristics, the analysis was undertaken with OLS regressions.  The next 
section reports the results.  
 
5.4 Results and discussion 
 
Based on the factor analysis, the four aspects of CSR as well as the general indicator are 
tested in the regression analysis. Each component is regressed against the independent 
variables in order to test the study’s hypotheses.  
 
Before examining the regression results in detail, one caveat needs to be mentioned. The 
institutional variables happened to be perfectly correlated with each other (correlation of 1 or 
-1). This perfect correlation caused a multicollinearity issue in the regression analysis. Indeed, 
insofar as only two countries are compared in this study, the institutional variables are 
interpreted by Stata as dummy variables. Due to their perfect collinearity, the regression 
analysis faced the dummy variable trap, forcing Stata to drop the institutional variables 
altogether. Only one institutional variable could be kept.  
The only way to get around this difficulty would have been to introduce other countries in the 
analysis, which would have completely changed the study, its research questions and data 
collection. However, despite this hurdle, the data still permits consideration of correlations 
between institutional variables and CSR components, providing some helpful insights on the 
relation between them. 
 
Two sets of regressions are performed using two distinct measures of national institutions: the 
country of origin and the aggregated measure of national institutions. The country of origin is 
a dummy variable where UK is coded 0 and France 1. The results of these regressions are 
presented in this Chapter as the interpretation of the results is easier with the variable country 
of origin. The regression results with the aggregated national institutions are in all respects 
identical, except for the coefficients of the institutional measure and the constant. The 
conclusions reached are then similar. The regression tables with each CSR component are 
presented in Appendix 3. 
 
The remainder of the section presents the results of the correlations and regressions regarding 
each aspect of CSR.  
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5.4.1 The antecedents of the general measure of CSR 
 
Table 5.4 presents the correlation matrix between general CSR and independent variables. 
General CSR is mainly correlated with the economic performance of the company and the 
company’s economic performance compared to its competitors. Table 5.5 focuses on the 
national institution measures and presents the correlation table between the different types of 
CSR and the institutional variables. For a mathematical reason, the correlation matrix does 
not distinguish between France and the UK. If the correlation matrix is calculated for each 
country separately, each institutional variable becomes a constant. Within the UK sample for 
instance, the institutional variables do not change from one respondent to the other. 
Therefore, in the formula for the correlation coefficient, this sometimes leads to division by a 
denominator equal to 0. Hence Stata cannot perform the calculation because it is 
mathematically impossible. The correlation matrix is composed of missing values. 
 
In Table 5.5, the correlations between the general measure of CSR and each institutional 
variable are highly significant (p<0.01). Table 5.5 indicates that the general measure of CSR 
is positively correlated with the common law variable and the governance variable. Since the 
UK is a common law country, it means its level of CSR would be higher than in France. 
Regarding the rest of the institutional variables, they are all negatively correlated with the 
general level of CSR. In Table 3.4, France scores lower than the UK on the governance 
indicator, whereas it scores higher on the proportionality index, PMR, state control, barriers 
to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment. Based on these correlation 
coefficients, Table 5.5 suggests that a lower level of regulation is beneficial to CSR, in this 
instance to the UK. This first finding provides support to hypothesis 1a: national institutions 
have an impact on CSR. More specifically, it substantiates the substitute theory of CSR, 
where CSR is stronger in LME countries.  
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 Table 5.4 Correlation table with general CSR 
  
General 
CSR 
country 
of origin 
Company 
size 
Company 
age 
Industry 
# of domestic 
competitors 
# of 
international 
competitors 
Eco. 
Perf. 
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
Private 
ownership 
Eco. 
Freedom 
General CSR 1                     
Country of 
origin 
0.24*** 1                   
Company size -0.09 0.16* 1                 
Company age -0.00 0.03 0.46*** 1               
Industry -0.13 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 1             
No. of domestic 
competitors 
-0.03 -0.15 -0.08 -0.14 0.19** 1           
No. of 
international 
competitors 
0.09 -0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.58*** 1         
Eco. Perf. 0.44*** -0.12 0.10 -0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.14 1       
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
0.43*** -0.15 0.12 0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.72*** 1     
Private 
ownership 
0.06 -0.08 -0.45*** -0.20** 0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.07 0.07 1   
Eco. Freedom 0.24*** -1 -0.16* -0.03 -0.00 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.08 1 
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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Table 5.5 Correlation table between types of CSR and institutional variables 
 General CSR Compulsory CSR Philanthropic/ 
Environmental CSR 
Local Community 
CSR 
Suppliers CSR 
Common Law 0.24*** 0.18* 0.22** 0.18* 0.22** 
Employee  
Rights 
-0.24*** -0.18* -0.22** -0.18* -0.22** 
Proportionality  
Index 
 -0.24***  -0.18*  -0.22**  -0.18**  -0.22** 
PMR  -0.24***  -0.18*  -0.22**  -0.18*  -0.22** 
State Control  -0.24***  -0.18*  -0.22**  -0.18*  -0.22** 
Barriers to  
Entrepreneur 
 -0.24***  -0.18*  -0.22**  -0.18*  -0.22** 
Barriers to  
Trade and  
Investment 
 -0.24***  -0.18*  -0.22**  -0.18*  -0.22** 
Governance1 0.24*** 0.18 0.22 0.18* 0.22** 
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p<0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p<0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
                                                
1 Governance is obtained as the mean of the six Worldwide governance indicators (Voice and Accountability; Political Stability & Absence of 
Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; Control of Corruption). 
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The OLS regression, presented in Table 5.6, investigates further the correlations between the 
general involvement of companies in CSR and national institutions on the one hand and 
companies’ characteristics on the other hand. Overall, the regression is significant (p< 0.001) 
with an adjusted R2 of 0.3108. 
 
The results suggest that four variables impact the general level of CSR involvement. The 
country of origin is negatively related to general CSR (p< 0.05). Therefore, this negative 
regression coefficient reads: the geographical location of companies matters insofar as 
companies established in France are less involved in CSR. This result confirms the finding of 
the previous chapter where UK companies display a higher degree of involvement in CSR.  
This result, supporting hypothesis 1a, substantiates the existing literature on the impact of 
national institutions on CSR actions. It supplies further evidence to support the 
complementary theory of CSR, where CSR acts as a supplement to national institutions. Put 
simply, CSR is stronger in the more liberalised countries to compensate for the negative 
consequences of capitalism. This theory is advanced to justify the historical development and 
growth of CSR among developed countries. The US and the UK have been traditionally the 
champions of CSR in spite of their high degree of liberalisation and free market economy 
(Kinderman, 2009, 2012). The apparent difference between UK companies and French ones 
contradicts at first the theory whereby globalisation, international forces and strategic 
pressures lead to a homogenisation of corporate practices including CSR (Dimaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
 
Nevertheless, as explained in a previous section the general measure of CSR is an aggregated 
measure based on the factors derived from the factor analysis. Since it is an average, the 
greater level of involvement of UK companies in CSR compared to French companies does 
not mean that the former is better than the latter in all aspect of CSR.   
 
The size of the company is also significant (p<0.01). Surprisingly, the coefficient is negative 
suggesting a negative relation between the participation in CSR and companies’ size, 
providing support for neither Hypothesis 2a nor Hypothesis 2b. This indicates that the bigger 
the company is, the less involved it is in CSR. This result runs against both the positive linear 
relation  (Brammer and Millington, 2006; Amann, Jaussaud and Martinez, 2012) and U-shape 
relation between company size and CSR (Udayasankar, 2008).  
 
The regression coefficients of age for the company, industry, number of competitors are not 
significant, suggesting that there is no evidence of impact on the general degree of CSR. 
These findings do not provide any support for hypotheses 3, 4 and 6. 
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The results show that the economic performance of a company compared to its competitors 
predicts more CSR actions than the individual measure of economic performance. Both are 
nevertheless significant, therefore providing support for hypothesis 5.  
These findings help to understand better the relationship between CSR and economic 
performance. The literature offers unclear and divided explanations regarding this link. This 
study establishes that the more successful a company is and appears to be in comparison to its 
competitors, the more likely it is to engage in CSR. This result does not come as a surprise. 
CSR actions depend on the financial situation of a company: a successful company has more 
money at its disposal to commit to CSR actions and is more willing to do so.  
The connection between CSR and the economic performance of a company compared to its 
competitors is at first glance less intuitive. A company is more likely to be CSR active if it 
believes its economic performance is stronger than its competitors. This result could be 
explained by viewing CSR as a marketing/public relations tool. It would relate to the 
widespread criticism that CSR is a mere smoke-screen companies advocate to gain publicity, 
extra customers and as a result extra profits. CSR would confer the company with a 
competitive advantage over competitors.  
 
However, these findings do not bring additional indication on the causation between 
economic success and CSR. Whether CSR actions improve or not the economic situation of a 
company remains unclear and is not part of this study. The purpose of this study was not to 
provide additional evidence to the business case of CSR. 
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Table 5.6 Regression results for general CSR 
 
General measure of CSR  t-value 
Country of origin (0 =UK; 1 = France) -0.2114176* -2.22 
Size of the company -0.0493669** -2.41 
Age of the company 0.0608547 1.09 
Industry -0.0105011 -1.10 
Number of domestic competitors (log) -0.0471368 -1.60 
Number of international competitors (log) 0.0183002 1.76 
Economic performance 0.2041518** 2.89 
Economic performance compared to competitors 0.2232156* 2.25 
Constant 2.633082*** 9.10 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.3108   
F 11.60   
N 162   
Prob> F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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After presenting the regression results for the general measure of CSR, the next sections will 
investigate each category of CSR. 
 
5.4.2 The antecedents of compulsory CSR 
 
The focus in this section is on the determinants of compulsory CSR. The definition of CSR adopted 
for this research encompasses on purpose compulsory and voluntary aspects of CSR. This position 
runs purposely against one strand of the CSR literature that understands CSR as beyond the 
requirements of the law. As Moon (2007) points out comprehensibly, it makes no sense to keep the 
voluntary requirement to define CSR. Depending on the institutional environment, regulations 
incorporate or not CSR activities. Would companies be deemed irresponsible by merely abiding by 
the law?  Furthermore, being a responsible company also starts by conducting business in a 
responsible way, by respecting the interests of the company’s primary stakeholders (Davis, 1973; 
Carroll, 1979, 1999; Waddock, 2001). 
 
Table 5.7 reports the results of the correlation matrix between compulsory CSR and company level 
variables. Similar to the correlation matrix obtained for the general measure of CSR, the table 
suggests than only economic performance and economic performance of the company compared to its 
competitors are positively and significantly correlated to compulsory CSR. This category of CSR does 
not appear to be influenced by the size of the company, its age, or its industry. That results are 
coherent and expected because CSR is incorporated within the legal framework of the country, 
leaving a small or no margin of actions for companies. 
 
Table 5.5 suggests that the correlation between the compulsory aspect of CSR and the institutional 
variables is less strong than for the general level of CSR. In absolute terms, the correlation coefficient 
is 0.18, which identifies a low relationship. The correlations are in the same directions than for the 
general level of CSR. The correlation is positive for the common law and governance variables, and 
negative for the others. Even though, compulsory CSR is weakly correlated with national institutions, 
this seems to corroborate the substitute theory of CSR, where liberal market institutions are more 
favourable to CSR.    
 
Moving on to the regression results, they mainly confirm this line of explanation. Overall, the 
regression is significant at a significance level of 0.001 with an adjusted R2 of 0.2573. Table 5.8 
shows that four regression coefficients are significant. 
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Table 5.7 Correlation table with compulsory CSR 
  
Compulsory 
CSR 
country 
of origin 
Company 
size 
Company 
age 
Industry 
# of domestic 
competitors 
# of 
international 
competitors 
Eco. 
Perf. 
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
Private 
ownership 
Eco. 
Freedom 
Compulsory 
CSR 
1                     
country of 
origin 
-0.18* 1                   
Company size -0.05 0.16* 1                 
Company age 0.02 0.03 0.46*** 1               
Industry -0.05 0.00 -0.13 -0.00 1             
# of domestic 
competitors 
0.04 -0.15 -0.08 -0.14 0.19** 1           
# of 
international 
competitors 
0.17 -0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.58*** 1         
Eco. Perf. 0.41*** -0.12 0.10 -0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.14 1       
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
0.41*** -0.15 0.12 0.05 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.72*** 1     
Private 
ownership 
0.04 -0.08*** -0.45** -0.26 0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.07 0.07 1   
Eco. Freedom 0.18* -1.00 -0.16* -0.03 -0.00 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.08 1 
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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Table 5.8 Regression results for compulsory CSR 
 
Compulsory CSR t-value 
country of origin (0= UK; 1= France) -0.1397527 -1.34 
Size of the company -0.0437266* -1.92 
Age of the company 0.0747347 1.13 
Industry -0.0009504 -0.09 
Number of domestic competitors -0.0403613 -1.32 
Number of international competitors 0.0282205** 2.49 
Economic performance 0.1925324** 2.69 
Economic performance compared to competitors 0.2463841* 2.33 
Constant 2.53355*** 7.04 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.2573   
F 7.52   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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Table 5.8 suggests that the country of origin has no impact on the compulsory aspect of CSR 
providing no support for Hypothesis 1 in both its developments. In other words, the findings 
demonstrate that, in this instance, national institutions, hence varieties of capitalism, play no 
part. This conclusion signals an alignment in regulations between France and the UK. This 
harmonisation comes mainly from the European Union which has promulgated few directives 
to ensure equal and non-discriminatory treatment of employees (see article 13 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam 1997; the Employment Equality Framework Directive (2000/78); Racial Equality 
Directive (2000/13)), customer protection (see the Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83)) 
and investor information (see the Transparency Directive (2004/109) revised by the 
Transparency Directive (2013/50)). By virtue of European law mechanisms, member states 
are provided with minimum standards they are forced to transpose into their national 
regulation.  
  
The result regarding the size of the company indicates that the bigger the company, the less 
involved it is in compulsory CSR. This result provides support for neither Hypothesis 2a nor 
Hypothesis 2b. Despite a small value, the coefficient is nonetheless significant (p<0.05). This 
finding is surprising as it would suggest at first that larger companies do not necessarily obey 
by the laws in these areas. Second, it is not very consistent with the role of economic 
performance assuming that economic success comes hand in hand with size. According to 
Table 5.7, the correlation between size and economic performance is very small and not 
significant. This finding remains unexpected as it contradicts studies connecting size and 
public visibility and scrutiny. The latter constraints companies’ actions by applying public 
pressure on them (Brammer and Millington, 2006).  
It could be argued that larger companies with their economic and knowledge power benefit 
from a better understanding of national regulations. One could anticipate that sometimes large 
companies accommodate with laws that are detrimental to their business interests. Such an 
explanation echoes the view by which company size is actually a reflection of organisational 
power and influence (Meznar and Nigh, 1995). In that sense, size can be indirectly 
detrimental to compulsory CSR.  
 
The results demonstrate that industry and company age are not drivers of CSR, providing no 
support to Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
 
As anticipated in the correlation matrix, economic performance and economic performance 
compared to competitors are the most significant coefficients. These findings support 
Hypothesis 5. As expected and in line with previous empirical evidence, the involvement in 
CSR depends on the economic success of companies. Part of the literature has unveiled a 
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positive correlation between financial success and CSR actions (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Weber, 2008; Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Porter and Kramer, 2011).  Economic success 
makes companies more visible to the public eye and scrutiny (Brammer and Millington, 
2006). With the increasing power of social media and technology, what Moon (2007) 
identifies as the social driver of CSR, they are under the constant scrutiny of financial 
institutions, non-governmental organisations and customers’ groups. They cannot afford to 
violate the law, in particular to preserve their reputation, in an obvious visible way. Besides, 
responsible behaviours can strengthen that very image and reputation. One should keep in 
mind though that regression analysis does not equate to causation and only indicates 
correlation. Whether CSR is the result of economic success or economic success the product 
of CSR, the question is still open. The business case for CSR defends the latter. One could 
argue though that economic success is necessary to launch initial CSR actions which then 
might improve further the financial situation of a given company. 
 
The number of international competitors is a significant factor (p<0.01) supporting hypothesis 
6. This coefficient is nevertheless small, suggesting a limited effect on the compulsory 
component of CSR. The more international competitors a company experiences, the more 
involved it will be in compulsory CSR. Even though this result may appear surprising at first, 
it can be explained by the position and power a company possesses on the international 
business stage. The number of international competitors increases visibility, scrutiny and 
therefore the pressure to act in accordance with the law. Companies are maintaining their 
license to operate while building ‘reputational capital’ (Jamali, 2010, p. 628). 
 
Finally, when it comes to the legal aspects of CSR, the question of compliance and the 
associated cost of non-compliance is raised as for any other regulated matters (Bullis and IE, 
2007). The fact that compulsory CSR is explained by company size, the number of 
international competitors and economic performance indicate a discrepancy between 
regulation and obedience. Companies face a dilemma between complying or disobeying the 
law with costs associated to both actions. This question might be even more acute in a legal 
environment such as the French one where regulations are more prominent than in the UK. 
The dilemma between abiding or not by the law is summarized by Bullis & IE (2007, p. 325): 
‘while it may seem surprising that some organizations would not adopt a stance of 
compliance, it makes sense that unless enforcement is expected and compliance is rewarded, 
a company might find that the costs of compliance far outweigh the benefits’. 
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5.4.3 The antecedents of philanthropic and environmental CSR 
 
The third aspect of CSR that is investigated relates to philanthropy and the environment. The 
previous chapter indicated that companies located in the UK are more involved in this area 
than French companies. The findings related to philanthropy were  not surprising as previous 
studies demonstrated the higher participation in charity donations of Anglo-Saxon companies, 
in particular UK ones (Brammer and Millington, 2006; Kinderman, 2009). On the other hand, 
the strongest presence of UK companies in the area of the environment was unexpected.  
 
These findings are hinted at in the correlations shown in Table 5.9 and confirmed by the 
regression analysis (See Table 5.10). Philanthropic and environmental activities are positively 
correlated with the economic performance of companies as well as the economic performance 
of companies compared to their competitors. Table 5.9 also signals a negative relationship 
between these activities and the country of origin. French companies are less engaged in them 
compared to their British counterparts confirming the descriptive results of the previous 
chapter. Table 5.5 suggests that with a correlation coefficient of 0.22 there is a stronger 
relation between national institutions and the philanthropic/environmental aspect of CSR than 
with the compulsory aspect of CSR.  
 
These results are validated by the regression analysis in Table 5.10. Overall, the regression is 
significant at a significance level of 0.001 with an adjusted R2 of 0.1925. Two coefficients are 
significant in this regression: the country of origin (p<0.01) and economic performance 
(p<0.05). The country of origin presents the highest coefficient with -0.328. This supports 
Hypothesis 1a but does not provide support for Hypothesis 2. It should be noted here that, as 
in the correlation table, the country of origin is negatively correlated to the philanthropic and 
environmental component of CSR. In other words, French companies are less involved in 
charity giving and in protecting of the environment.  
 
These findings highlight first the impact of the institutional background. In the area of the 
environment and corporate sustainability, the legal framework as well as the existence of 
social sanctions are key (Montiel, 2008). A study of medium and small manufacturing 
companies in the UK suggests that two factors encourage companies to engage in 
environmental CSR: business performance and regulation (Williamson, Lynch-Wood and 
Ramsay, 2006). In this instance, business performance is narrower than the business case for 
CSR as it refers to cost reduction, customers’ satisfaction and efficiency (Williamson, Lynch-
Wood and Ramsay, 2006).  
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These results would suggest that in our case the British legal environment is tighter than the 
French one, or that the social stigma following environmentally irresponsible behaviours is 
stronger in the UK than in France. The first explanation needs to be nuanced. The European 
Union is at the forefront of the questions of sustainability and protection of the environment. 
For that matter, the EU legislation in that area is abundant and has the direct effect of 
homogenising member states’ legislation. For instance, 2014 saw the adoption of the directive 
on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large companies. Publicly 
listed companies of more than 500 employees have to report on environmental, social and 
employee-related, human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters; as well as evaluate 
corporate risks in these areas. This directive is only one among a long list adopted by the 
European Union covering for instance carbon emissions (2003), limitation of pollution from 
industrial and agricultural activities (2008) and industrial emissions (2011). By European law, 
member states have to transpose them into national legislation. As a result, French and UK 
legislation should be similar when it comes to the environment. Transposition does not equate 
automatic compliance by local companies though. Despite that, UK companies are found to 
be more involved than are French companies. 
 
In addition, the involvement of UK companies in philanthropic activities such as charity 
donations is greater as documented by the literature (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; Brammer 
and Millington, 2006). In particular, size normally plays a significant role in charity 
donations, where the larger the company, the more charitable they tend to be. The results 
show that such a relationship is not present in our sample as company size was insignificant, 
that the variable was dropped.  
 
In the case of France, the question of philanthropy is quite complex. Traditionally, the role of 
businesses is restricted to economic activities. Actions regarding the rest of the community 
and society at large are left to the state. To this role division between business and state, 
France has shown a general mistrust towards companies acting beyond their normal domain 
(Berthoin Antal and Sobczak, 2007). Antal and Sobczak (2007) argue that despite successive 
laws (1987, 1997, 2002) incentivising companies towards philanthropic activities, French 
companies are still lagging behind.  
 
In this instance, economic performance plays a significant part in the participation of 
companies in this aspect of CSR, as anticipated by Hypothesis 5. A positive coefficient 
indicates that the more successful a company is economically, the more involved it will be in 
philanthropy and in protecting the environment. For these activities that are voluntary, this 
result is not surprising. Economic success provides companies with extra-funds for these non-
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productive activities, especially as part of the corporate involvement is in monetary form. 
Aside from the availability of funds, the literature has studied the connections between 
corporate actions towards the protection of the environment and corporate financial 
performance. Despite mixed empirical evidence, a positive correlation between economic and 
environmental performance exists (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Wahba, 2008). Companies 
that attempt to be more environmentally friendly receive the financial fruits of such actions. 
In this instance, the causality works both ways again where financial success is likely to 
promote involvement in CSR practices which might then generate more profits for 
companies. 
 
The results in the case of charity donations should be interpreted with some caveats. At first 
sight, the results regarding UK companies are extremely positive and demonstrate an 
involvement and a care of UK companies towards charities. One should be cautious however. 
Charity giving can also be the result of other factors. First, most profitable UK companies do 
not always pay their way, one blatant example encompasses tax avoidance and tax evasion 
practices in the case, for instance, of Shell, Lloyds Banking Group or Vodafone. Shamed by 
the media and consumer groups, one might argue that companies rely on charity giving to 
repair reputational damage.  
Second, it can be part of an astroturfing agenda, which has proliferated in the UK over the last 
years. Indeed, that movement could explain a significant amount of charitable giving, 
especially by large companies. Companies would give money to third organisation or 
charities in order for them to promote corporate interests and give the impression of 
grassroots movements or expert support. Astroturfing originated in the US and was coined by 
a Texas senator, Lloyd Bentsen. It comes from ‘‘‘AstroTurf,’’ which is a brand of synthetic 
carpeting designed to look like natural grass, but is in fact fake grass (generally used for 
sports fields). Hence, astroturf organizations are simply fake grassroots organizations usually 
created and/or sponsored by large corporations to support any arguments or claims in their 
favour, or to challenge and deny those against them’ (Cho et al., 2011, p. 572). Initially used 
in the political arena to impact the passing of laws (for instance laws against tobacco 
companies in the US), the practice is now used widely, for instance in the environmental 
sector to negate the scientific existence of global warming (Cho, Patten and Roberts, 2006; 
Cho et al., 2011). Charity donations become a tool in the wider corporate agenda to promote 
companies and their interests.  
The use of charity donations for a hidden purpose whether it be corporate image and 
reputation or a political or corporate agenda is reminiscent of the distinction between explicit 
and implicit CSR. Charity giving offers a telling illustration of explicit CSR defined as 
‘voluntary programs and strategies by corporations that combine social and business value 
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and address issues perceived as being part of the social responsibility of the company’ 
(Matten and Moon, 2008, p. 409). Explicit CSR is the result of voluntary, deliberate strategic 
decisions of companies. As predicted by Matten and Moon (2008), explicit CSR has spread 
from the US into Europe, in particular in the UK, whose institutional system is closest to the 
American one. France, on the other hand, still presents the characteristics of implicit CSR, 
defined as ‘values, norms, and rules that result in (mandatory and customary) requirements 
for corporations to address stakeholder issues and that define proper obligations of corporate 
actors in collective rather than individual terms’ (Matten and Moon, 2008, p. 409). 
 
The results about the environment also need to be qualified. The UK is shown to be more 
involved than France in the area of the environment. As already mentioned in the Chapter 4, 
these findings need to be moderated. When it comes to their environmental record, the UK 
lags behind most European nations, France being one of them (Hsu, 2016). The general 
stance of the UK government on environmental issues is more averse than the French one. 
For instance, the current position of the UK government on hydraulic fracturing, commonly 
known as fracking, demonstrates a continued support of fossil fuels instead of promoting 
renewable energies in the hope to mitigate the effects of global warming. Whereas France 
banned fracking in 2011, the UK government has been an active supporter of that method for 
the last three years. Finally, in October 2016, the government allowed the first horizontal 
fracking operation in Lancashire.  One could therefore doubt the results on environmental 
CSR, interpreting them in light of the aforementioned explicit-implicit distinction where UK 
companies would be more vocal than French ones in their actions. It seems that UK 
companies are better at talking the talk but might be not so present when it comes to walking 
the walk.  
 
When philanthropy and the environment are concerned, the rest of the variables are not 
significant, such as company size, industry, number of competitors or economic performance 
compared to competitors. Hypothesis 2a and 2b, 3, 4 and 6 are not supported by the results. 
The absence of company size and industry from the results seems contradictory with the 
existing literature. Regarding the environment, studies have demonstrated the impact of size 
and industry (Lepoutre and Heene, 2006; Hoogendoorn, Guerra and van der Zwan, 2015).   
 
In this component of CSR, the study suffers from a main limitation.  It refers to the factor 
analysis itself, since it does not allow to differentiate between charity donations and the 
environment. Companies might carry out dissimilar practices in both areas. For instance, a 
company can be strongly involved in protecting the environment, limiting the company’s 
carbon footprint but does not give money to charities.  Or vice versa.  
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Table 5.9 Correlation table with philanthropic and environmental CSR 
  
Philanthropic/ 
Environ CSR 
country 
of origin 
Company 
size 
Company 
age 
Industry 
# of domestic 
competitors 
# of 
international 
competitors 
Eco. 
Perf. 
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
Private 
ownership 
Eco. 
Freedom 
Philanthropic/ 
Environ CSR 
1                     
country of 
origin 
-0.22* 1                   
Company size 0.06 0.16* 1                 
Company age 0.05 0.03 0.46*** 1               
Industry -0.15 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 1             
# of domestic 
competitors 
-0.07 -0.15 -0.08 -0.14 0.19* 1           
# of 
international 
competitors 
0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.14 0.03 0.58*** 1         
Eco. Perf. 0.35*** -0.12 0.10 -0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.14 1       
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
0.34*** -0.15 0.12 0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.72*** 1     
Private 
ownership 
-0.06 -0.08 -0.45*** -0.21** 0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.07 0.07 1   
Eco. Freedom 0.21** -1.00 -0.16* -0.03 -0.00 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.08 1 
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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Table 5.10 Regression results for philanthropic and environmental CSR 
 
Philanthropic/Environmental 
CSR t-value 
country of origin (0 = UK; 1 = France) -0.3286039** -2.54 
Industry -0.0155258 -1.33 
Number of domestic competitors -0.0427558 -1.54 
Economic performance 0.2285409* 2.23 
Economic performance compared to competitors 0.1887686 1.28 
Constant 2.579829 6.64 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.1925   
F 8.75   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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5.4.4 The antecedents of CSR practices towards the local community 
 
With the local community, actions of companies are not connected to the core of their 
business activities. These actions undertaken on a purely voluntary basis are correlated with 
the economic performance variable and the economic performance compared to the 
competitors’ variable (Table 5.11). Similarly, the correlation table (Table 5.5) suggests a 
lower role played by institutions in that respect. National institutions are indeed less 
correlated with this aspect of CSR with a 0.18 correlation coefficient (Table 5.5. 
The results of the linear regression corroborate this finding (Table 5.12). Overall, the 
regression is significant at a significance level of 0.001 with an adjusted R2 of 0.2262. The 
coefficient for economic performance is highly significant (p<0.001).  Economic performance 
is once again a significant antecedent for this specific aspect of CSR, providing support for 
Hypothesis 5. The explanations provided in the previous sub-section apply here as well. 
Insofar as taking part in the local community is not directly linked to a company’s core 
business, companies become involved when they are financially able to do so.  
 
The second significant coefficient relates to the size of the company (p<0.05). Similar to 
general CSR and compulsory CSR, the coefficient is negative, which provides support for 
neither Hypothesis 2a nor Hypothesis 2b. It implies again that the larger the company is, the 
less it engages with the local community. This finding makes conceptual sense and supports 
previous work on that question (Arend, 2014). A small company due to its size is naturally 
more rooted and thus more involved and active within the local community, compared to a 
multinational company for instance. Therefore, it is more aware of the local needs, challenges 
and possibilities and can devise plans to help the community. By their physical presence, 
companies might also feel pressure from local citizens, local government and/or NGOs to 
help improve the local community. 
 
Lastly, the local community aspect of CSR is not impacted by the country of origin, the 
industry or company age providing no support for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 3 and 4. 
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Table 5.11 Correlation table for local community CSR 
  
Local 
Community 
CSR 
country 
of origin 
Company 
size 
Company 
age 
Industry 
# of domestic 
competitors 
# of 
international 
competitors 
Eco. 
Perf. 
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
Private 
ownership 
Eco. 
Freedom 
Local 
Community 
CSR 
1                     
country of 
origin 
-0.18* 1                   
Company size -0.10 0.16* 1                 
Company age 0.03 0.03 0.46*** 1               
Industry -0.11 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 1             
# of domestic 
competitors 
-0.03 -0.15 -0.08 -0.14 0.19* 1           
# of 
international 
competitors 
0.01 -0.08 0.05 -0.14 0.03 0.58*** 1         
Eco. Perf. 0.32*** -0.12 0.10 -0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.14 1       
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
0.41*** -0.15 0.12 0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.72*** 1     
Private 
ownership 
0.11 -0.08 -0.45*** -0.21** 0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.07 0.07 1   
Eco. Freedom 0.18* -1.00 -0.16* -0.03 -0.00 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.08 1 
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001
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Table 5.12 Regression results for local community CSR 
 
Local community CSR t-value 
country of origin (0 = UK; 1 = France) -0.1489053 -1.18 
Size of the company -0.0603781* -2.17 
Age of the company 0.0832467 1.14 
Industry -0.0158212 -1.44 
Economic performance 0.5134026*** 6.23 
Constant 2.093607*** 5.34 
Adjusted R squared 0.2262   
F 12.27   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
 
	 156	
5.4.5 The antecedents of CSR practices towards suppliers 
 
The final component of CSR corresponds to companies’ relations with their suppliers. 
Contrary to the previous two sections, suppliers are an essential part of a company’s 
activities. Correlation Table 5.13 provides a first indication of the important firm level 
variables. With the highest correlation coefficient (0.37), companies’ economic performance 
stands out, followed closely by companies’ economic performance compared to their 
competitors. It should also be noted that company size and country of origin are negatively 
correlated to the suppliers’ component of CSR.  Table 5.5 offers further insight regarding the 
role of national institutions.  Their impact on the supplier aspect of CSR is similar to the 
general CSR and philanthropic/environmental components of CSR with a moderate 
coefficient of 0.22. Common law and governance institutions are positively correlated with 
supplier CSR, whereas the rest of the institutional variables are negatively correlated with this 
aspect of CSR. Table 5.5 substantiates the greater involvement of UK companies in 
supporting therefore the substitute theory of CSR. 
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Table 5.13 Correlation table for suppliers CSR 
  
Suppliers 
CSR 
country 
of origin 
Company 
size 
Company 
age 
Industry 
# of domestic 
competitors 
# of 
international 
competitors 
Eco. 
Perf. 
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
Private 
ownership 
Eco. 
Freedom 
Suppliers CSR 1                     
country of 
origin 
-0.22** 1                   
Company size -0.23** 0.16* 1                 
Company age -0.12 0.03 0.46*** 1               
Industry -0.12 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 1             
# of domestic 
competitors 
-0.03 -0.15 -0.08 -0.14 0.19* 1           
# of 
international 
competitors 
0.11 -0.08 0.05 -0.14 0.03 0.58*** 1         
Eco. Perf. 0.37*** -0.12 0.10 -0.11 -0.10 0.12 0.14 1       
Eco. Perf. 
compared to 
competitors 
0.28*** -0.15 0.12 0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.72*** 1     
Private 
ownership 
0.14 -0.08 -0.45*** -0.21** 0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.07 0.07 1   
Eco. Freedom 0.22** -1.00 -0.16* -0.03 -0.00 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.08 1 
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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These preliminary findings are partially observed in the regression results presented in Table 
5.14. Overall, the regression is significant at a significance level of 0.001 with an adjusted R2 
of 0.2774.  
The country of origin is a significant explanatory factor for Suppliers CSR (p<0.05). The sign 
of the coefficient is negative providing support for Hypothesis 1a. This indicates that French 
companies are less likely to be responsible towards their suppliers than English companies. 
This result appears counter intuitive. It implies that UK national institutions protect suppliers 
more. 
 
Table 5.14 demonstrates that company size is highly significant (p<0.001) with a negative 
coefficient. The second finding indicates that the larger the company, the less responsible it 
will be towards its suppliers. Hypothesis H2a and H2b are not supported by the results. The 
coefficient is nevertheless rather small (-0.081), indicating that size is only accountable for a 
slight decrease in suppliers CSR. Looking back at the practices covered by Factor 4, the fact 
that company size is negatively correlated with suppliers CSR is coherent. Suppliers depend 
on large companies for business conferring the latter with power in the business relation. This 
power allows large companies to invest less in the relation with their suppliers. They do not 
need to incorporate suppliers’ interests of instance or inform them about any corporate policy 
changes. Nevertheless, CSR suppliers also cover the fair and respectful treatment of suppliers. 
The negative results regarding the size of the company becomes then more problematic.  
 
The issue of the treatment of suppliers down the supply chain has grown central in the CSR 
debate in particular for multinational companies. Despite being a recurring one since 2000s, it 
has sparked new interests among CSR scholars since the recent tragedies leading to the death 
of employees in garment factories such as the Rana Plaza collapse in May 2013 (Lund-
Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2013; Goyer, Reinecke and Donaghey, 2014; Donaghey and 
Reinecke, 2017). Questions regarding the way suppliers treat their employees and infringe on 
human rights have gained public attention from governments to international organisations 
and customers. These scandals related to the treatment of labour in the supply chain triggered 
different responses from companies on one hand and governments on the other hand. 
Multinational companies, under the scrutiny of NGOs, trade unions, social media and 
customers, have adhered to international norms, such as the SA 8000 Standard, and designed 
voluntary codes of conduct and monitoring mechanisms (Locke, Qin and Brause, 2007). As a 
reaction to the recent scandals and disasters in garment supply chains, the UK government 
reacted by including, at the last minute, a section on supply chains in the Modern Slavery Act 
in 2015. Section 54 ‘Transparency in supply chains’ directly tackles human rights 
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infringement and requires companies with a global turnover of more than £36m to issue an 
annual transparency statement2. Even though the impact of this regulation has not been 
evaluated yet, one might question the existence of changes considering that non-compliance 
is not legally sanctioned. No matter where the rules and regulations come from, they all suffer 
from a compliance void where no sanctions are attached to non-compliance behaviours. 
Therefore, work conditions have not really improved for workers as exemplified in a study of 
the Banana supply chain with UK supermarkets in Costa-Rica, where there is a growing 
dichotomy between buyers’ pressure for social responsibility and pressure on producers to 
reduce prices (Robinson, 2010), or mock compliance and corruption in the Bangladesh 
garment supply chain (Huq, Stevenson and Zorzini, 2014). More strikingly, the Rana Plaza 
factory collapse killing 1129 garment workers implicated UK companies such as Bon 
Marche, Primark, Catalan, already committed to applying CSR codes of conduct in their 
supply chain.  
 
Industry, company age and the number of competitors are not significant offering no support 
to Hypothesis 3,4 and 6.  
 
Finally, the results show that economic performance is again highly significant (p<0.001) 
with a coefficient of 0.315 which supports Hypothesis 5. This means that the more successful 
a company, the more involved it will be with CSR suppliers.  
 
Nevertheless, these findings should be interpreted in light of the observations of Chapter 4 
where the overall differences between France and the UK in the area of suppliers remain 
small. Furthermore, the distinction between implicit and explicit CSR is again enlightening. 
The better results for UK companies clash with facts leading to the conclusion that UK 
companies are more explicit and vocal about their CSR practices than French companies. It 
does not mean that these words creating an impression of good companies are necessarily 
followed with effective actions in the area of CSR. 
                                                
2 ‘(1) A commercial organisation within subsection (2) must prepare a slavery and human 
trafficking statement for each financial year of the organisation. 
A slavery and human trafficking statement for a financial year is— 
(a) a statement of the steps the organisation has taken during the financial year to ensure that 
slavery and human trafficking is not taking place—(i) in any of its supply chains, and (ii) in 
any part of its own business, or (b) a statement that the organisation has taken no such steps.’ 
Modern Slavery Act 2015, part 6 section 54. 
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Table 5.14 Regression results for suppliers CSR 
 
Suppliers CSR t-value 
country of origin (0= UK; 1 = France) -0.2246513* -1.94 
Size of the company -0.0816477*** -4.14 
Industry -0.0128243 -1.24 
Number of domestic competitors -0.0656459 -1.68 
Number of international competitors 0.0271905 1.72 
Economic Performance 0.3154664*** 5.81 
Constant 3.59932*** 14.00 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.2774   
F 14.30   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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5.5 A multi-faceted CSR 
 
The previous sections have confirmed that CSR should not be treated as a unique 
homogenous concept. It is a heterogeneous one where each aspect follows different 
determinants. Table 5.15 summarises the findings.  
 
Table 5.15 Antecedents of CSR 
 
Country of 
origin 
Firm Size 
No. of 
International 
competitors 
Economic 
performance 
Economic 
performance 
compared to 
competitors 
 
General CSR 
 
Ö (-)   Ö Ö 
Compulsory 
CSR 
 Ö (-) Ö Ö Ö 
 
Suppliers 
CSR 
Ö (-) Ö (-)  Ö  
Local 
community 
CSR 
 Ö (-)  Ö  
Philanthropy 
and 
Environment 
CSR 
Ö (-)   Ö  
 
 
CSR responds to a combination of determinants at both national and company level. This 
combination varies for each aspect of CSR. This is a notable finding because the CSR 
literature tends to study CSR as a unique whole. Beyond the recognition of the variety of 
company stakeholders and their different needs, the literature does not closely investigate 
CSR antecedents as the result of CSR components.  
All aspects of CSR share in common their reliance on the economic performance of the 
company. The only variation is the extent to which the economic performance impacts, as 
illustrated by the coefficients in the aforementioned regressions. Economic performance plays 
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a greater role when it comes to CSR actions towards the local community than its smallest 
part in compulsory CSR. This connection between CSR actions and economic performance 
highlights the dependence of CSR on the economic success of companies. In other words, 
unless CSR is prescribed by law, it remains incidental. 
 
The previous chapter concluded that UK companies are more involved in CSR behaviours 
than French ones. This chapter shows that this is the result of a combination of institutional 
pressures combined with company characteristics. However, ultimately the question remains: 
with everything else held constant, why does a company decide to conform to CSR rather 
than avoiding or resisting it? Jamali (2010) argues, for instance, that companies are faced with 
various options: true conformance, symbolic conformance, “ cherry picking” and resistance 
(Caprar and Neville, 2012). It is argued that the study of the antecedents of CSR would not be 
complete without interrogating the role of culture. Caprar and Neville define culture ‘as a 
fundamental contextual factor in driving institutional pressures for sustainability, and 
ultimately, sustainability adoption’ (Caprar and Neville, 2012, p. 232). In their theoretic study 
of the interplay between institutions and culture as a way to explain the adoption of CSR 
practices, they formulate two insightful propositions. The first one is that ‘the more a cultural 
context includes norms and values compatible with sustainability principles, the more this 
context will generate and/or embrace sustainability-relevant institutions, increasing the 
likelihood for sustainability adoption’ (Caprar and Neville, 2012, p. 238). The second one 
reinforces the norming effect of culture via institutions since ‘the impact of institutional 
pressures for sustainability will be greater in tight, than in loose, cultural contexts, such that 
cultural tightness increases the likelihood for sustainability adoption’ (Caprar and Neville, 
2012, p. 239). 
 
In other words, culture complements and reinforces the role of institutions and company 
characteristics in the adoption of CSR practices. Some cultures by their values, beliefs and 
history create a better mould for CSR adoption than others. The initial manifestation of CSR 
in Anglo-Saxon countries partially derives from a specific cultural understanding of the 
business-society nexus. The particularities of the French model of capitalism were introduced 
in Chapter 2.  French culture, history and religion have played a role in the specific adoption 
of CSR. As the French model of capitalism is singular, combining abiding state intervention 
and moderate neo-liberalism, the same can be said about its way of doing CSR (Berthoin 
Antal and Sobczak, 2007). Two main elements are essential for this analysis: the long-time 
role of the state and the impact of the catholic religion. From a historical perspective, state 
interventionism is not viewed negatively contrary to the perception in other countries. ‘The 
long-standing tradition of centralized power and faith in changing society via legislation in 
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France is one factor behind the acceptance of what in other cultures would be seen as 
intolerable state interventionism. It is thus not surprising that the discourse and practice of 
CSR in France has generated a body of legislation regulating business behaviour 
corresponding with the culturally shared understanding of roles and responsibilities’ 
(Berthoin Antal and Sobczak, 2007, p. 13). The French state became involved in CSR as early 
as the 1970s by regulating the publication of social reports by companies. Furthermore, the 
catholic culture has negatively influenced the acceptance of the principle of transparency, 
which is essential in the area of CSR. ‘The idea of communicating about corporate social 
performance to a larger public goes against the grain of the French catholic culture’ 
(Berthoin Antal and Sobczak, 2007, p. 14). Although the state supported the development of 
CSR, French companies do not score well on the conformance aspect. Compared to the UK 
and Anglo-Saxon countries in general, France is historically known for its cultural flexibility 
and its non-conformism (Berthoin Antal and Sobczak, 2007). Gelfand et al. (2011) classify 
countries between tight and loose culture with the former defined as having ‘strong norms 
and a low tolerance of deviant behaviour’ and the latter as having ‘weak norms and a high 
tolerance of deviant behaviour’ (Gelfand et al., 2011, p. 1100). Combined with a lower 
tightness score for France compared to the average of a 33-country sample, culture offers a 
supplementary layer of explanation for the reasons French companies are less involved in 
CSR than UK companies (Gelfand et al., 2011).  
 
5.6 Limitations  
 
This chapter by providing an empirical analysis of the antecedents of CSR practices in France 
and the UK is subject to several limitations.  
 
The first limitation of this study is that the evaluation of CSR practices derives only from 
surveys completed by HR managers. The use of that method results in two main drawbacks. 
First, the survey instrument does not guarantee respondents’ honesty. CSR is a topic that is 
highly controversial and sensitive to corporate communication and reputation. Companies 
control the way they communicate about their CSR practices via questionnaires, CSR or 
financial reporting, marketing campaign, and the general media. In other words, the 
declarative aspect of CSR makes it highly dependent on discourse. No one can ignore that 
CSR is still affected by green-washing, which this study to a certain extent might be subjected 
to. 
 
From this first difficulty derives the second one where it should be borne in mind that in this 
study respondents’ answers are used as a proxy for CSR activities. Using them as a proxy is 
	 164	
convenient because it allows access to primary information possessed by the respondents, 
instead of obtaining secondary information in annual reports for instance. Yet, respondents’ 
answers do not necessarily mean that companies actually do what respondents say they do. 
There is always the possibility of a discrepancy between answers and actions. This possibility 
is even higher in the case of CSR where the social desirability bias might be even more 
severe.  
 
From a methodological point of view, one goal of the study was to evaluate quantitatively the 
impact of national institutions on CSR practices. In the statistical analysis, the institutional 
variables presented in Chapter 3 were included in the regressions analysis. After repeated 
trials arranging them in different order, they were repeatedly and systematically dropped by 
Stata due to multicollinearity issues. The only remaining institutional variable is the country 
of origin preventing us to disentangle the separate role of various national institutions on CSR 
practices. As explained at the beginning of the analysis, this situation comes from the fact that 
only two countries are compared in this study, leading Stata to interpret the institutional 
variables as dummy variables. Given that these variables are perfectly correlated, Stata 
dropped them. Nevertheless, the correlation table between national institutions and each 
aspect of CSR provided valuable insights on the relation between institutions and CSR. 
 
Finally, the limited size of the individual UK and French samples did not permit separate 
regression analysis. The main advantage of carrying out these regressions would have been to 
study more closely differences in antecedents between France and the UK. Instead of that, 
membership to one or the other sample was marked with the use of a dummy variable. 
Further studies could specifically look at variations in antecedents between France and the 
UK by relying on a larger sample of companies.  
 
5.7 Summary 
 
The aim of this chapter was to understand better the determinants of CSR practices based on 
an analysis of the primary survey data. We concluded the previous chapter with the 
establishment of differences between the French and UK sample, both in terms of type and 
extent of these CSR practices. It was indeed found that UK companies are more involved with 
CSR activities than their French counterparts. This finding pointed to the strand of literature 
viewing CSR as a substitute of the national institutions (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). 
Following the establishment of differences between France and the UK, the purpose of this 
chapter was to explain them with a multilevel analysis combining national institutions and 
company characteristics.  
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The first conclusion of this chapter is that CSR is not a homogeneous concept that can be 
researched as a whole. Its components, almost following a stakeholders’ view of CSR, 
respond to various incentives and pressures. These findings call for a nuanced view of CSR 
determinants. It is not just the result of national institutions, in the form of a variety of 
capitalism, or the expression of specific company characteristics. It is a subtle combination of 
both depending on the CSR aspect under scrutiny.  
 
Based on the factor analysis, CSR is divided between a compulsory aspect, a supplier aspect, 
a local community aspect and an environmental/philanthropic aspect. The compulsory side of 
CSR is predicted by the size of the company (negative relation), the number of international 
competitors and a company’s financial performance. Country of origin, size (both negatively 
correlated) as well as economic performance predict the suppliers’ aspect of CSR. The CSR 
actions towards the local community are influenced by the company’s size (again negative 
correlation) and economic performance. Finally, the involvement towards the environment 
and charity giving are predicted by the country of origin and economic performance.  
 
Therefore, this chapter provides answers to the initial research questions. Specifically, 
national institutions have an impact on a country general level of CSR as well as on the 
suppliers and the environmental/philanthropic aspects of CSR. This result confirms the 
substitute role of CSR where CSR compensates for LME institutions. The substitute theory 
does not explain the whole picture though and needs to be complemented by the effect of 
companies’ characteristics. 
Not all of them predict CSR practices. It was found that only size, economic performance, 
economic performance compared to competitors and number of international competitors are 
significant. No matter what aspect is under scrutiny, the economic success of a company is a 
constant determinant of CSR involvement. The importance of this factor shows that CSR is 
still dependent on something else. It signals that CSR does not exist for itself but is incidental. 
It has not yet received the status of necessary/automatic institution for companies. In the 
event of another economic downturn, one might predict that CSR budgets will be cut except 
for its regulated aspects.  
 
Furthermore, the specificity of certain stakeholders, such as employees, investors or 
customers, force us to include the supranational level. In the context of France and the UK, 
the impact of the European Union should not be neglected or downplayed. By its regulations 
and directives, it directly influences companies on their CSR path.  
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Going back to Figure 5.1 at the opening of this Chapter, one of the arrows connects the 
variety of capitalism to company characteristics. Despite being unable in this study to 
investigate further this particular connection, the way in which national institutions impact on 
company characteristics influences CSR practices. This domino effect was not measurable 
here, but it should not be overlooked.   
 
The next chapter will add an extra-layer of analysis and shed light on the respondents’ 
perceptions of the role and motivations of CSR.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE IMPACT OF PERCEPTIONS 
ON CSR PRACTICES  
 
‘A house may be large or small; as long as the neighbouring houses are 
likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let 
there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to 
a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no social 
position at all to maintain, or but a very insignificant one; and however 
high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighbouring 
palace rises in equal or even in greater measure, the occupant of the 
relatively little house will always find himself more uncomfortable, more 
dissatisfied, more cramped within his four walls (Marx, 1975, p. 33)’ 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In previous chapters, the combined impact of varieties of capitalism and company 
characteristics on CSR was examined. It was argued that CSR practices are the results of a 
subtle combination of factors respectively from national institutions and corporate 
characteristics. Yet, it might be asked what the role of employees – if any -  is in relation to 
CSR. This aspect is investigated in the last part of the survey, notably perceptions of CSR by 
HR managers. Perceptions in this context relates to the way respondents perceive CSR. 
Perceptions are studied with regard to two lines of inquiry. To begin with, whether CSR is 
seen to work in terms of improving performance. Are there any discrepancies between France 
and the UK? Moreover, to what extent are CSR practices shaped by the way HR managers 
perceive and define CSR? This chapter sheds some light on the individual actors who make 
and implement CSR on a daily basis by placing the focus on them.  
 
The role of HR managers’ CSR beliefs can provide researchers and practitioners with 
valuable insight on CSR.  To date, the literature has mainly focused on employees’ 
perceptions for instrumental purposes: attraction and retention of employees, job satisfaction, 
employees’ productivity and commitment (Rupp et al., 2006; Brammer, Millington and 
Rayton, 2007; Farooq et al., 2013; Glavas and Godwin, 2013; De Roeck et al., 2014; Glavas 
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and Kelley, 2014). The literature remains largely silent on the way employees view CSR, its 
potential outcomes and its rationale. Scholars have recently started to examine the 
connections between CSR and employees. However, the analysis remains limited; Brammer 
(2014, p. 325) laments that ‘much of the extant literature examines attitudinal responses to 
CSR but fails to link these to behaviours’. This Chapter aims to address this gap in the 
literature by offering exploratory analysis of HR manager CSR beliefs and the possible 
interactions between CSR beliefs and CSR activities. Focusing on employee perceptions is 
important at two levels. Firstly, positive views of the role of CSR might improve a company’s 
involvement in CSR. Secondly, studying employee perceptions of CSR gives a salient and 
valuable insight into larger debates around business and society. The nature of the 
respondents, i.e HR managers, should not be forgotten. They may not represent the whole 
employee 
 
Referring again to Figure 6.1, that accompanies each step of this study, this chapter adds 
another level, highlighted in bold, corresponding to the way employees in the surveyed 
companies perceived and understand the role of CSR. To sum up, this exploratory chapter 
investigates differences in HR managers CSR perceptions and the possible direct relation 
between these perceptions and the company’s CSR practices. 
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Figure 6.1 Research model 
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section develops the 
hypotheses related to HR managers’ perceptions of CSR. This is followed by the results and 
discussion section, then consideration of the limitations. This chapter closes with a summary 
section outlining the key points.  
 
6.2 Hypotheses development  
 
6.2.1 Perceptions of CSR 
 
It is argued that the way employees see the role of CSR reflects and varies according to four 
broader issues that are central to the debate on CSR, issues that have been already touched 
upon in previous chapters. Nevertheless, these four issues exert opposite influence on how 
employees, in this case HR managers, perceive CSR. 
 
The first key debate relates to the role of companies which differs in France and in the UK. 
The terms of this debate are pretty simple: what is the role of a company? Is it purely a 
money-making machine for the sake of the shareholders? Or is there a higher purpose to it 
with the provision of broader services towards the community and society at large? This 
debate is a long-standing one with conflicting – at times irreconcilable- viewpoints. At one 
end of the spectrum, the most well-known answer was formulated in Milton Friedman’s 
admonition that companies should pursue a single goal: profits for their shareholders 
(Friedman, 1970).  Conversely, others argue that companies should go beyond the pure 
interest of their shareholders by taking into account their stakeholders (Eells and Walton, 
1974; Carroll, 1991, 2009). Companies should be involved in the community and take part in 
solving social, economic and environmental issues beyond the realm of the company. This 
position has gained momentum with the acceleration of globalisation and unbridled 
capitalism, outbreaks of global issues requiring global solutions (the most pressing one of 
them being global warming). Besides, multinational companies have reached an 
unprecedented level of economic and therefore political power contending with national 
states (Matten and Crane, 2005; Scherer and Palazzo, 2008; Dicken, 2011). This power 
should come with responsibilities and duties beyond the sphere of the company. Between 
these two polar opposites, the European Commission provides a prudent mid-way position 
hinting at a broader voluntary role of companies: ‘Although the prime responsibility of a 
company is generating profits, companies can at the same time contribute to social and 
environmental objectives, through integrating corporate social responsibility as a strategic 
investment into their core business strategy, their management practices and their 
operations’ (European Union Commission, 2001, p. 4). 
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In practice, the answer to the question of the role of companies is highly cultural and country-
dependent. Indeed, the role of business and the role of the state are two sides of the same 
coin: if companies are not trusted to act, then it should be the responsibility of the state and 
vice versa. When comparing France and the UK, it has been argued that France is genuinely 
different from Anglo-Saxon countries (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2003; Prasad, 2005; 
Berthoin Antal and Sobczak, 2007). As established in previous chapters (in particular Chapter 
2), France has a unique conception of the business and society nexus, that led to a unique 
variety of capitalism marked by the ongoing strong role of the state, suspicions towards 
businesses to provide both public service and transparency (Schmidt, 2003; Prasad, 2005; 
Berthoin Antal and Sobczak, 2007). France relies on the direct intervention of the state to 
legislate on economic, social and environmental issues and distrusts self-regulation, as 
suggested by Hancke, Rhodes and Thatcher (2007). The UK is the polar opposite, where there 
is a strong belief in markets, transparency, a preference for a non-interventionist state and a 
trust in businesses to do the job. It is contended that the conception of the role of the state and 
business impacts the way employees believe whether CSR works in terms of improving the 
bottom line. The trust and latitude UK companies enjoy give them more opportunities, 
credibility and legitimacy to engage in CSR. French companies are less trusted in that regard 
leading to a more pragmatic and/or suspicious assessment of CSR.  
 
The expectations of the role of companies and national states intensify the distinction between 
implicit CSR and explicit CSR (Matten and Moon, 2008).  The division follows historically 
the opposition between Anglo-Saxon countries and continental Europe. Matten and Moon 
(2008) argue that the American National Business System triggered an explicit way of doing 
CSR that extended to the UK; whereas the specificities of the National Business Systems in 
continental Europe provided the conditions for an implicit way of doing CSR. In the case of 
explicit CSR, ‘incentives and opportunities are motivated by the perceived expectations of 
different stakeholders of the corporation’ (Matten and Moon, 2008, p. 410). Yet explicit CSR 
combined with higher freedom of actions for companies does not mean that employees 
perceive CSR actions in a better light. 
Companies engage in CSR voluntarily in order to respond to stakeholders’ expectations. They 
do so with a hidden agenda, or at least with benefits in mind, whether it is to repair a 
tarnished corporate image or to avoid becoming the target of public shaming (Vogel, 2005b). 
It has notably been the case with the pressures from NGOs, customers and employees 
following corporate scandals (Merck, Levi Strauss, Nike, Enron to name just a few) (Vogel, 
2005b). Anglo-Saxon companies are accustomed to explicit, vocal and visible acts of CSR 
that could lead to suspicions about the actual outcomes and impact of these actions -  in other 
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words suspicions of green-washing. On the other hand, implicit CSR, because it mirrors the 
traditional expectations and roles of the different groups in society (Matten and Moon, 2008), 
would protect companies from being accused of faking CSR. The discreet CSR discourse 
protects companies from suspicion. That being said, the explicit way of doing CSR has been 
spreading across continental Europe, France included, and with it, doubts on the genuine 
character of (implicit) CSR.  
 
The other question that impacts the way employees view CSR relates to another distinction, 
namely internal and external CSR. It comes from the absence of an official definition and the 
voluntary nature of CSR. One way to make sense of the wide range of CSR activities is to 
sort them based on their recipients: those in the company with employees and shareholders on 
one hand; those outside the company such as customers, suppliers, public authorities, NGOs 
etc., on the other. The Green Paper of the EU Commission provides a clear definition: ‘Within 
the company, socially responsible practices primarily involve employees and relate to issues 
such as investing in human capital, health and safety, and managing change, while 
environmentally responsible practices relate mainly to the management of natural resources 
used in production. They open a way of managing change and reconciling social development 
with improved competitiveness’ (European Union Commission, 2001, p. 8). External CSR 
‘extends beyond the doors of the company into the local community and involves a wide 
range of stakeholders in addition to employees and shareholders: business partners and 
suppliers, customers, public authorities and NGOs representing local communities, as well as 
the environment’ (European Union Commission, 2001, p. 11). Companies do not deal with 
their stakeholders in a similar fashion, notably due to their different expectations.  
 
When it comes to CSR measures towards employees (internal CSR), employee rights play an 
important part in the equation. France and the UK treat their employees very differently 
because of their variety of capitalism. It has been shown in Chapter 2, that employment 
relations in LME are characterised by a high turnover rate, a high level of inequality in 
salaries and wages, decentralisation of bargaining, and low level of collective bargaining 
coverage (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Jackson and Kirsch, 2014). The state provides the rules of 
the game of the market, but coordination mechanisms are market-based and industrial 
relations are regulated by employers and employees themselves through collective 
agreements (Meardi, 2014). In France, employment relations are not coordinated by the 
market. The state is directly involved in the regulation of employment relations and collective 
bargaining despite the recent evolutions. The state used to decide which organisations are 
‘representative’ to take part in collective bargaining. The state is also involved at every level, 
from the national to the local, either as a supervisor of the negotiation or by imposing the 
	 173	
bargaining agenda (Meardi, 2014). French employees are also more involved in the 
elaboration of company norms with the social dialogue, the obligation to consult, the 
existence of work councils and workers’ representatives. Most of the time, these areas of 
consultation and social dialogue overlap with the field of CSR (Berthoin Antal and Sobczak, 
2007).  
 
In addition, employee rights are lower in the UK than in France. According to the OECD in 
2013 (Table 6.2), the level of employment protection for individual and collective dismissals 
is significantly lower in the UK compared to France, with France having the highest level of 
employment rights among OECD countries (Goergen et al., 2013). Despite a stronger trade 
union density (see Table 6.2), the collective bargaining coverage is weaker in the UK 
compared to a 98% coverage in France. In terms of real wages, the situation is again worse on 
the UK side, where between 2007 and 2015 UK workers experienced the greatest fall in real 
wages among OECD countries. Real wages fell by 10.4% (a similar percentage to Greece) 
compared to a 10.5% rise in France (TUC, 2016).  
 
Table 6.2 Employment relations variables in the UK and France 
Variable (in 2013) UK France OECD countries 
Strictness of 
employment protection 
– individual and 
collective dismissals 
(regular contracts)  
 
1.66 2.82 2.28 
Trade Union Density  
 
25.8 7.7 17 
Collective bargaining 
coverage  
 
29.5 98 49.2 
Notes 
1. The strictness of employment protection is based on a scale from 0 (least restriction) to 6 
(most restriction) on dismissals. 
2. Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union 
members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners, measured in percentage 
(OECD Labour Force Statistics). 
3. The coverage rate is measured as the percentage of workers who are covered by collective 
bargaining agreements regardless of whether or not they belong to a trade union.  
Source: OECD Stat. 
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We argue that the French system, with greater state intervention and stronger employee 
rights, leads French employees to a better view of internal CSR compared to UK employees. 
French employees can witness for themselves better workplace conditions as opposed to UK 
employees who witness messages of CSR actions without experiencing improving working 
conditions. UK employees are more likely to experience a disconnect between corporate 
communications on internal CSR and observed working conditions.  
 
Regarding the external aspect of CSR, the explanation is different and reflects back the 
implicit/explicit distinction. In an explicit environment, companies respond to their external 
stakeholders’ pressure to create and perpetuate an image of a responsible company. The CSR 
discourse, the CSR marketing Public Relation campaigns are targeted towards the outside, 
towards external stakeholders, primarily customers, suppliers and NGOs. In an implicit 
environment, CSR does not need to be advertised by the company, CSR communication is 
less intensive and aggressive (Matten and Moon, 2008). The obviousness of CSR measures 
has not been accompanied by the end of corporate scandals and irresponsible actions of 
companies. The last decade has come with its share of corporate scandals: tax evasion and tax 
avoidance strategies by MNCs (Credit Suisse Group, Google, Apple, Amazon, Starbucks), 
unethical employment practices in the supply chain (Apple, garment industry), risky and 
unethical behaviours in the banking industry leading to the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
In conclusion, employees receive mixed messages: on one hand, positive CSR messages 
about how responsible companies are, and on the other hand, public corporate shaming and 
real working conditions leading to the idea that CSR is just a smoke-screen. It is posited that 
this disconnect is stronger where CSR is explicit, namely in the UK. 
 
Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is suggested, with two alternatives: 
 
H1: French HR managers have different perceptions of CSR than UK HR managers. 
H1a: UK HR managers have a better perception of CSR than French HR managers (based on 
the role of business). 
H1b: French HR managers have a better perception of CSR than UK HR managers (based on 
the implicit CSR theory combined with employee rights). 
 
 
 
 
 
	 175	
6.2.2 The impact of CSR perceptions on CSR activities 
 
As individuals, we express opinions that reflect normative beliefs about the way companies 
ought to behave. As Mudrack (2007) explains, these individual beliefs are independent from 
the way companies actually behave in real life. Individual beliefs are therefore central to the 
way employees perceive CSR and its role. Despite the importance of individual beliefs and 
perceptions, there is a limited number of CSR studies in the area (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). 
A few studies have demonstrated the general role played by individual values. For instance, 
CEOs’ values exert an influence on their perceptions of stakeholder salience (Agle and 
Mitchell, 1999). At a lower hierarchical level, employee values are also central in their 
perception of the rightness of CSR (Mudrack, 2007). Mudrack (2007) provides a similar 
conclusion for employee personality traits and attitudes and concludes they are closely linked 
to employees’ perception of CSR. It has been shown that the impact of individual values on 
corporate actions is even greater when they are aligned with organisational values (Bansal, 
2003). In this case, the role of congruence between individual and organisational values lead 
to higher corporate responses towards environmental issues. Finally, individual concerns 
regarding a particular issue also act as a determinant of corporate actions (Bansal and Roth, 
2000). This literature – though nascent – reveals a connection between individual values and 
beliefs and CSR.   
Nevertheless, there is a gap in the literature regarding the specific relations between employee 
perceptions of CSR and CSR activities within the company. We argue that perceptions do 
play a part, and more specifically we contend that employee perceptions - in this case HR 
managers’ perceptions -  of CSR will have an impact on a company’s CSR activities.  
 
When it comes to employees, the literature has so far demonstrated the role of employee CSR 
perceptions in organizational attractiveness, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, 
citizenship behaviour, and job performance (Rupp et al., 2006; Farooq et al., 2013; Brammer, 
He and Mellahi, 2014; De Roeck et al., 2014). The literature has established a direct causal 
link between the assessment by an employee of a company’s CSR policy and her personal 
feelings about the company, her job and motivation. Furthermore, Aguilera et al. (2007) argue 
that employees’ perceptions of CSR create ‘an organizational climate for CSR, which 
contributes to a firm’s overall social reputation’ (Aguilera et al., 2007, p. 840). Vogel 
(2005b) contends that  employees can exert a similar influence on CSR as customers would 
do if they believe in the positive effect of CSR. It is argued then that this positive climate for 
CSR is beneficial to further involvement in CSR practices.  
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This positive influence created by CSR involvement is also viewed outside of the company. 
Indeed, Sen et al. (2006) confirm the role of perceptions of CSR for external stakeholders. 
Despite the limited character of Sen et al.’s (2006) study, it provides some interesting results 
with regard to the role of CSR perceptions on various stakeholders: ‘Individuals who were 
aware of the CSR initiative in this study had more positive company-related associations; 
displayed greater organizational identification with the company; and indicated a greater 
intent to purchase products, seek employment, and invest in the company than respondents 
who were unaware of the initiative. Therefore, CSR activity has the potential to increase not 
only CSR associations, attitudes, and identification but also the intent of stakeholders to 
commit personal resources (e.g., money, labour, etc.) to the benefit of the company’ (Sen, 
Bhattacharya and Korschun, 2006, p. 164). It is argued that positive perceptions of CSR 
similarly create positive attitudes and associations propelling employees to invest further in 
CSR activities.  
It should be highlighted again that respondents are HR managers (the reasons for that choice 
were explained in Chapter 3) which offer a specific case of HR managers’ perceptions. They 
express their views as a specific category of employees. This discussion leads to the 
following hypotheses. 
 
H2: A positive HR manager perception of CSR has a direct positive impact on a company’s 
general level of CSR practices. 
H3: A positive HR manager perception of CSR has no impact on a company’s compulsory 
component of CSR. 
H4: A positive HR manager perception of CSR has a direct positive impact on a company’s 
philanthropic and environmental CSR. 
H5: A positive HR manager perception of CSR has a direct positive impact on a company’s 
CSR component towards the local community. 
H6: A positive HR manager perception of CSR has a direct positive impact on a company’s 
CSR component towards suppliers. 
 
6.3 Results and discussion 
 
In order to determine HR managers’ CSR perceptions and their impact on CSR activities, the 
survey asked the respondents various questions regarding the role of CSR. The purpose was 
to assess whether HR managers believe CSR is positive or negative for companies in the 
areas of employment, business growth and financial success. Furthermore, the survey asked 
HR managers what they think their company’s motivations to engage in CSR activities are –  
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is it because of ulterior motives (such as gaining reputation) or genuine ethical motives (CSR 
is the right thing to do)?  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, Hypothesis 1 states the existence of differences in HR 
managers’ perceptions between the two countries. In order to test this, two-sample t-tests are 
performed. The results of the two-sample t-test are presented in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 
providing the rank order of HR managers’ CSR perceptions based on a measure of the mean. 
The nature of the data makes it relevant to supplement again this parametric test by a z-test as 
a check on its interpretation. The non-parametric test (not reported here) confirms the findings 
of the parametric test reported below. The tests are conducted for each individual CSR 
perception (15 in total). For the sake of clarity, the results on the outcomes of CSR are 
reported first and separately (Table 6.3) from the CSR rationale (Table 6.4). 
 
6.3.1 Dissimilarities in the perceived outcomes of CSR 
 
At first glance, Table 6.3 provides support to Hypothesis 1: French and UK HR managers 
present different perceptions of the outcomes of CSR. The differences are observed both in 
terms of mean and ranking of the statements. Out of the 10 perceptions investigated, 8 reveal 
significant differences in mean between the two samples (p<0.05). Nonetheless similarities 
exist. The two samples share in common the idea that CSR has a positive impact on 
companies confirmed by the lowest rankings of all the negative statements on CSR. These 
results reaffirm also respondents’ consistency in that respect. 
 
In terms of the areas CSR improve, results differ between the two samples. On average 
respondents from the UK sample believe that CSR has first a positive impact on accessing 
new markets. Then, CSR improves employees’ productivity, customers’ and employees’ 
retention (the means for these statements being extremely close ranging from 3.44 to 3.46). 
Finally, CSR has a positive impact on the financial performance of the company and 
employees’ motivation (similar mean for both statements). In other words, respondents from 
the UK sample does not focus on particular positive benefits regarding the role of CSR. There 
is not much unity in their perceptions.  
 
On the other hand, the French sample conveys a much more intelligible picture of CSR. On 
average, French respondents trust that CSR increase customers’ retention with the highest 
mean of 3.70. Then CSR enhances the financial performance and access to new markets, with 
respectively a mean of 3.62 and 3.58. In other words, CSR is seen as a tool to improve a 
company’s economic success which reflects the business case of CSR, mentioned in previous 
	 178	
chapters. After the business case element comes improvements towards employees. The 
highest ranked improvements relate to those with an impact on the company’s activities 
namely retention and productivity. Employees’ retention and productivity are close in means 
(respectively 3.56 and 3.52) followed by employees’ motivation (3.44). In short, French 
employees manifest a domination of the business case of CSR over employees when it comes 
to CSR outcomes.  
 
Furthermore, a closer look at the table indicates that French HR managers perceive CSR 
better than their UK counterparts, providing full support to hypothesis 1b. Contrary to 
Chapter 4, in absolute measures, French respondents rate higher each positive statement on 
CSR and rate lower each negative statement than British respondents. French respondents 
perceive better CSR than they implement CSR measures (as per the conclusion of Chapter 4). 
Put differently, this result means that French HR managers believe that CSR is able to 
improve the bottom line in comparison to UK HR managers despite a lower level of 
implementation. 
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Table 6.3 Perceived roles of CSR 
 UK France  
Variable 
Rank of 
UK 
companies 
Mean SD 
Rank of 
French 
companies 
Mean SD t-value 
CSR + 
impact on 
accessing 
new markets 
1 3.55 0.12 3 3.58 0.07 -0.20 
CSR: + 
impact on 
employees’ 
productivity 
2 3.46 0.12 5 3.52 0.07 -0.47* 
CSR + 
impact on 
customers’ 
retention 
3 3.45 0.12 1 3.70 0.07 -1.91* 
CSR + 
impact on 
employees’ 
retention 
4 3.44 0.11 4 3.56 0.07 -0.85* 
CSR + 
impact on 
company’ 
financial 
performance 
5 3.31 0.11 2 3.62 0.09 -2.24* 
CSR + 
impact on 
employees’ 
motivation 
6  3.31 0.11 6 3.44 0.08 -0.96* 
CSR – 
impact on 
employees’ 
productivity 
7 2.92 0.14 8 2.67 0.10 1.48* 
CSR – 
impact on 
8 2.88 0.14 10 2.56 0.10 1.89* 
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 UK France  
employees’ 
motivation 
CSR – 
impact on 
customers’ 
retention 
9 2.86 0.14 7 2.79 0.10 0.45 
CSR – 
impact on 
employees’ 
retention 
10 2.79 0.15 9 2.67 0.10 0.68* 
Notes 
1. SD = Standard Deviation 
2. * Results statistically significant at a significance level of p< 0.05 
3. z-values were also calculated but with no difference in significance with t-values, therefore 
z-values are not reported here. 
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6.3.2 Dissimilarities in the motivations behind CSR 
 
Moving on to the CSR rationale, how do respondents conceive CSR? The two-sample t-tests 
exhibit 3 (out of 5) significant differences between the French and UK sample in terms of 
mean. The ranking of the statements differs between the two samples. The initial observation 
for Table 6.3 remains applicable in this instance. French respondents rate more highly, in 
absolute means, CSR rationale than their UK equivalents.  Table 6.4 unveils an enlightening 
opposition in the philosophy behind CSR. The results show that UK respondents consider that 
CSR is carried out because it is the right thing to do with a mean of 3.40, hinting at an ethical 
perspective of CSR. The French respondents are more pragmatic and/or cynical. CSR is first 
conducted to improve the reputation of the company with a mean of 3.47. Closely following 
comes the ethical rationale for doing CSR (mean of 3.45). It is striking that for both samples 
respondents ascertain that CSR is not so much conducted for the sake of improving the 
financial performance of the company. This statement obtains a mean of 3.13 in the UK 
sample and 3.27 in the French one. 
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Table 6.4 The motivations behind CSR 
 UK France  
Variable 
Rank of 
UK 
companies 
Mean SD 
Rank of 
French 
companies 
Mean SD t-value 
CSR right 
thing to do 
 
1 3.40 0.13 2 3.45 0.08 -0.34* 
CSR 
conducted to 
improve 
reputation 
2 3.30 0.12 1 3.47 0.08 -1.19* 
Company 
needs to be 
more 
responsible 
3 3.30 0.11 3 3.27 0.77 0.19 
Company 
more 
responsible 
than 
competitors 
4 3.21 0.12 5 3.01 0.09 1.35 
CSR 
conducted to 
improve 
company’s 
financial 
performance 
5 3.13 0.13 4 3.27 0.08 -0.97* 
Notes 
1. SD = Standard Deviation 
2. * Results statistically significant at a significance level of p< 0.05 
3. z-values were also calculated but with no difference in significance with t-values, therefore 
z-values are not reported here. 
 
Table 6.3 and 6.4 offer interesting results regarding the perceived outcomes of CSR and its 
rationale. There is a clear-cut contrast between France and the UK. French HR managers are 
more likely to trust CSR to improve the bottom line even though French companies are 
generally less involved in CSR. Despite a positive perception of the effects of CSR, French 
HR managers are more cynical about CSR rationale. The ethical justification comes second; 
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CSR is conducted to improve the reputation of companies. Conversely, UK respondents are 
less convinced that CSR is able to improve the bottom line despite a higher degree of CSR 
involvement by UK companies. There is therefore a disconnect between CSR actions they 
know of and their actual impact on internal and external stakeholders. Regardless of this 
contradiction, UK HR managers view CSR as an ethical act from companies. These findings 
should be outlined as they are particularly interesting. The position of French HR managers 
appears as expected, whereas the position of UK HR managers is quite unexpected. What 
these results indicate on a deeper level is that UK HR managers do not believe in the 
possibility of future changes (changes here with the implementation of CSR practices). 
French HR managers are not that pessimistic, changes are feasible even though they might 
come from utilitarian and pragmatic motivations. UK HR managers present a gloomy picture 
of their current mind-set. How can that be explained?  
 
The first line of explanation relates to the distinction between explicit and implicit CSR 
discrediting CSR outcomes (Matten and Moon, 2008). Regardless of the actual degree of 
CSR involvement, the need for UK companies to communicate about CSR is stronger than 
French companies. They also would want to try to establish their explicit CSR credentials 
more vehemently than French ones. This distinction has an impact on the evaluation of CSR 
outcomes.  In a UK context where revelations of tax evasion, inhuman working conditions in 
the supply chain, disproportionate pay of executives and CEOs have surfaced, combined with 
a general low level of employment protection, CSR cannot be seen as improving the bottom 
line. CSR only appears as a strategic and Public Relations tool to gain strategic advantages 
over competitors and increase profits for shareholders. That position converges with the 
general criticism of CSR regarding its lack of impact and its use as a smoke-screen covering 
business as usual. In the French environment, corporate scandals are less present and 
companies are quieter regarding their CSR ventures, limiting the suspicion of greenwashing. 
Furthermore, when looking at the impact of CSR on employees, the findings can be explained 
by the differences in employment protection between the UK and France. Among the OECD 
countries, France has the highest level of employment protection; the UK one the lowest 
(Goergen et al., 2013). French employees are covered and protected by laws and regulations, 
the internal aspect of CSR is therefore less essential because internal CSR is less needed. On 
the contrary, in the UK there is an opposition between employment protection and investors 
rights, the latter winning by far and impacting HR managers’ perceptions. Internal CSR could 
be used to improve employees’ workplace conditions. Furthermore, companies would want to 
demonstrate to their stakeholders their explicit CSR credentials more strongly. However, they 
do not seem to pass the reality test and convince their employees of better working 
conditions.  
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That being said, UK HR managers are more likely to believe that CSR is conducted out of the 
goodness of companies’ hearts, which seems contradictory. UK HR managers still trust 
businesses whereas French HR managers are more cynical about CSR motivations. Georgen 
et al. (2013) demonstrated in their study that country trust is negatively correlated with weak 
employee rights and investor rights. In the case of France and the UK, the former presents the 
lowest level of country trust (19%) and the latter is the OECD mean of 30%. These 
contrasting levels of country trust associated with the perceived role of businesses can explain 
the findings on CSR rationale.  
 
It might also be asked whether the UK findings reflect a general dissatisfaction with the 
current economic system and a general sense of fatalism: nothing can be changed. In that 
sense, CSR is not seen as the right tool to mitigate and correct the negative consequences of 
capitalism. But companies do not seem to be blamed for that as indicated by the traditional 
trust in businesses. The culprit is located somewhere else. Currently, it is the European Union 
(see the Brexit result) and immigration, as extreme-right and populist parties try to argue. 
These arguments seem to work: Trump was elected in the US, the UK is now leaving the EU, 
Golden Dawn (an extreme-right wing party) became the third largest party in the 2015 Greek 
elections. France, on the other hand, did not elect the far-right candidate but someone outside 
of the traditional right or left, a symbol of change.  
 
The theory on relative deprivation (Davis, 1959; Crosby, 1976) provides further insight on the 
position of UK workers. The theory on relative deprivation helps understand the reasons why 
in a society some people feel deprived, even though they may be in a better objective 
situation than the non-deprived ones. It is a relative feeling because it comes from the 
comparison of one’s own situation to others. ‘People feel unjustly treated or inadequately 
compensated when they compare themselves to some standard of reference. Because 
deprivation is relative, it is often true that those who are the most deprived in an objective 
sense are the ones most likely to experience deprivation’ (Crosby, 1976, p. 85). For someone 
to feel deprived, Crosby (1976) argued that five cumulative preconditions are required: seeing 
that Other possesses X; wanting X; feeling that one deserves X; thinking it feasible to obtain 
X; lacking a sense of responsibility for failure to possess X. 
It is argued that the self-deprivation theory helps explain the position of UK HR managers 
with regard to CSR outcomes. It is a predictor of the perception of CSR outcomes. In a group 
without deprivation feelings, people will perceive CSR as able to improve economic and 
social performance. This is the case of French HR managers. Conversely, a group of people 
experiencing a feeling of deprivation will not view CSR as able to improve the current 
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situation. The feeling of deprivation leads to the view CSR cannot change the present 
conditions which is the case of UK workers. Increasing inequality in the UK is connected to 
this feeling of deprivation and hopelessness about the future. 
 
In summary, Hypothesis 1 in its second alternative is supported: CSR perceptions between 
France and the UK diverge, with a better perception expressed on the French side. Do these 
variations have any impact on CSR behaviours? This question will be examined in the next 
section.  
 
 
6.3.3 Impact of CSR perceptions on CSR activities 
 
In order to evaluate the impact of perceptions on the level of CSR activities, five new 
composite variables are created based on the statements presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. 
These new indicators are the results of the means of the relevant existing (Likert-scale) 
variables.  
 
The new variables are: 
1. Positive impact of CSR on employees:  
a. Positive impact of CSR on employees’ productivity 
b. Positive impact of CSR on employees’ retention 
c. Positive impact of CSR on employees’ motivation 
2. Negative impact of CSR on employees: 
a. Negative impact of CSR on employees’ productivity 
b. Negative impact of CSR on employees’ retention 
c. Negative impact of CSR on employees’ motivation 
3. Positive impact on business: 
a. Positive impact of CSR on accessing new markets 
b. Positive impact of CSR on customers’ retention 
c. Positive impact of CSR on financial performance 
4. CSR conducted for business case: 
a. CSR conducted to improve reputation 
b. CSR conducted to improve company’s financial performance 
5. Importance of CSR: 
a. CSR is priority 
b. CSR beyond the law 
c. Importance of CSR 
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d. Familiarity with CSR 
 
The relation between CSR perceptions and CSR activities is tested through the OLS 
regression analysis using the same CSR indicators presented in Chapter 5. Similarly, CSR 
perception variables are regressed against each aspect of CSR: its general measure, its 
compulsory component, its philanthropic and environmental aspect, its local community 
component and lastly its supplier aspect. The linear regression analysis is based on the results 
reported in the previous chapter. More specifically, the same dependent and independent 
variables are included in the regression equation, but also added are the five CSR perception 
variables.  
 
6.3.3.1 General measure of CSR 
 
The previous chapter concluded that four variables impacted the general level of CSR in a 
company: the country of origin, company size, economic performance and economic 
performance compared to competitors. Adding measures of CSR perceptions improve the 
results as shown in Table 6.5. Overall, the regression is significant at a significance level of 
0.001 with an adjusted R2 of 0.3482.  
The results suggest that aside from country of origin, company size and the two measures of 
economic performance, the number of international competitors and CSR conducted for 
business case need to be added. This result supports hypothesis 2 where a positive perception 
of CSR has a direct positive impact on the general level of CSR in a company. Specifically, 
the perception that CSR is conducted for the business case is correlated to the CSR level. The 
other perception variables were dropped due to their insignificance.  
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Table 6.5 Regression results for general CSR 
 
General measure of CSR t-value 
Country of origin (0 =UK; 1 = France) -0.2456483 ** -2.84 
Size of the company -0.0478925* -2.39 
Age of the company 0.0728157 1.35 
Industry -0.0064252 -0.69 
Number of domestic competitors (log) -0.0406094 -1.49 
Number of international competitors (log) 0.0209536* 2.00 
Economic Performance 0.1554351* 1.97 
Economic performance compared to competitors 0.2136119* 2.17 
CSR conducted for business case 0.1696966 * 2.19 
Constant   2.145089*** 5.44 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.3482   
F 12.84   
N 162   
Prob> F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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6.3.3.2 Compulsory component of CSR 
 
The focus in this section is on the determinants of compulsory CSR and the potential impact 
of CSR perceptions. From the previous chapter, it was found that four variables are 
explanatory: company size, number of international competitors, economic performance and 
economic performance compared to competitors. The addition of perception variables 
changes the regression result reported in Table 6.6 below. The same four independent 
variables are still significant (at p<0.05 or p<0.01). To them must be added the country of 
origin, the negative impact on employees of CSR and CSR conducted for business case. The 
most significant variables are now economic performance compared to competitors, negative 
impact on employees of CSR and country of origin. Overall, the regression gains in 
explanatory power with an adjusted R2 of 0.3268 (compared to 0.2573 in Chapter 5).  
Despite its significance, the results provide no support to Hypothesis 3. The perceptions that 
CSR has a negative impact on employees and that CSR is conducted for the business case are 
determinants of CSR activities. In particular, the variable ‘negative impact on employees’ is 
negatively correlated to compulsory CSR, which means that the belief CSR is detrimental to 
employees leads to a decrease in the general level of compulsory CSR. The sign for the 
independent variable ‘CSR conducted for the business case’ is positive. Compulsory CSR 
increases with the belief that CSR is conducted for the business case. It should be noted that 
the addition of these perception measures renders the country of origin significant. In a 
similar way to every instance where this variable is significant, it denotes a negative 
relationship between the CSR component and the country of origin. French companies are 
less engaged in CSR practices than UK ones.  
Chapter 5 concluded that the compulsory component of CSR leads to a harmonisation of 
practices in the area of CSR practices regulated by law, in particular by European legislation. 
The variations in components of CSR revealed a discrepancy between regulation and 
compliance. Compulsory CSR is lowered by a negative impact of CSR on employees.  
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Table 6.6 Regression results for compulsory CSR 
 
Compulsory CSR t-value 
Country of origin (0= UK; 1= France) -0.2001039* -2.07 
Size of the company -0.0600238** -2.64 
Age of the company 0.1111524 1.71 
Industry -0.0058903 -0.51 
Number of domestic competitors -0.035095 -1.17 
Number of international competitors 0.0245725* 2.05 
Economic Performance 0.1870428** 2.61 
Economic performance compared to competitors 0.2539587* 2.47 
Negative impact on employees of CSR -0.2035566*** -3.67 
CSR conducted for business case  0.1631164* 2.33 
Constant 2.53355*** 7.04 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.3268   
F 8.01   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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6.3.3.3 Philanthropic and environmental CSR 
 
The previous chapter concluded that the UK was more involved than France in CSR practices 
targeting the environment and charities. These results were put into perspective questioning 
the actual involvement of UK companies. In particular, green-washing and better 
communication about CSR – hinting at the Matten and Moon (2008) distinction between 
implicit and explicit CSR  – were offered as explanations.  
Interestingly, the addition of perception variables recast the results. Table 6.7 shows that with 
an adjusted R2 of 0.2831 (compared to an adjusted R2 of 0.1925 in Chapter 5), the regression 
gains in explanatory power without losing its significance (p< 0.001). As shown in Table 6.7, 
the variables Country of Origin and Economic Performance are no longer significant. The 
only significant variable is Importance of CSR (p<0.001) with a coefficient of 0.376. This 
indicates that HR managers’ perception that CSR is important triggers or reinforces a 
company’s involvement in CSR practices. Put differently, the more employees believe CSR is 
important, the more CSR actions are carried out in the area of the environment and charity 
giving. This result provides support to Hypothesis 4.  
 
The variable ‘Importance of CSR’ only reflects the priority given to CSR; it does not say 
anything about the reasons for that importance. This result should therefore be interpreted in 
the light of what is really happening. Chapter 4 established the greater involvement of UK 
companies towards the environment and charity giving compared to France. At the same 
time, the UK has one of the worst environmental records in Europe, corporate scandals have 
increased and inequalities between the richest 1% and the rest are also deepening (Augar; Bell 
and Van Reenen, 2010; Piketty, 2013; Farrell, 2016). In the light of explicit CSR and green-
washing, companies, above all UK companies, do need CSR to improve or build an image of 
responsibility. Companies have to demonstrate their actions to their stakeholders, whether 
these actions are real and effective or not. It could even be argued that CSR is used by 
companies as a way to justify the continuation of capitalism. By being responsible at the 
margin with some charity donations, with some actions towards the environment, companies 
can justify the more irresponsible behaviours they may have in other areas. CSR is important 
not so much to improve the bottom line but to allow companies business as usual.  
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Table 6.7 Regression results for philanthropic and environmental CSR 
 
Philanthropic/Environmental 
CSR t-value 
Country of origin (0 = UK; 1 = France) -0.2000345 -1.56 
Industry -0.0051211 -0.43 
Number of domestic competitors -0.0196224 -0.77 
Economic Performance 0.1396607 1.36 
Economic performance compared to competitors 0.1518095 1.03 
Importance of CSR 0.3760829*** 3.81 
Constant 1.549126 2.96 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.2831   
F 11.43   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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6.3.3.4 CSR towards the local community 
 
Like philanthropic and environmental CSR, it may be assumed that the local community 
aspect of CSR is reinforced by positive perceptions of CSR. The regression results in Table 
6.8 provide support to Hypothesis 7. Overall, the regression is significant at a significance 
level of 0.001 with an adjusted R2 of 0.2838, showing better results compared to those 
reported in the previous chapter. Company size and Economic Performance remain 
significant explanatory variables in comparable weight as previously.  
 
The variable ‘CSR conducted for the business case’ had to be dropped due to its 
insignificance. This combined with the non-significance of the variable ‘Positive impact on 
business’, indicates that the local community aspect of CSR is not believed to be 
economically beneficial to the company. Therefore, only the economic performance of a 
company combined with the belief that CSR is important explains the company’s 
involvement.  
 
The variable Importance of CSR must be added to the list of significant explanatory variables. 
In an area where CSR activities are far away from the core business activities, the perception 
that CSR is important increases corporate involvement. Once again, the meaning of 
‘important’ should be considered carefully. It might be questioned whether this is not a 
strategy to improve corporate image despite the proliferation of irresponsible behaviours by 
companies. One aspect to improve the local community for instance is to pay taxes so they 
can then be redistributed to the local communities through various projects. Over recent 
years, for example, reports have increased in the media claiming that some multinational 
companies are not paying their taxes in the UK. How is that compatible with the importance 
of CSR? It is argued, similarly to the environmental and charity component of CSR, that CSR 
is important not to improve the bottom line but for companies to continue their actions. CSR 
is a justifying tool. In that respect, from the findings of this study, French employees appear 
not to be fooled by the reality of CSR.  
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Table 6.8 Regression results for local community CSR 
 
Local community CSR t-value 
Country of origin (0 = UK; 1 = France) -0.1278516 -1.00 
Size of the company -0.0621647* -2.30 
Age of the company 0.0958 1.34 
Industry   -0.0063953 -0.60 
Economic Performance 0.4026719*** 4.34 
Positive impact on business  0 .138064 1.26 
Importance of CSR 0.1895258* 1.89 
Constant 1.220132 * 5.34 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.2838   
F 11.64   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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6.3.3.5 CSR towards suppliers 
 
The final component of CSR deals with the relations with suppliers. As shown in Table 6.9, 
the regression results are improved by the addition of perception measures. The adjusted R2 is 
0.3172 compared to 0.2774 before.  These results provide support for Hypothesis 6. In 
addition, two perception variables are significant: Negative impact of CSR on employees and 
Importance of CSR. The sign of the former is negative meaning that CSR involvement is 
lower when CSR is believed to have a greater negative impact on employees. It should be 
noted that the variable Country of origin loses its significance, contrary to the previous 
chapter. The variables Size of the company and Economic Performance remain highly 
significant (p<0.001) with similar coefficients.  
These differences can be understood as a confirmation of the conclusions of Chapter 5 on the 
supplier component of CSR. The UK does not present a better treatment of suppliers in the 
supply chain. CSR activities come with the belief that CSR does not have negative 
consequences on employees and a belief of its importance. In that area, the country of origin 
no longer plays a part. It is down to the individuals. 
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Table 6.9 Regression results for suppliers CSR 
 
Suppliers CSR t-value 
Country of origin (0= UK; 1 = France) -0.1799166 -1.50 
Size of the company -0.0913037*** -4.73 
Industry -0.0132235 -1.20 
Number of domestic competitors -0.0569217 -1.53 
Number of international competitors 0.0241922 1.49 
Economic Performance 0.2917055*** 4.93 
Negative impact of CSR on employees -0.1310921* -2.00 
Importance of CSR   0.1851024* 2.24 
Constant 3.483409 *** 8.74 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.3172   
F 13.26   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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6.4 Limitations 
 
This chapter comes with several limitations regarding the analysis of the of HR managers’ perceptions 
of CSR. The first one relates to how knowledgeable employees, in this case HR managers, are of both 
CSR and their company CSR policy. Previous studies (Sen, Bhattacharya and Korschun, 2006) 
deplored the low level of employees’ awareness in the area of CSR. This observation applies to both 
sub-samples where UK respondents are familiar with CSR with an average of 2.95 and French 
respondents with an average of 2.2. CSR familiarity appears to be lower among French respondents.  
This low level might be explained by the CSR notion itself. CSR is an unclear concept in the 
academic literature, in spite of numerous efforts to provide greater clarity. It is, therefore, no surprise 
that definitional uncertainty and confusion exist also in the business world, where CSR definition 
varies from company to company. The implicit-explicit distinction (Matten and Moon, 2008) is also 
helpful to explain this low level of familiarity. The French sample displays the lowest level of CSR 
awareness. Yet, France, part of continental Europe, is more implicit in its way of doing CSR. It has 
been argued that France relies a lot on the state to legislate including in CSR areas (Berthoin Antal 
and Sobczak, 2007). This less vocal state-centred tradition might explain why respondents may not 
necessarily label activities as CSR as such. On the other hand, the low level of CSR familiarity among 
the UK sample points to another explanation. The explicit use of CSR by companies as a marketing, 
PR tool may not be communicated to the rest of the company. CSR actions are the monopoly of the 
CSR department or marketing department and are directed towards external stakeholders, rather than 
internal ones. CSR actions that may turn out to be only words with companies exceling at talking the 
talk rather than walking the walk. 
 
Due to its exploratory nature, these preliminary results need to be complemented with further 
research. Given the nature of the study and its constraints, respondents are HR managers.  It would be 
beneficial to replicate the study with a survey of the rank and file, and to compare and contrast views 
of HR managers with those of the workforce at large.  
 
It would also be beneficial to carry out interviews to provide employees with the time and space to 
elaborate on their perceptions of CSR. The survey data offers helpful insights in the categorisation of 
CSR perceptions, though they might be limited because of the very nature of the survey method. In 
particular, the social desirability bias might have influenced respondents. When respondents are asked 
about the reasons why their company engages in CSR, it is socially more acceptable to underline an 
ethical motivation rather than a business-oriented one. 
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Finally, this chapter finds a correlation between CSR perceptions and CSR actions. However, it could 
not provide explanations on the mechanisms between CSR perceptions and CSR actions. Further 
research would be required to determine the extent to which the former impacts the latter.  
 
6.5 Summary 
 
This chapter adds a final layer to the empirical analysis of the determinants of CSR practices between 
France and the UK. It offers valuable insight into the way CSR is seen by HR managers in its ability 
to change the bottom line. It also explores the role played by HR managers perceptions in the area of 
CSR. The literature has under-researched the impact of employee perceptions of CSR on corporate 
involvement in CSR. The literature has so far examined the alternative by which employees are 
influenced by CSR. This chapter offers preliminary explanations in order to begin to fill this gap in 
relation to one category of employees: HR managers. This chapter presents new findings in relation to 
differences in the way employees view CSR and its outcomes.  
 
The main and essential finding of this chapter indicates that HR managers in France and the UK have 
different perceptions of the role and rationale of CSR. The French respondents have a more positive 
view of the outcomes of CSR, but they are more cynical when it comes to its rationale. Respondents 
from the French sample consider that CSR is carried out to improve the reputation of a company, 
whereas the British respondents put forward an ethical motivation. French HR managers regard CSR 
as a potentially positive tool, but they are not fooled by the CSR spiel. UK HR managers on the other 
hand are not that convinced by the impact of CSR despite believing in benign managers and 
companies. Their position is all the more surprising. It is asserted that the self-deprivation theory 
(Davis, 1959; Crosby, 1976) can help clarify this position and predicts the negative perception of CSR 
outcomes.  
 
The second finding demonstrates that the determinants of CSR are better captured once measures of 
CSR perceptions are incorporated into the regressions. With no surprises, the role of these perceptions 
varies with the component of CSR under study, in accordance with the observations made in Chapter 
5. When CSR as a whole is studied, the perception that it is conducted for the business case provides 
another explanation to the level of CSR activities. When the components of CSR are disclosed, the 
perception that CSR is important explains CSR in its philanthropy/environment component, local 
community component and supplier component.  
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This finding is particularly interesting and telling. CSR is important, not to improve the bottom line, 
but for companies to buy a license to operate. This need is increased in a CSR explicit environment 
such as the UK. It can be argued that CSR has become an excuse for companies to continue business 
as usual. CSR is a legitimation tool for capitalism in an era of unbridled globalism, corporate 
scandals, and rising inequalities. Following Boltanski and Chiapello’s thesis (1999), capitalism is 
always looking for excuses to justify itself against critics. Each consecutive spirit of capitalism has 
successfully relied on a different justification. One might wonder whether CSR is the new one found 
to sustain capitalism.  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that respondents to the survey, i.e HR managers, are honest with their 
perceptions of CSR. They are ready to criticise the way their company behave in the CSR space and 
show limitations to CSR actions. In itself, it is an important finding. Respondents’ honesty could 
suggest that HR managers and companies behind them do not really care about CSR. If they do, 
respondents would try to depict a more positive picture.  
 
Finally, this chapter laments that employees’ knowledge of CSR is still low, which casts more doubt 
on the real involvement of companies in CSR, behind the smoke-screen of PR campaigns. This is true 
for both France and the UK. This finding questions the communication of CSR policies within 
companies. Companies spend a great deal of money on PR campaigns and marketing to build an 
image of a responsible company. This image is directed towards their shareholders and external 
stakeholders such as customers, public organisations, media and NGOs.  In the process, companies 
may have forgotten to inform their own employees of their activities, unless there is nothing to tell 
them, in particular regarding explicit CSR.  
 
The next chapter will offer a summary of this study and its findings as well as identifying further 
avenues for research.  
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This study presents a comparison of CSR practices from a comparative capitalism perspective. This 
work is embedded in an uncompromising account of capitalism and the global supremacy of neo-
liberal capitalism that has been accompanied with a high share of corporate scandals, rising 
inequalities and environmental catastrophes. Over the last decades, the notion of CSR has reached its 
peak of attention. Academics and professionals have scrutinised companies in order to define and 
understand the concept and its outcomes. However, there seems to be a growing disconnect between 
the reality of capitalism, corporate practices on the one hand and companies’ claims of being more 
responsible and sustainable on the other. This raises several questions, such as: are companies really 
engaging in CSR? Are they becoming more responsible and sustainable? This study has attempted to 
investigate the reality of CSR practices.  
This study examined two countries, France and the UK, and the way companies in these countries are 
doing CSR. By investigating CSR practices in these two countries, the aim is also to provide greater 
understanding of the antecedents of CSR. What matters most in triggering CSR practices: national 
institutions or company characteristics?  
 
This study answered the following research questions: 
• What types of CSR practices do we observe in French and UK companies? Are they different 
or do we observe a homogenisation of CSR practices? 
• What is the impact of key institutional features on CSR practices? Do they differ between 
France and the UK? 
• What is the impact of key companies’ characteristics on CSR practices? Do they differ 
between France and the UK?  
 
In order to respond to these questions, the study developed a research model presented in Figure 7.1. 
The impact of the institutional environment, companies’ characteristics and HR managers’ 
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perceptions was statistically tested to quantity their relative impact on the general measure of CSR as 
well as on its compulsory, philanthropic/environmental, suppliers and local community components. 
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Figure 7.1 Research model 
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This chapter summarises first the main findings presented in each chapter. It then continues 
with the presentation of the limits of the study and its practical implications. The chapter 
concludes with suggestions of avenues for future research.  
 
7.2 The study’s findings 
 
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 located this research at the junction of two wide 
strands of literature: the comparative capitalism literature and the comparative CSR literature. 
This research has neither aimed at providing a new theory of variety of capitalism nor 
offering a new definition of CSR. Its aims were to better understand the reality of CSR 
practices and their causes in two different types of capitalism. The comparative capitalism 
literature, in particular, VoC and the regulation approach, helped situating France and the UK 
on the spectrum of capitalism models. The UK belongs without much doubt to the category of 
LME (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Vitols, 2001). France is a more complex case, making this 
study even more interesting. The debate continues as to whether France should be classified 
as a CME, LME-to-be or a type of its own (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2003, 2012; 
Goyer, 2006; Goyer and Jung, 2011). One aspect the literature agrees on is the unusual 
abiding role of the French state despite evolutions in its role (Hancke, Rhodes and Thatcher, 
2007; Schmidt, 2003, 2012). The current system seems to be an opportunistic combination of 
state interventionism and neo-liberalism where the former is part of France’s political-cultural 
heritage and the latter a requirement of globalisation.  
Regardless of the absence of a definite answer, the comparative capitalism literature made it 
obvious that France and the UK are intrinsically different in their model and spirit of 
capitalism. This divergence bears necessary consequences when it comes to CSR; 
consequences that were underlined and explained in this research project. 
 
The notion of CSR itself is a complex one whose definition remains unclear and debated. In 
other words, CSR is still in the making. There are dozens of definitions of CSR, I decided to 
retain the one proposed by Matten and Moon: ‘CSR (and its synonyms) empirically consists of 
clearly articulated and communicated policies and practices of corporations that reflect 
business responsibility for some of the wider societal good’ (Matten and Moon, 2008, p. 405). 
This definition is general enough to cover every aspect of CSR activities, and therefore does 
not limit the study of CSR in any way. It also highlights the communication aspect of CSR, 
one that is highly essential to the concept of CSR. 
The comparative CSR literature, in spite of its disparity, has established a connection between 
variety of capitalism and forms of CSR, the most important one being the distinction between 
implicit and explicit CSR (Matten and Moon, 2008). This literature also questions the role of 
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CSR with regard to national institutions: is it a mirror or a complement to existing 
institutional arrangements (Matten and Moon, 2008; Kinderman, 2009; Jackson and 
Apostolakou, 2010)? The literature is divided on the connection between national institutions 
and development of CSR. This study provides enlightening inputs on these two central 
aspects surrounding CSR: the implicit/explicit distinction and the substitute/mirror 
connection.   
 
Chapter 2 also reviews the possible impact of company characteristics on CSR and shows that 
the literature has found that company size, financial success, industry and corporate 
governance have an impact on CSR.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a detailed account of the research methods. To conduct this study, data 
was necessary to examine both the national and company level. For this reason, secondary 
data was collected to characterise the main UK and French national institutions. A self-
administered survey was undertaken in order to collect primary data in France and the UK. 
Based on the existing literature, I collated several variables in order to measure French and 
UK national institutions. The first variable relates to the legal origin as developed by La Porta 
et al.(2008) where the UK has a Common Law origin whereas France comes from a Civil 
Law tradition. The proportionality index created by Pagano and Volpin’s (2005) is also used 
because they prove the existence of a connection between the electoral system and employee 
rights (a central element in the study of CSR). The Worldwide Governance indicators 
compiled by the World Bank are relied upon to describe differences in political governance in 
France and the UK. Finally, indications of economic regulations are provided by the economy 
wide product-market regulation (PMR) dataset constructed by the OECD.  
 
In parallel, a survey in French and in English was undertaken to gather primary data. The aim 
of this survey was twofold: collect company data with regard in particular to size, industry, 
financial success and to obtain information on CSR practices. This survey was informed by 
existing ones but does not replicate them, making this study original. It was sent to HR 
managers, identified as the person in a company who should know most about corporate 
practices in relation to employees, the environment and CSR practices in general. The data 
collection led to a general sample of 162 respondents with 95 French respondents and 57 UK 
respondents. This chapter ended with descriptive statistics of the sample regarding the 
professional experience of the respondents, size and age of the companies in the sample, the 
industry, ownership characteristics and the number of national and international competitors.  
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Chapter 4 examined the CSR practices in France and the UK, with a descriptive account of 
CSR practices in both countries. Its aim was to determine whether French and UK companies 
actually present variations in CSR practices, the starting hypothesis of this study. These 
differences can be of two kinds: nature of the practices and degree of involvement. Based on 
two-sample t-tests, the analysis considered CSR practices towards direct stakeholders 
(employees, shareholders, customers and suppliers) and indirect stakeholders (the 
environment, charities and the local community).  
The results were particularly interesting on several accounts. Firstly, the findings were 
unexpected in the way French and UK companies deal with CSR. In terms of direct 
stakeholders, UK companies treat their employees better than French ones, which contradicts 
the VoC literature and empirical research on the UK and French employment relations (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Goergen et al., 2013; Meardi, 2014). UK companies also display a greater 
involvement towards their shareholders compared to French companies. This result is 
expected based on the fact that the UK is a typical LME experiencing a high degree of 
neoliberal capitalism. France on the other hand is less involved due to its unique model of 
capitalism, questioning the adoption by French companies of LME characteristics in terms of 
corporate governance. 
Regarding indirect stakeholders, another surprising finding relates to the greater involvement 
of UK companies in the environment, which is in contradiction with the existing literature 
and empirical accounts of the UK environmental record compared to other European 
countries. The local community receives generally less attention by companies, even though 
UK companies give more to charities than French ones.  
The preliminary analysis supported the existence of genuine differences in CSR involvement 
between France and the UK, answering the first research question. It showed that UK 
companies are more active in CSR and pointed to the validity of the CSR substitute 
hypothesis  (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). In other words, CSR would act as a substitute 
to national institutions and therefore would be more significant in LME countries such as the 
UK. If that explanation is verified, it would suggest that the French variety of capitalism is 
not a LME-to-be when it comes to CSR practices.  
 
Chapter 5 went a step further in the study by focusing on the antecedents of CSR at the 
national and company level. For that purpose, an exploratory factor analysis was first carried 
out to reduce the data and limit risks of statistical and conceptual overlap. Then OLS 
regressions were conducted to examine the relationships between CSR practices on one hand 
(measured by the factors) and a country variable (dummy variable) and company variables on 
the other. The first insightful finding is that CSR cannot be considered as a homogeneous 
entity. Indeed, the exploratory factor analysis showed that CSR is composed of a compulsory 
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aspect, a supplier aspect, a local community aspect and an environmental/philanthropic 
aspect. A general measure of CSR was also created as the mean of each factor in order to 
provide a global indicator of CSR. Each component of CSR was then regressed against 
national institution variables as well as company characteristics variables. Regressing each 
component of CSR against national and company characteristics variables prove that CSR 
responds to various incentives and pressures. These findings call for a nuanced view of CSR, 
which is not just the result of a variety of capitalism or a combination of company 
characteristics. CSR is the subtle result of combinations of national and company level factors 
depending on the aspect under scrutiny.  
 
In greater detail, the analysis demonstrated that the global level of CSR depends on the 
country of origin, company size and the economic performance of companies. These results 
validate hypothesis 1a where CSR is viewed as a complement to national institutions. 
Companies in the UK are more involved with CSR than those in France, confirming the initial 
results presented in Chapter 4. 
 
Second, the results of regression analysis significantly found that each CSR component 
responds differently to national institutions and companies’ characteristics. In other words, 
the antecedents of CSR vary depending on the CSR component at stake.  This is a notable 
finding as the comparative CSR literature considers CSR as a homogeneous entity. CSR is 
therefore a subtle combination of national and company level factors and cannot be reduced 
to the mere role of a substitute to LME institutions. CSR is a substitute for national 
institutions and is stronger where neoliberal capitalism is stronger. But it is not just a 
substitute. Companies’ characteristics play a part in the involvement with CSR, in particular 
the economic success of companies. In the case of compulsory CSR, it is correlated to 
company size (though negatively correlated), the number of international competitors and the 
economic performance of the company itself, and in comparison to its competitors. For 
philanthropic and environmental CSR, the country of origin and the company’s economic 
performance are the antecedents. The local community component of CSR sees company size 
and economic performance as explanatory variables. Lastly, the supplier aspect of CSR is 
determined by the country of origin, company size and economic performance. 
In conclusion, no matter which CSR component is studied, only size, economic performance 
and the number of competitors are significant company level variables. The industry variable 
is not explanatory here, neither is company age or the ownership structure of the company. 
Table 7.2 below summarises the findings of Chapter 5. 
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Table 7.2 Chapter 5 - Findings 
Chapter 5 - Hypotheses Chapter 5 - Findings 
CSR is greater in the UK than in France as suggested 
by the substitute theory of CSR. 
 
- Supported for general CSR 
- Supported for 
philanthropic/environmental CSR 
- Supported for suppliers CSR 
 
CSR is greater in France than in the UK as suggested 
by the complement/mirror theory of CSR. 
 
Not supported 
Size has a direct positive impact on company’s 
involvement with CSR activities based on a linear 
relation between size and CSR. The larger a company 
is, the more involved it will be with CSR activities. 
 
- Supported for general CSR. 
- Supported for compulsory CSR 
- but negative relationship 
- Supported for local community 
CSR- but negative relationship 
- Supported for suppliers CSR - 
but negative relationship 
Size does not have an effect on CSR as small, 
medium or large companies present specific 
characteristics allowing their involvement in CSR. 
Size is not an explanatory factor of CSR involvement. 
 
Not supported 
The greater the impact of a particular industry, the 
more a company will be involved with CSR activities. 
 
Not supported 
Company age has a direct positive impact on CSR 
involvement. The older a company gets, the more 
involved it will be with CSR activities. 
 
Not supported 
The economic performance of a company has a direct 
positive effect on CSR involvement. 
 
- Supported for general CSR 
- Supported for compulsory CSR 
- Supported for 
philanthropic/environmental CSR 
- Supported for local community 
CSR 
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Chapter 5 - Hypotheses Chapter 5 - Findings 
- Supported for suppliers CSR 
The greater the number of competitors the more a 
company will be involved with CSR activities. 
 
Supported for compulsory CSR 
 
 
Chapter 6 concludes the empirical analysis by concentrating on the lowest level of analysis, 
namely the employees. The investigation places the focus on a specific group of employees, 
HR managers, to determine whether they have any role in relation to CSR. The first line of 
enquiry was how HR managers perceive CSR and the extent to which they believe it can 
improve performance. Are these perceptions different between France and the UK? Then, 
given the differences in CSR perceptions the second line of enquiry related to the way in 
which these perceptions may shape CSR activities.  
It was argued that the way HR managers see the role of CSR is embedded in four broader 
issues, central to the debate on CSR: the role of the corporation within society; implicit versus 
explicit CSR; internal versus external CSR; and employee rights. In short, two opposite 
hypotheses on CSR perceptions were formulated. Either the trust and latitude UK companies 
enjoy support the hypothesis of a better perception of CSR by UK HR managers. The unique 
conception of the business and society nexus in France is detrimental to a positive perception 
of CSR. Or it was conversely argued that the implicit/explicit theory combined with employee 
rights work in favour of a better perception of CSR by French HR managers. Implicit CSR in 
France limits the risks of green-washing. Better worker rights compared to the UK is likely to 
improve workers’ judgement on the internal aspect of CSR.  
 
Regarding the second line of enquiry, Chapter 6 investigates a connection between HR 
managers and CSR absent from the existing literature. It was contended that positive 
perceptions of CSR create positive attitudes and associations propelling employees to act as 
another driver of CSR activities.  
 
Similar to the observed differences in CSR activities between France and the UK, perceptions 
are dissimilar. The data permitted distinction between two types of perceptions: perception of 
the role of CSR (i.e. improvement or not of the bottom line) and perception of the rationale 
behind CSR (i.e. why do companies engage in CSR?). Once again, a clear opposition between 
France and the UK emerges. While UK companies are more involved with CSR, HR 
managers do not trust CSR to improve the bottom line. Conversely, French HR managers 
have a more positive view of the outcomes of CSR: it improves performance. Regarding CSR 
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rationale, French HR managers believe CSR is firstly adopted to improve the reputation of the 
company, whereas UK HR managers underline an ethical motivation. These findings are 
revealing. They show that UK workers are more likely to be convinced as to the genuine 
motivations of their employers, but less likely believe anything positive will result from it. 
French workers do not hold that management are well meaning, but what they do will 
nevertheless result in positive outcomes. This finding reveals, on a deeper level, a climate of 
little hope in the UK, with a small likelihood of change.  
 
In order to evaluate the impact of perceptions on the level of CSR activities, five new 
composite variables were created: positive impact of CSR on employees; negative impact of 
CSR on employees; positive impact of CSR on business; CSR conducted for business case; 
and importance of CSR. The relation between CSR perceptions and CSR activities is tested 
through OLS regression analysis using the same CSR indicators presented in Chapter 5. Aside 
from the compulsory component of CSR, the OLS regressions demonstrated that a positive 
perception of CSR has a direct positive impact on every other component of CSR.  The 
determinants of CSR are better captured once the three levels of analysis are combined, that is 
the national level, company level and individual level. Table 7.3 summarises the findings of 
Chapter 6.  
 
Chapter 6 pinpoints an essential aspect of CSR, which is the role of communication (i.e. in 
reference to explicit CSR). Put differently, it directly asks whether CSR is purely a smoke-
screen to convince people that companies are not behaving that badly and capitalism is still 
on track in a general climate of distrust in corporations and politics.  
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Table 7.3 Chapter 6 - Findings 
Chapter 6 - Hypotheses Chapter 6 - Findings 
French UK managers have different perceptions of 
CSR than UK HR managers. 
 
Supported 
UK HR managers have a better perception of CSR 
than French HR managers (based on the role of 
business). 
 
Not supported 
French HR managers have a better perception of CSR 
than UK HR managers (based on the implicit CSR 
theory combined with employee rights). 
 
Supported 
A positive perception of CSR has a direct positive 
impact on a company’s general level of CSR 
practices. 
 
Supported 
A positive perception of CSR has no impact on a 
company’s compulsory component of CSR. 
 
Not supported 
A positive perception of CSR has a direct positive 
impact on a company’s philanthropic and 
environmental CSR. 
 
Supported 
A positive perception of CSR has a direct positive 
impact on a company’s CSR component towards the 
local community. 
 
Supported 
A positive perception of CSR has a direct positive 
impact on a company’s CSR component towards 
suppliers. 
 
Supported 
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7.3 Contributions of the study 
 
This study of the CSR practices between France and the UK unveils two opposing views of 
CSR, reflecting a broader and deeper distinction in the way these countries view the role of 
business and society. On one hand, the UK, an LME where neoliberal capitalism is more 
advanced, shows a prima facie greater involvement in CSR, or at least what employees 
believe. Nevertheless, and quite surprisingly, these very same employees do not view CSR as 
able to improve the bottom line. Such scepticism indicates a belief that CSR is not useful to 
improve the situation of direct and indirect stakeholders. Given the implicit/explicit 
distinction (Matten and Moon, 2008), it was contended that UK companies are very vocal, 
explicit on their CSR actions, but not necessarily truly active, bearing in mind for instance the 
poor working conditions and environmental record. Put differently, the findings on the UK 
side confirms the idea that it is easy to talk about CSR, to create a public image of responsible 
companies, but the corresponding actions do not necessarily follow. UK companies are not 
walking the CSR walk. The UK position on CSR explains as well why UK HR managers 
think that CSR is conducted by companies for ethical motivations. The real and legitimate 
CSR can only come from the goodness of companies’ hearts, testifying of a traditional faith in 
businesses to do the job correctly. 
 
On the other hand, French companies are seemingly less involved with CSR. The implicit 
tradition makes it subtler, less visible and vocal. Companies do not advertise their actions as 
much as UK companies, in particular when for them it is a mere question of abiding by the 
law (for instance in the case of employee working conditions). It does not mean that French 
employees are wary of CSR. They have confidence in its ability to improve the bottom line, 
not out of goodness but because it enhances the company’s image. It most likely comes from 
the French tradition where the state is believed more trustworthy than businesses to change 
things, and in particular to protect its citizens against the negative consequences of capitalism.  
 
This study shows that CSR has still a way to go if it wants to be effective and have a real 
impact on stakeholders. The findings of this research are situated in line with the general 
negative conception of CSR, where it is accused of green-washing, of being a smoke-screen. 
CSR is stronger in the UK, a country where neoliberalism is strongest. However, it does not 
properly fulfil its role of substituting the national institutions; the consequences of neoliberal 
capitalism are still visible and far-reaching in spite of this greater involvement with CSR. As 
a result, it is claimed that unless the spirit of business is changed, for instance by installing 
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responsibility at its core (Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008), CSR does not have the power and the 
ability to mitigate the negative effects of neoliberal capitalism (Bullis and IE, 2007). 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. It is a unique cross-country 
analysis of CSR practices and CSR antecedents between France and the UK. It is based on a 
quantitative multi-level analysis of CSR antecedents, combining the impact of national 
institutions, companies’ characteristics and HR managers perceptions. Comparative CSR 
tends to study CSR antecedents one level at a time. This study fills in this gap by providing a 
global picture of CSR antecedents based on an original survey administered to companies in 
both the UK and France. This study is therefore not just another theoretical account of CSR 
antecedents and practices, but an original empirical examination. 
 
Furthermore, much of the comparative CSR literature is highly theoretical when it comes to 
assessing the impact of national institutions on CSR practices. This study offers a relatively 
unique empirical study of CSR practices as observed by employees in France and the UK. 
The analysis of CSR practices in France makes it even more valuable. The comparative CSR 
literature is mainly an Anglo-Saxon literature highly centred on the US. This study offers a 
novel study and comparison between an Anglo-Saxon country and an understudied one - 
France. The choice of France makes it even more worthy because of its unique model of 
capitalism. This uniqueness has an impact on the way business is understood and theorised as 
well as on the way CSR is performed.  
 
Regarding the determinants of CSR perceptions, this study provides a novel explanation by 
connecting negative perceptions of the effects of CSR and self-deprivation theory (Davis, 
1959; Crosby, 1976). It is argued that self-deprivation can be a predictor of CSR perceptions 
by extinguishing any glimpse of hope. 
 
Finally, the results help better understanding of the French model of capitalism by providing 
new evidence. Even though the purpose of the study was not to redefine the French variety of 
capitalism, it gives additional insights. The differences in the antecedents and perceptions of 
CSR demonstrate that France behaves differently than the UK, a typical LME. France is 
rather an opportunistic combination of moderate neo-liberalism and state interventionism. 
This finding is interesting regarding the characterisation of France within the comparative 
capitalism literature. Chapter 2 showed how the French variety of capitalism is hard to 
classify. It also underlined major reforms France went through. Despite these LME-oriented 
reforms, this study highlights that the French model retains clear features that are not LME. 
France cannot be characterised as an LME. This finding suggests that institutions are 
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somewhat resilient regardless of reforms. It can also show that reforms in one area may 
coexist with the strengthening of an institutional feature in another area. It also indicates that 
institutions are not as closely coupled as the comparative capitalism literature commonly 
argues (Lane and Wood, 2009). In addition, when the French model is explored, there is a 
tendency in the literature to focus on the differences with other countries and ideal-types, and 
specifically the role of the state (Schmidt, 2003, 2012, Clift, 2004a, 2012a, 2012b; Howarth, 
2013). Contrary to this common trend, this study envisages both the formal and informal 
aspects of regulation. By considering both corporate and individual behaviours, this study 
demonstrates that embedded behaviours persist irrespective of changes in formal regulations. 
 
7. 4 Limitations of the study 
 
As with all studies, this study is subject to some limitations. The first limitation is with the 
data collected. Chapter 3 describes the data collected, a combination of primary and 
secondary data, and the difficulties faced regarding the collection of the former. The objective 
of the study was to describe and unveil patterns in CSR practices between companies in 
France and the UK. As a consequence, the survey asked very specific questions that could not 
be answered by using pre-existing datasets. I therefore had to collect data on my own with 
limited resources. Initially, a traditional collection method was tried with the administration 
of a web survey directed at HR managers. Even though  Dillman’s (2009, 2016) method was 
followed, the response rate was low, jeopardizing the study. An alternative solution was 
found in the use of an online panel. The main question about the use of online panels 
concerns the reliability and quality of the data. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the literature is 
divided on that issue, but does not provide enough evidence supporting the lower quality of 
online panel data compared to data obtained from traditional surveys. On the contrary, the use 
of online panels provides an alternative solution to the increasing non-response rates to 
surveys, which is a problem for academic and governmental studies.  Ultimately, the use of an 
online panel guaranteed the feasibility of the study, with a final sample of 162 respondents, 
large enough to carry out the statistical analysis. This study remains valuable in that it 
detected clear patterns of CSR behaviours between France and the UK. 
 
The second limitation relates to the quantitative analysis itself. In the regression analysis in 
Chapters 5 and 6, it was not possible to single out the effect of each national institution. 
National institutional variables are by definition highly correlated. In this study, they turned 
out to be perfectly correlated. Having tried to experiment with different institutional variables 
and alternative statistical methods (i.e., a hierarchical linear model), the regressions 
systematically faced multicollinearity issues due to the presence of only two sub-samples: 
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France and the UK. This led Stata to interpret the institutional variables as dummy variables. 
Due to their perfect correlation, Stata dropped all but one, the country of origin. However, the 
correlations between each aspect of CSR and the institutional variables reveal the existence of 
a relation between them. These correlations tended to support the substitute theory of CSR 
where CSR is stronger in a LME, compared to less liberal economies.  
 
 
Finally, the study remains silent on the reverse impact of CSR practices on companies and 
national institutions. This possible impact was acknowledged in the study’s conceptual 
framework, Figure 7.1, with the dotted arrows. This line of enquiry was beyond the limits of 
this study but would be worth exploring nevertheless.  
 
 
7.5 Practical implications 
 
This study has practical implications for policy makers and practitioners. One of the findings 
shows that CSR cannot be treated as a whole. Four components have been established: the 
compulsory aspect of CSR, the philanthropy/environment aspect, the local community aspect 
and the supplier aspect. As exhibited in Chapter 5, each component of CSR responds to 
different factors. In the case of the environment and mitigating the effects of global warming 
for instance, CSR depends highly on the economic success of the company. If policy makers 
want a greater involvement with the environment aspect, they cannot let companies decide 
freely when to act. Most likely, tighter regulations with strong compliance mechanisms need 
to be put in place by the state.  
 
Another practical aspect brought to light by this study is the rather low knowledge of 
employees about CSR. This absence of clear knowledge, beyond green-washing, beyond 
companies’ public relation campaigns, raises concern. Policy makers, and most importantly 
practitioners, need to invest time and effort to explain CSR to their employees for CSR to be 
effective. Otherwise, it will remain, at least for UK employees, a mere smokescreen. 
Employees are not just employees, they are also customers, members of the local community, 
potentially members of NGOs or charities.  
 
7. 6 Avenues for future research 
 
The study focuses on two countries only, France and the UK. CSR is a highly cultural and 
state-dependent concept, so the findings may not be generalizable. Consequently, it would be 
	
 
214	
valuable to undertake similar CSR research in other country contexts, either by including a 
CME type country or by investigating similar questions in developing countries, where the 
literature on CSR is still nascent.  
 
Secondly, CSR perceptions have not been given much attention so far. Most prior studies 
relate to customers and whether the image of a responsible company helps to attract and 
retain customers. In relation to employees, only the attraction and retention roles of CSR are 
investigated. Understanding the way CSR perceptions arise and their effects is essential in the 
development and success of CSR. Employees are central to the implementation of CSR. This 
study offers some preliminary insights on the way employees view the role of CSR and CSR 
rationale. Further research is needed to fully capture how CSR is perceived by employees and 
the causes for such perceptions. If employees believe in the role of CSR, they can be the 
driving force of CSR efficiency by pressuring companies to become more responsible.  
 
There is need in the CSR literature to develop measures to quantify better the outcomes of 
CSR. Chapter 6 provided some insights on CSR outcomes and how they are perceived by 
workers. Despite the obvious difficulty of developing measurement tools, it would be highly 
beneficial to CSR research. It would also help in monitoring companies’ actions and claims in 
this area. 
 
 
Finally, another avenue for research comes from one of the limitations of this study. In the 
evaluation of the impact of varieties of capitalism on CSR, the sample size made it difficult to 
pinpoint the exact role of each category of national institutions. Further studies could fill that 
gap by singling out the impact of national institutions on CSR. In particular, they could 
include more countries in the sample, thus avoiding the dummy trap and multicollinearity 
issues. 
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APPENDIX 1 
- 
COVER LETTER 
AND QUESTIONNAIRE IN FRENCH 
 
 
 
LETTRE 
 
 
Cher répondant, 
 
Je mène un projet de recherche sur les pratiques d’entreprise en matière de 
management en Angleterre et en France. Pour m’aider dans ma recherche, j’aimerais 
vous inviter à compléter le questionnaire en ligne suivant sur les pratiques de votre 
entreprise en matière de management. Ce projet de recherche est entrepris dans le 
cadre de mon doctorat à Warwick Business School, Université de Warwick 
(Angleterre).  
 
Votre participation à ce questionnaire est purement volontaire. Vous pouvez refuser 
d’y participer ou y mettre un terme à tout moment sans aucune sanction. Vous êtes 
libre de refuser de répondre à toute question à laquelle vous ne souhaitez pas 
répondre, quel que soit le motif.  
 
Les réponses à ce sondage seront envoyées par un lien sur Quatrics.com où les 
données seront conservées et protégées au format électronique par un mot de passe. 
Qualtrics ne collecte pas d’informations permettant de vous identifier telles que noms, 
adresse email. Par conséquent, vos réponses resteront anonymes. Personne ne pourra 
vous identifier vous ou vos réponses, personne ne saura si vous avez ou non participé 
à cette étude. Aucun nom ou information permettant de vous identifier ne sera inclus 
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dans des publications ou présentations portant sur ces données, et vos réponses à ce 
sondage resteront anonymes.  
 
Très peu de données ont été collectées de manière systématique sur les pratiques 
d’entreprise en matière de management. Les résultats de cette étude seront utiles non 
seulement pour des universitaires mais aussi pour des managers. Le questionnaire 
devrait prendre en moyenne 15 minutes. Vos réponses sont précieuses pour le succès 
de ce projet. A l’issue de l’analyse des données, je serai ravie de vous envoyer un 
résumé des conclusions.  
 
Merci d’avance pour votre coopération. 
 
Laure-Emmanuelle LEGUY 
	 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
I. Questions sur la société  
 
1. Nom de la société: … 
2. Quel est votre poste dans la société? Titre du poste: … 
3. Combien de personnes vous rendent directement compte ? Nombre … 
4. Quand avez-vous commencé à travailler pour la société? Année: … 
 
5. Selon la classification ci-dessous, quel est le principal secteur d’activité dans 
lequel votre entreprise opère ? 
(Cochez la case correspondante s’il vous plait) 
 
Industrie alimentaire/boisson [   ] 
Métallurgie [   ] 
Energie [   ] 
Industrie du bâtiment travaux publics [   ] 
Produits chimiques [   ] 
Industrie pharmaceutique et 
biotechnologie 
[   ] 
Informatique [   ] 
Télécommunications [   ] 
Fabrication d’équipements électriques  [   ] 
Automobiles et ses composants [   ] 
Aérospatial et Défense  [   ] 
Autre industrie manufacturière  [   ] 
Transport [   ] 
Distribution [   ] 
Voyage et loisirs [   ] 
Services financiers [   ] 
Autres services [   ] 
Autre (préciser s’il vous plait) …. 
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6. En quelle année a été créée votre entreprise? Année: … 
 
7. Combien de concurrents nationaux avez-vous? Nombre: … 
 
8. Combien de concurrents internationaux avez-vous? Nombre: …  
 
9. Qui est propriétaire de la société (i.e., l’actionnaire majoritaire)? (Cochez la case 
correspondante s’il vous plait) 
 
Fondateur et/ou membres de la famille [   ] 
Personne privée [   ] 
Managers [   ] 
Private Equity ou Venture Capital [   ] 
Joint-Venture [   ] 
Entreprise Multinationale [   ] 
Gouvernement [   ] 
Pas d’actionnaire majoritaire [   ] 
Autre (à préciser) … 
 
10. Si la société est détenue par le fondateur ou la famille : est-ce que le PDG est un 
membre de la famille ?  
□ Non       □ Oui 
 
11. Combien de salariés travaillent pour la société? Nombre: … 
 
12. Par rapport au nombre total d’employés, quel est le pourcentage de : 
Hommes: ...%   Femmes: …% 
 
13. En terme de répartition des âges des employés, quel est le pourcentage de :  
20-35 ans: …% 
36-50 ans: …% 
51- 65 ans: … % 
65 ans et plus: … % 
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14. Combien de femmes occupent actuellement des postes de managers ? 
Nombre: … 
  
15. Quel est le pourcentage de positions clefs détenues par des femmes ? …. % 
 
16.  Combien de femmes sont membres du conseil d’administration? Nombre: … 
 
17.  Quel est le pourcentage d’employés handicapés? … % 
 
18. Sur les 5 dernières années, combien d’employés ont été licenciés pour :  
 
Cause du licenciement Nombre d’employés licenciés  
Motif personnel … 
Faute … 
Licenciement économique  … 
  
 
19. Sur les 5 dernières années, quel a été en moyenne le taux de turnover des 
employés ? Taux: … 
 
 
II. Performance de la société  
 
1. Sur les 3 dernières années, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait de la 
performance de votre société en fonction des critères suivants ? (Entourer la 
réponse adéquate) 
1= Pas du tout satisfait; 2= Un peu satisfait; 3= Modérément satisfait; 4= Très 
satisfait; 5= Extrêmement satisfait 
 
Croissance des profits  1 2 3 4 5 
Croissance des ventes en volume 1 2 3 4 5 
Croissance de la part de marché 1 2 3 4 5 
Rentabilité des actifs après taxes 1 2 3 4 5 
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Rentabilité des ventes après taxes 1 2 3 4 5 
Ratio des ventes sur actifs 1 2 3 4 5 
Performance/succès général de la société  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
2. Sur les 3 dernières années, quelle est la performance de votre société par 
rapport à ces concurrents majeurs selon les critères suivants ? (Entourer la 
réponse adéquate) 
1= Vraiment pire; 2= Pire; 3= Equivalente; 4= Meilleure; 5= Vraiment meilleure 
 
Croissance des profits  1 2 3 4 5 
Croissance des ventes en volume 1 2 3 4 5 
Croissance de la part de marché  1 2 3 4 5 
Rentabilité des actifs après taxes 1 2 3 4 5 
Rentabilité des ventes après taxes 1 2 3 4 5 
Ratio des ventes sur actifs 1 2 3 4 5 
Performance/succès général de la société  1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
 
 
III. Pratiques de la société   
 
1. Indiquez s’il vous plait dans quelle mesure vous êtes ou non d’accord avec les 
affirmations suivantes. (Entourer la réponse adéquate) 
1= En désaccord complet; 2= en désaccord; 3= Ni en accord, ni en désaccord; 4= En 
accord; 5= En accord complet 
 
Notre société fournit à ses clients les informations 
nécessaires pour prendre de bonnes décisions d’achat 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société répond de manière satisfaisante aux plaintes 
de ses clients au sujet de ses produits ou services 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société intègre totalement les intérêts de ses clients 1 2 3 4 5 
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dans ses décisions 
Notre société traite ses fournisseurs équitablement, quel que 
soit leur taille ou emplacement 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société traite ses fournisseurs respectueusement, quel 
que soit leur taille ou emplacement  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société intègre totalement les intérêts de ses 
fournisseurs dans ses décisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société informe pleinement ses fournisseurs de toute 
décision organisationnelle ayant un impact sur ses décisions 
d’achat  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société soutient pleinement les employés souhaitant 
se former ou se développer davantage  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société a mis en place des programmes de formation 
et de développement pour ses employés 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société offre à ses employés une couverture de santé 
totale  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société traite ses employés équitablement quelque 
soit leur genre 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société traite ses employés équitablement quelque 
soit leur orientation sexuelle 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société traite ses employés équitablement quelque 
soit leur origine ethnique 
1 2 3 4 5 
Le bien-être des employés est très important pour notre 
société  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société aide ses employés à équilibrer vie 
professionnelle et vie privée 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société incorpore pleinement les intérêts de ses 
employés dans ses décisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société offre à ses employés des salaires rémunérant 
leur travail à sa juste valeur  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société offre à ses investisseurs des informations 
financières exhaustives sur la société  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société offre à ses investisseurs des informations 1 2 3 4 5 
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financières exactes sur la société 
Notre société incorpore pleinement les intérêts des 
investisseurs dans ses décisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société informe pleinement ses investisseurs de 
changements dans la direction de la société  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société incorpore pleinement dans ses décisions les 
intérêts de la communauté locale où elle opère 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société offre un soutien financier substantiel à 
l’éducation dans la communauté locale où elle opère 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société stimule considérablement le développement 
économique de la communauté locale où elle opère 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société améliore considérablement la qualité de vie 
de la communauté locale où elle opère 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société fait des donations conséquentes à des œuvres 
caritatives  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société offre un soutien financier substantiel à la 
culture et aux activités de loisirs dans la communauté locale 
où elle opère 
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société est parfaitement au courant de la législation 
en matière d’environnement  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société va volontairement et de manière substantielle 
au-delà de la législation en matière d’environnement  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société incorpore pleinement dans ses décisions les 
questions liées à l’environnement  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société incorpore pleinement des objectifs de 
performance environnementale dans le plan stratégique de 
la société  
1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société offre un soutien financier substantiel aux 
initiatives en matière d’environnement  
1 2 3 4 5 
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2. Dans la liste des formations ci-dessous, quelle est/sont celles mises en place 
par votre société ? Indiquer s’il vous plait le nombre de salariés y ayant 
participé (si applicable).  
 
Type de formation Mise en 
place 
OUI 
 
 
NON 
Nombre de 
participants 
Formation de sensibilisation des employés à la 
sécurité 
[   ] [   ] …. 
Formation de sensibilisation des employés aux 
questions de santé mentale 
[   ] [   ] …. 
Formation de sensibilisation des employés au bien-
être  
[   ] [   ] …. 
Formation des employés aux questions de diversité [   ] [   ] …. 
 
 
3. Si la société a financé des formations universitaires l’année dernière, combien 
d’employés en ont profité ? Nombre :  
 
 
 
 
 
4.  
La société finance t-elle les avantages 
suivants ?  
Cet avantage en 
matière de santé 
est-il légalement 
obligatoire? 
S’il n’est pas 
légalement 
obligatoire, est-il 
offert 
automatiquement ? 
Dentaire (inclut par exemple bilan, 
plombage, soins de nettoyage, radios et 
dentier) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
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Accident dentaire (résultat direct d’un 
impact accidentel) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Optique (inclut par exemple examen de la 
vue, lunettes, lentilles, réparations et 
chirurgie des yeux au laser) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Examen général de santé (pour prévenir 
toute maladie) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Consultation chez un médecin spécialiste 
(couvre les consultations pour diagnostique 
et examens) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Bien-être (Kinésithérapie/ Ostéopathie/ 
Chiropractie/ Acupuncture) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Traitements complémentaires 
(Homéopathie/Réflexologie/Aromathérapie) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Soins des pieds OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Hospitalisation  au-delà d’une journée 
(indemnité de nuit pour admission en 
hôpital ou clinique privée) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Hospitalisation de jour (indemnité de jour) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Séjour en hôpital pour un parent (Indemnité 
de nuit pour un parent accompagnant un 
enfant) 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Ordonnance prépayée OUI            OUI             NON 
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5.  Combien d’accidents du travail se sont produits l’année dernière ? Nombre: 
… 
 
6. Sur les 5 dernières années, dans quelle mesure votre société a été poursuivie 
pour les faits suivants ? Indiquer s’il vous plait le nombre de procès 
correspondant, si applicable.  
1= Jamais; 2= Rarement;3= Quelque fois 4= Souvent; 5= Très souvent   
  
Rupture illégale du contrat de travail 1 2 3 4 …. 
Harcèlement (verbal, physique, sexuel…) 1 2 3 4 …. 
Discrimination 1 2 3 4 …. 
 
 
7. Parmi les aménagements suivants, quels sont ceux offerts à vos employés ?  
Aménagement OUI NON 
Salle de sport [   ] [   ] 
Coiffeur [   ] [   ] 
Pressing [   ] [   ] 
Supermarché [   ] [   ] 
Garderie [   ] [   ] 
Autre ...  
 
8. Dans quelle mesure vos employés sont-ils autorisés à travailler depuis chez 
eux ? (Cocher la case correspondante) 
Pas du tout [   ] 
1 fois par semaine [   ] 
OUI            NON NON 
Réduction sur les spas, clubs de sport, 
vacances, parcs à thème, attractions  
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
Assurance couverture monde 
OUI            NON 
OUI            
NON 
OUI             NON 
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2 fois par semaine [   ] 
3 fois par semaine [   ] 
4 fois par semaine [   ] 
Tous les jours [   ] 
 
9. Au sein du nombre total d’heures de travail, les employés sont-ils autorisés à 
s’organiser de manière flexible ?  
o  Oui 
o Non 
 
10. Quelle est la proportion d’employés au SMIC ? ….% 
 
11. Combien d’employés ont été embauchés l’année dernière en CDI ?  
Nombre: … 
 
12.  Combien d’employés ont été embauchés l’année dernière en CDD ?  
Nombre: … 
 
13. Si votre société a l’année dernière financièrement soutenu la communauté 
locale en matière d’éducation, combien a t-elle donné ? Montant : … €  
14. Quel pourcentage des dépenses totales cela représente t-il ? … % 
 
15. Sur les 5 dernières années, votre société a t-elle participé aux activités 
suivantes pour stimuler le développement économique local ? (Cocher la ou 
les cases correspondantes) 
Recruter des personnes de la communauté 
locale  
[   ] 
Création de programmes de travail pour 
les jeunes  
[   ] 
Actions soutenant l’éducation [   ] 
Action soutenant la formation 
professionnelle  
[   ] 
Achats de produits locaux [   ] 
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Aucune [   ] 
 
16. Sur les 5 dernières années, votre société a t-elle participé aux activités 
suivantes pour améliorer la qualité de vie des communautés où elle opère ? 
(Cocher la ou les cases correspondantes) 
 
Encourager les employés à faire du 
bénévolat  
[   ] 
Création d’une association caritative [   ] 
Création de structure pour cibler des 
problèmes de santé  
[   ] 
Création ou participation à des 
programmes de traitement des déchets  
[   ] 
Création ou participation à des 
programmes  pour améliorer la sécurité 
des communautés  
[   ] 
Création ou participation à des 
programmes pour améliorer la propreté 
des communautés  
[   ] 
Création ou participation à des 
programmes pour améliorer l’égalité des 
chances  
[   ] 
Aucune [   ] 
 
17. Combien d’argent votre société a t-elle donné à des œuvres caritatives l’année 
dernière ? Montant : … € 
 
18. Si votre société a donné à des œuvres caritatives l ‘année dernière, quel 
pourcentage des dépenses totales cela représente t-il ? … % 
 
19. Combien d’argent votre société a t-elle donné l’année dernière à des activités 
culturelles et de loisirs (arts, culture, sports…etc.) ? … € 
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20.  Si votre société a donné l’année dernière à des activités culturelles et de 
loisirs (arts, culture, sports…etc.), quel pourcentage des dépenses totales cela 
représente t-il ? … % 
 
21. Dans quelle mesure votre société fait-elle les choses suivantes ? (Entourer la 
réponse adéquate) 
1= Pas du tout; 2= Un peu; 3= Raisonnablement; 4: De manière significative; 5= 
Complètement 
 
Mesurer les émissions de carbone 1 2 3 4 5 
Mesurer les déchets produits par la société  1 2 3 4 5 
Mesurer la performance environnementale 1 2 3 4 5 
Minimiser l’impact environnemental de ses activités  1 2 3 4 5 
 
22. Dans quelle mesure êtes vous familier avec le concept de Responsabilité 
Sociale d’Entreprise (RSE) ?  
o Jamais entendu parler de RSE 
o Vague idée de ce qu’est la RSE 
o Bonne idée de ce qu’est la RSE 
o Idée supérieure à la moyenne  
o Idée précise de ce qu’est la RSE 
 
23. Quel département dans votre société est en charge des questions de 
Responsabilité Sociale d’Entreprise (RSE) ? 
Nom du département :  
Pas de département en charge: 
 
24. Quel est le titre de la personne en charge des questions de RSE, s’il y en a 
une ?  
Titre du poste:  
Personne n’est responsable de la RSE: 
 
25. Les informations sur la RSE sont-elles publiées dans le rapport annuel ? 
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o Oui 
o Non 
 
26. Est-ce que votre société publie un rapport spécial sur la RSE (aussi appelé 
rapport social, ou rapport sur la RSE) ? 
o Oui 
o Non 
 
 
27. Dans quelle mesure êtes vous en accord ou désaccord avec les propositions 
suivantes ? (Entourer la réponse adéquate)  
1= En désaccord complet; 2= en désaccord; 3= Ni en accord, ni en désaccord; 4= en 
accord; 5= en accord complet 
 
Notre société est plus socialement responsable que ses concurrents 1 2 3 4 5 
Notre société devrait être plus responsable dans la conduite de ses 
activités  
1 2 3 4 5 
Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact positif sur la 
productivité de certains employés  
1 2 3 4 5 
Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact négatif sur la 
productivité de certains employés  
1 2 3 4 5 
Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact positif sur la 
conservation de certains employés  
1 2 3 4 5 
Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact négatif sur la 
conservation de certains employés 
1 2 3 4 5 
Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact positif sur la motivation 
de certains employés 
1 2 3 4 5 
Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact négatif sur la motivation 
de certains employés 
1 2 3 4 5 
Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact positif sur la 
performance financière de la société  
1 2 3 4 5 
Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact positif pour accéder à de 
nouveaux marchés  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact positif sur la 
conservation de certains clients 
1 2 3 4 5 
Etre une entreprise responsable a un impact négatif sur la 
conservation de certains clients 
1 2 3 4 5 
La Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE) est une question 
importante pour notre activité  
1 2 3 4 5 
La Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE) est une priorité 
pour notre activité 
1 2 3 4 5 
La Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE) commence au-delà  
des exigences de la loi  
1 2 3 4 5 
Les activités de RSE sont menées pour améliorer la réputation de la 
société  
1 2 3 4 5 
Les activités de RSE sont menées pour améliorer la performance 
financière de la société 
1 2 3 4 5 
Les activités de RSE sont menées car c’est la bonne chose à faire 1 2 3 4 5 
 
_____________________ 
 
 
 
Merci de votre participation. 
 
Si vous souhaitez une copie des résultats, veuillez s’il vous plait indiquer vos 
coordonnées: 
……… 
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APPENDIX 2 
-  
COVER LETTER  
AND QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENGLISH 
 
 
 
COVER LETTER 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
I am undertaking a research project on management practices in companies in the UK 
and France. To help in this research I would like to request that you complete the 
online survey of your company’s management practices. This is a research project I 
am undertaking as part of my doctoral studies at the University of Warwick Business 
School (United-Kingdom). 
 
Clearly, your participation in this survey is voluntary. You may refuse to take part in 
the research or exit the survey at any time without penalty. You are free to decline to 
answer any particular question you do not wish to answer for any reason. 
 
Your answers will be sent to a link at Qualtrics.com where data will be stored in a 
password protected electronic format. Qualtrics does not collect identifying 
information such as your name, email address, or IP address. Therefore, your 
responses will remain anonymous. No one will be able to identify you or your 
answers, and no one will know whether or not you participated in the study. No 
names or identifying information will be included in any publications or presentations 
based on these data, and your responses to this survey will remain confidential.  
 
Very little systematic data exist on management practices and it is intended the 
findings will be useful, not only to academics interested in this area, but also to 
practicing managers.  The questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes to 
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complete. Your answers will be very valuable to the research project. When the 
analysis is complete I will be pleased to send you a summary of the findings. 
 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
 
Yours faithfully 
Ms Laure-Emmanuelle Leguy 
 
	 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
I. Organisation questions 
 
20. Name of your company: … 
21. What is your position in your company? Job title: … 
22. How many people report directly to you? Number: … 
23. When did you start working for this company? Year: … 
 
24. Based on the following classification, what is the main industry your company 
operates within?  
(Please tick one box) 
 
Food/Beverage manufacturing [   ] 
Metals and Minerals [   ] 
Energy [   ] 
Construction [   ] 
Chemicals [   ] 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology [   ] 
IT [   ] 
Telecommunications [   ] 
Other Electrical [   ] 
Automobiles and Parts [   ] 
Aerospace and Defence [   ] 
Other Manufacturing [   ] 
Transport [   ] 
Distribution [   ] 
Travel and Leisure [   ] 
Financial services [   ] 
Other Services [   ] 
Other (please specify) …. 
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25. In what year was your company established? Year: … 
26. How many domestic competitors do you have? Number: … 
 
27. How many international competitors do you have? Number: …  
 
28. Who owns the firm (i.e. who is the largest shareholder)? (Please tick one box) 
 
Founder and/or Family Members [   ] 
Private individuals [   ] 
Managers [   ] 
Private Equity or Venture Capital [   ] 
Joint Venture [   ] 
Multinational Company [   ] 
Government [   ] 
No large shareholder [   ] 
Other (please specify) … 
 
29. If the founder or the family owns the firm: is a family member the CEO?  
□ No.       □ Yes. 
 
30. How many employees does your company employ? Number: … 
 
31. Of the total number of employees, what is the percentage of : 
Men: ...%  Women: …% 
 
32. In relation to the age distribution of the employees, what is the percentage of:  
20-35 years olds: …% 
36-50 years olds: …% 
51- 65 years olds: … % 
Over 65 years: … % 
 
33. How many women are currently in managerial positions? Number: … 
  
34. What is the percentage of key positions held by women? …. % 
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35.  How many women are members of the board? Number: … 
 
36.  What is the percentage of disabled employees? … % 
 
37. Over the last 5 years, how many employees were dismissed for:   
Cause of the dismissal Number of employees dismissed 
Poor individual performance … 
Misconduct … 
Redundancy (due to lack of demand for 
the product/service) 
 
… 
 
 
38. Over the last 5 years, on average what has been the employees’ turnover rate? 
Rate: …% 
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II. Performance of the company 
 
3. Over the last 3 years how satisfied are you with your company’s performance 
in terms of the following criteria? (Circle the relevant answer) 
1= Not at all satisfied; 2= Slightly satisfied; 3= Moderately satisfied; 4= Very 
satisfied; 5= Extremely satisfied 
 
 
Growth of profits  1 2 3 4 5 
Growth of sales volume 1 2 3 4 5 
Growth of market share 1 2 3 4 5 
After tax return on total assets 1 2 3 4 5 
After tax return on total sales 1 2 3 4 5 
Ratio of total sales to total assets 1 2 3 4 5 
Company’s overall performance/success 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
4. Over the last 3 years how has your company performed relative to its major 
competitors in terms of the following criteria? (Circle the relevant answer) 
1= Much worse; 2= Worse; 3= About the same; 4= Better; 5= Much better 
 
Growth of profits  1 2 3 4 5 
Growth of sales volume 1 2 3 4 5 
Growth of market share 1 2 3 4 5 
After tax return on total assets 1 2 3 4 5 
After tax return on total sales 1 2 3 4 5 
Ratio of total sales to total assets 1 2 3 4 5 
Company’s overall performance/success 1 2 3 4 5 
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III. Company practices  
 
28. Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following 
statements. (Circle the relevant answer) 
1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= Neither Agree nor Disagree; 4= Agree; 5= 
Strongly agree 
 
 
Our company fully provides our customers with the 
information needed to make sound purchasing decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company addresses satisfactorily the complaints 
received from customers about our products or services 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully incorporates the interests of our 
customers in our business decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company treats our suppliers, regardless of their size 
and location, fairly 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company treats our suppliers, regardless of their size 
and location, respectfully 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully incorporates the interests of our 
suppliers in our business decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully informs our suppliers about 
organisational changes affecting our purchasing decisions  
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully supports employees who want to pursue 
further training and development 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company has put in place many training and 
development programmes for employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company provides full health benefits for employees  1 2 3 4 5 
Our company treats employees fairly regardless of their 
gender 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company treats employees fairly regardless of their 
sexual orientation 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company treats employees fairly regardless of their 1 2 3 4 5 
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ethnic origin 
The well being of employees is very important for our 
company 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully helps employees to balance their private 
and working lives 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully incorporates the interests of employees 
in our business decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully provides employees with salaries that 
fairly reward them for their work 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company provides investors with full financial 
information about the organisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company provides investors with fully accurate 
financial information about the organisation  
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully incorporates the interests of investors in 
our business decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully informs investors of changes in 
corporate policy 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company fully incorporates the interests of the local 
community, where we operate, in our business decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company provides substantial financial support for 
education in the local community where we operate 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company substantially stimulates the economic 
development in the local community where we operate 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company substantially improves the quality of life in 
the local communities where we operate 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company makes substantial donations to charities 1 2 3 4 5 
Our company provides substantial financial support for 
cultural and leisure activities in the communities where we 
operate 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company is fully aware of regulations in regard to 
environmental impact 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company substantially voluntarily exceeds 
government-imposed environmental regulations 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Our company fully incorporates environmental concerns in 
its business decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company substantially incorporates environmental 
performance objectives in our company’s strategic plan 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company provides substantial financial support for 
environmental initiatives 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
29. From the types of training below, which ones have been implemented by your 
company? Please indicate the number of participants, if any. 
 
Type of training Implemented 
YES 
 
NO 
Number of 
participants 
Employee safety awareness training [   ] [   ] …. 
Employee mental health awareness training [   ] [   ] …. 
Employee well-being awareness training [   ] [   ] …. 
Employee diversity training [   ] [   ] …. 
 
 
30. If your company financed employees’ university degrees last year, how many 
employees did this benefit? Number: … 
 
31.  
Does your company provide 
financial assistance for the 
following benefits? 
Please circle either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 
 Is this health 
benefit legally 
binding? 
If not binding, 
is this health 
benefit 
automatically 
offered? 
Dental (includes for instance check 
ups, fillings, hygienist fees, x-rays 
and dentures) 
YES           
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Dental accident (as a direct result 
of accidental impact) 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
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32.  How many workplace accidents occurred last year in your company?  
Number: … 
 
Optical (includes for instance eye 
tests, glasses, contact lenses, 
repairs and laser eye surgery) 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Health screening (in order to 
prevent illness) 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Specialist consultation (covers 
diagnostic consultations and tests) 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Wellbeing (Physiotherapy/ 
Osteopathy/ Chiropractic/ 
Acupuncture) 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Complementary Therapies 
(Homeopathy/Reflexology/Aromat
herapy) 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Chiropody YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Hospital in Patient (nightly 
allowance for any NHS or private 
hospital admission) 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Day case (daily allowance) YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Hospital Parental Stay (Nightly 
allowance for one parent 
accompanying a child) 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Paid-for prescriptions 
 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Saving on spas, gyms, holidays, 
theme parks, attractions 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
Worldwide insurance cover 
 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
YES             
NO 
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33. Over the last 5 years, has your company been sued for any of the following 
charges? Please indicate the number of lawsuits if applicable. 
1= No; 2= Yes 
  
     Number 
Unlawful termination of employment contract 1   2  …. 
Harassment (e.g. verbal, physical, sexual…)  1   2  …. 
Discrimination 1   2   …. 
 
 
34.  Which among the following corporate facilities are available to your 
employees?  
Facility YES NO 
Gym [   ] [   ] 
Hairdresser [   ] [   ] 
Drycleaner [   ] [   ] 
Supermarket [   ] [   ] 
Nursery [   ] [   ] 
Other [   ] [   ] 
 
35. To what extent are your employees allowed to work from home? (Tick the 
relevant box) 
Not at all [   ] 
1 day per week [   ] 
2 days per week  [   ] 
3 days per week [   ] 
4 days per week [   ] 
Everyday  [   ] 
 
36. Within the total number of working hours, are the employees able to work 
flexible hours? 
o  Yes 
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o No 
 
37.  What is the proportion of employees receiving the minimum legal wage? 
….% 
 
38.  How many employees did your company hire last year on permanent 
contracts? Number: … 
 
39.  How many employees did your company hire last year on fixed-term 
contracts? Number: … 
 
40. If your company financially supported education in the local community last 
year, how much did it give? Amount: … £ 
 
41. What percentage of last year’s expenses does that represent? … % 
 
42. Over the past 5 years, has your company participated in any of the following 
activities to stimulate local economic development? (Please tick the relevant 
box(es) ) 
Hiring people from the local community [   ] 
Creation of work programmes for young people [   ] 
Actions supporting general education [   ] 
Actions supporting job training [   ] 
Purchasing products from local suppliers [   ] 
None of the above [   ] 
 
43. Over the past 5 years, has your company participated in any of the following 
activities to improve the quality of life of the communities in which it 
operates? (Please tick the relevant box(es) ) 
 
Encouraged employees to volunteer in charities [   ] 
Creation of a charity [   ] 
Building facilities to target health issues [   ] 
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Creation or involvement in waste treatment programmes [   ] 
Creation or involvement in programmes to improve the safety of 
communities 
[   ] 
Creation or involvement in programmes to improve the cleanliness of 
communities 
[   ] 
Creation or involvement in programmes to improve equality of opportunity [   ] 
None of the above [   ] 
 
44. How much money did your company give to charities last year? Amount: … £ 
 
45. If your company gave money to charities last year, what percentage of last 
year’s expenses does that represent? … % 
 
46. How much money did your company give to support leisure and cultural 
activities (arts, culture, sports, etc.) last year? … £ 
 
47.  If your company financially supported leisure and cultural activities (arts, 
culture, sports, etc.), what percentage of last year’s expenses does that 
represent? … % 
 
48. To what extent does your company do the following? (Circle the relevant 
answer) 
1= Not at all; 2= A little; 3= A fair amount; 4: A great amount; 5= Totally 
Measure its carbon emissions 1 2 3 4 5 
Measure the waste produced by the company 1 2 3 4 5 
Measure its environmental performance 1 2 3 4 5 
Minimise the environmental impact of its activities 1 2 3 4 5 
 
49. How familiar are you with the notion of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR)?  
o Never heard of CSR 
o Vague idea of what CSR is 
o Fair idea of what CSR is 
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o Above average idea of what CSR is 
o Precise idea of what CSR is 
 
50. Which department in your company has oversight of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) matters?  
Department name:  
No department has responsibility: 
 
51. What is the job title of the person in charge of CSR matters in your company, 
if any?   
Job title:  
No one is in charge of CSR: 
 
52. Is information in relation to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) published 
in the company’s annual financial report? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
53. Does your company publish a stand-alone Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) report (also called a social report, or a social responsibility report)?  
o Yes 
o No 
 
54. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
(Circle the relevant answer)  
1= Strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3= Neither Agree Nor Disagree; 4= Agree; 5= 
Strongly agree 
 
Our company is more socially responsible than its competitors 1 2 3 4 5 
Our company should be more responsible in its way of doing 
business 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being a responsible company has a positive impact on the 
productivity of some employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Being a responsible company has a negative impact on the 
productivity of some employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being a responsible company has a positive impact on the retention 
of some employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being a responsible company has a negative impact on the retention 
of some employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being a responsible company has a positive impact on the 
motivation of some employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being a responsible company has a negative impact on the 
motivation of some employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being a responsible company has a positive impact on your 
company’s financial performance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being a responsible company has a positive impact to access new 
markets 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being a responsible company has a positive impact on the retention 
of some customers 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being a responsible company has a negative impact on the retention 
of some customers 
1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an important matter for 
our business 
1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a priority for our business 1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) starts beyond the 
requirements of the law 
1 2 3 4 5 
CSR activities are conducted to improve the reputation of our 
company  
1 2 3 4 5 
CSR activities are conducted to improve the financial performance 
of our company 
1 2 3 4 5 
CSR activities are conducted because it is the right thing to do 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
___________ 
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Thank you for your participation. 
 
If you would like a copy of the findings,  
please provide your contact details: 
……
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APPENDIX 3 
-  
SUPPLEMENTARY REGRESSION TABLES  
 
 
 
 
	
 
269	
 
 
Table A 1. Regression results for general measure of CSR 
 
General measure of CSR  t-value 
National institutions -1.057088* -2.22 
Size of the company -0.0493669** -2.41 
Age of the company 0.0608547 1.09 
Industry -0.0105011 -1.10 
Number of domestic competitors (log) -0.0471368 -1.60 
Number of international competitors (log) 0.0183002 1.76 
Economic performance 0.2041518** 2.89 
Economic performance compared to competitors 0.2232156* 2.25 
Constant 3.743024*** 5.50 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.3108   
F 11.60   
N 162   
Prob> F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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Table A 2. Regression results for compulsory CSR 
 
Compulsory CSR t-value 
National institutions -0.6987631 -1.34 
Size of the company -0.0437266* -1.92 
Age of the company 0.0747347 1.13 
Industry -0.0009504 -0.09 
Number of domestic competitors -0.0403613 -1.32 
Number of international competitors 0.0282205** 2.49 
Economic performance 0.1925324** 2.69 
Economic performance compared to competitors 0.2463841* 2.33 
Constant 3.267252*** 4.24 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.2573   
F 7.52   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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Table A 3. Regression results for philanthropic/environmental CSR 
 
Philanthropic/Environmental 
CSR t-value 
National institutions -1.643019** -2.54 
Industry -0.0155258 -1.33 
Number of domestic competitors -0.0427558 -1.54 
Economic performance 0.2285409* 2.23 
Economic performance compared to competitors 0.1887686 1.28 
Constant 4.304999*** 4.81 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.1925   
F 8.75   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
** Results significant at a significance level of p <0.01 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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Table A 4. Regression results for local community CSR 
 
Local community CSR t-value 
National institutions -0.7445261 -1.18 
Size of the company -0.0603781* -2.17 
Age of the company 0.0832467 1.14 
Industry -0.0158212 -1.44 
Economic performance 0.5134026*** 6.23 
Constant 2.875359*** 3.26 
Adjusted R squared 0.2262   
F 12.27   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
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Table A 5. Regression results for suppliers CSR 
 
Suppliers CSR t-value 
National institutions -1.123256* -1.94 
Size of the company -0.0816477*** -4.14 
Industry -0.0128243 -1.24 
Number of domestic competitors -0.0656459 -1.68 
Number of international competitors 0.0271905 1.72 
Economic Performance 0.3154664*** 5.81 
Constant 4.778739*** 6.45 
      
Adjusted R squared 0.2774   
F 14.30   
N 162   
Prob > F 0   
Notes: 
* Results significant at a significance level of p <0.05 
*** Results significant at a significance level of p < 0.001 
 
 
